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MANAGING THE BAY AREA'S 
ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPERIMENT 




lmdtute of Gonmmear.U Studies 
The San Francisco Bay Area is mid-stream in a compli-
cated process of planning for environmental protection 
and considering the consequent sociai and economic 
impactS. Paradoxically, the effort's principal hope for 
success seems to rest on its complexity and its heroic 
scale. Fuelled by federal funds, the coHaboration brings 
together representatives of most of the governmental 
bodies in the 9-county region who are concerned with 
environmental matters.. as well as citizen participants 
representing ''the pubiic. ·• The Bay Area's leadership is 
in effect trying cooperation and innovative methods· to 
accomplish effective environmental planning and pian 
implementation. 
Earlier planning efforts and growing environmental 
awareness emphasized the many interconnections among 
problems. Thus it became clear that environmental 
quality depends on factors like land use and population 
distribution; design and location of housing, industries 
and businesses; and transportation methods and 
movements. Also crucially important are preservation or 
loss of nonintensive .. natural .. uses such as agriculture; 
regional parks and open spaces; hills, mountains and 
forests; and the Bay itself. · 
Confronted with these justifications for comprehensive 
plans, the region's response was halting. The Association 
of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)* tried its hand at 
overall planning but lacked power to implement. Each of 
the Bay Area's special purpose agencies had imple-
menting power, but only for its own function and area. 
The very names of major regional bodies emphasized 
their functional scope and related limits:' Bay Area Air 
Vol. 18, No.2 Apri11977 
Pollution Control District; San Francisco Bay Regional 
Water Quality Control Board: Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Commission (MTC); and the San Francisco Bay 
Conservation and Develooment Commission (BCDC). 
Improved regional Iitachinery for comprehensive 
environmental planning was sought many times in 
Sacramento. So far, legislative efforts at such structural 
reform have not succeeded. The most prominent 
examples are the succession of regional "Knox bills" for 
the Bay Area (introduced in the California Legislature by 
Assemblyman John A. Knox of Richmond). The most 
recent Knox proposal would have established a single 9-
county comprehensive regional agency for environmental 
planning and policy implementation. Despite their 
failure. these regional bills received substantial support 
from the Bay Area leadership and several seemed on the 
verge of passage. Although the measures fell short of 
enactment there is growing agreement that federal-state-
regional environmental. social and economic objectives 
cannot be reached by ad hoc devices alone. In fact. some 
observers see separate, single-purpose agencies as com-
pounding difficulties by generating a second levei of 
problems related to policy coordination and imple-
mentation. 
Seeing the failure of the Knox bills. Bay Area leaders 
explored other avenues. Meanwhile, state and federal 
initiatives have encouraged and required new methods of 
managing environmental problems. One of the most 
significant for Bay Area planning is the federal "208 .. 
program, made possible by new federal policies. 
Recent Federal Laws: New Approaches 
Growing public concern has brought greater sophis-
tication in the federal government's approach to environ-
mental protection. Thus several federal laws have sought 
stronger environmental controls. especiaily the two most 
important statutes. the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
and the Federal Water Pollution Controi Act Amend-
• Severa! of the acronyms most frequently used are listed at the end of 
the paper. 
ments of 1972.2 Moreover, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 required a wide range of 
impact studies and statements on major projects 
affecting the environment. As for solid waste manage-
ment. the progressive name changes of federal laws also 
reflected new approaches: from simple waste disposal 
(the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965), to recycling (the 
Resource Recovery Act of 1970), to more general conser-
vation of materials otherwise lost in solid waste (the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976). 
Under these and other acts, the national goals -
ending water degradation by 1983 and providing cleaner 
air as .. expeditiously .. as possible (an interpretation of 
the 1977 deadline)- required the use of more stringent 
regulation and higher standards for pollutants 
discharged into the nation's air and water. For example, 
earlier water pollution control laws were weakened by 
using receiving water ("ambient" water) standards for 
enforcement, rather than discharge standards.3 Since 
ambient standards specify a permissible quality level for 
an entire body of water, it is hard to link violations to the 
discharges of any one polluter. 
Accordingly, the following are now required: 
(1) controls over the quality of liquid wastes and 
polluted water discharged from point sources (e.g., 
municipal and industrial treatment plants) as well as 
nonpoint sources of water pollution (e.g., runoff from 
farms and city streets), the principal focus of Sec. 208 
planning; and 
(2) control of air pollutants at the places they are 
emitted (emission controls), and consideration of indirect 
sources of air pollution (e.g., land uses such as highways, 
shopping centers and other facilities that attract mobile 
sources of pollntion). 
The Feralenl "208" Prop-am: A Brief <neniew 
In short, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
AmendmentS of 1972 provided an integrated program 
that gave the federal government major regulatory 
authority to control water pollution, a function 
previously considered the principal responsibility of state 
and local governments. Sec. 208 was by far the legis-
lation's most important planning provision. Its purpose 
was to develop programs and harness resources needed 
to achieve a major water quality goal, i.e., "fishable and 
swimmable" water by 1983. It also required the use of 
land-use controls and other regulations in limiting pollu-
tion from point and nonpoint sources. Finally, 208 called 
for broad regional analysis of pollution problems, 
especially the study of future growth and its implications 
for water quality. 
Other important sections included, for example, Sec. 
201, which mandated planning, economic and 
engineering studies for construction of waste treatment 
facilities. Sec. 303 provided for (a) basinwide planning 
(covering a large area, e.g., a river basin drained by a 
river and its tributaries), and (b) water quality control, 
including regulating the quality of discharged waste-
water. Sec. 402 required a permit system for wastewater 
discharge. 
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The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
issued guidelines and regulations to help the states select 
areas whose water quality problems were most likely to 
require Sec. 208 planning. In 1975, when California's 
Governor named the State Water Resources Control 
Board to administer the 208 program. the board con-
ducted hearings and, with the concurrence of the EPA, 
selected the Bay Area as one of seven California regions 
to receive priority attention. The choice was based on 
several considerations: the Bay Area's concentrations of 
population and industry and conditions adversely 
affecting water quality as shown, for example, in polluted 
shellfish beds in the relatively shallow South Bay. 
Further, there was evidence of major problems in solid 
waste management. Moreover the region had previously 
been designated an air quality maintenance area (one 
with critical pollution levels). 
The state water board also named the Association of 
Bay Area Governments, a 9-county Council of Govern-
ments, as the "208 planning agency," i.e., the body 
responsible for carrying out the provisions of Sec. 208. 
The EPA then granted $4.3 million directly to ABAG, 
which established an Environmental Management Task 
Force (EMTF) currently composed of 45 members 
including elected local officials and representatives of the 
public and special interest groups (discussed below). 
The program's timetable calls for seven plans, for: 
surface runoff; industrial discharges; municipal facili-
ties; miscellaneous sources; water conservation, reuse 
and supply; air quality; and solid waste management, all 
to be ready by August 1977. This version will be a dis-
cussion document, a preliminary Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP). In the Bay Area, air quality is 
tied to 208 water quality planning, and EMTFs goal is 
also to reach and maintain federal and state air quality 
standards "as expeditiously as practicable." 
Accordingly, a management structure must be designed 
that will be capable of on-going planning and 
implementation. 
As they push the plans along, officials are reminded 
that all 208 funds are to be used "not to make a study or 
report but rather to develop" an environmental manage-
ment system "integrated with all Bay Area regional and 
local planning programs."• Clearly, such a directive 
implies a high level of cooperation among local. regional. 
state and federal agencies, and willingness to negotiate. 
The following discussion briefly treats some earlier 
planning efforts related to Bay Area concerns, and 
summarizes the roles of local governments, ABAG, and 
the state and federal governments in the Bay Area's 
environmental protection. The focus. then turns to 
ABAG's Environmental Management Task Force, 
reviewing regional planning efforts in the interest of air 
and water quality and solid waste management. Finally, 
the discussion attempts to provide both an interim 
assessment and possible guideposts for future evalua-
tions. 
Lessons from the Past and 
Evolution of New Efforts 
In the past half century the San Francisco Bay Area 
has seen the establishment of many agencies in response 
to environmental problems, but these single-purpose 
efforts suffered from uneven performance, as well as 
jurisdictional and functional limitations. Creation of 
single-purpose agencies has continued, but policymakers 
have also considered proposals for more comprehensive 
regional environmental governance, as noted earlier. 
Some would have had substantial powers, including 
regional land use controls, but none became law. 
The 208 effort, seen as an alternative to the regional 
bills that failed, evokes serious questions such as these: 
If we are going to come out of this 208 process with 
a different set of rules for land-use decisions .. . 
won't someone or something have to change? ... If 
we just rearrange the same old pieces of the govern-
mental puzzle, will it make a new and better 
picture?5 
Despite some misgivings about implementation, there 
is substantial agreement that the three major Bay Area 
problems in the EMP assignment - air and water 
quality and solid waste management - must be 
addressed together and that those problems have been 
intensified by the absence of common policy. Time con-
straints will force the EMP to focus first on technical, 
short-run preventive measures, designed to arrest and 
reverse harmful practices. Further in the future lie such 
considerations as major new regional policies for land 
use and transportation. Meanwhile, the EMP goal is to 
win conditional approval for an on-going planning and 
implementing mechanism. 
As EPA regional administrator Paul De Falco, Jr. 
commented: 
... the existing water quality institutions ... are 
taking pollution control as far as technology will 
carry it. But the problems that remain require 
programs that involve major public policy choices 
regarding life style. land use. resource use and 
conservation, growth and tax base. and equity in 
the distribution of benefits and costs . ... 
[emphasis supplied]8 
De Falco further noted that: 
... the Clean Air Act requires land use and trans-
portation controls to reduce growth in auto 
emissions to ... maintain ... air quality standards. 
It has become clear~ . . that in some of our major 
metropolitan areas. such as Los Angeles or the Bay 
Area, the long term solutions to the air quality 
problem must be solutions to the area's land use 
and mass transit problems . ... [emphasis suppliedJ7 
Consequently, implementation of the EMP may focus 
on both immediate and future improvement of water and 
air quality and solid waste management through back-up 
measures. These relate to controls by other agencies, and 
take into account the implications of land use and trans-
portation. Note that air quality is included in the Bay 
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Area's 208 program because the EPA regional adminis-
tration's interpretation held that such inclusion would 
help promote integrated planning in the region. 
Federal Initiative and Local Responsibility 
While much of the Bay Area program's impetus comes 
from federal policy and funds, "208" is regarded 
primarily as a state and regional program requiring coor-
dination among levels of government, the "critical 
element being local government and the people and 
interests it represents."8 Implementation at all govern-
mental levels is stressed, but major responsibility is 
assigned to local and regional bodies. To involve local 
citizens and governments, ABAG is allocating nearly $1 
million in "pass through" 208 funds for local prepara-
tion of surface runoff plans, review of policies on land 
development, and efforts to stimulate citizen partici-
pation. 
With respect to the regional approach, George Hagevik 
ofthe ABAG staff, noi:ed that the authors of the Federal 
Water ?ollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 sought 
to foster comprehensive regional agencies that could 
implement 208 mandates; but their intent was not 
realized. As for the possibility of creating a compre-
hensive regional agency in the Bay Area empowered to 
implement the EMP, Hayward Mayor Ilene Weinreb, 
chairperson of an ABAG policy committee. commented 
that the "Bay Area might be ready for such a move" after 
the 208 process is complete. She thought cities, counties 
and special districts probably would not "give up powers 
unless forced to do so," and suggested that agency 
leadership and ABAG staff meet to "look into ways to 
combine separate permit procedures" and adminis-
tration.~ 
Dianne Feinstein. a San Francisco County Supervisor 
who chairs the EMTF, acknowledged that environmental 
decisions are political choices - tradeoffs - made by 
locally elected officials working together. She stressed the 
politics of plan implementation, and described local 
regional responsibility as the willingness to take appro-
priate actions to solve environmental problems.' 0 
Focns on Three Critical Problems 
Under the federal water pollution laws, · EMTF 
planning will attack significant problems of air and 
water quality and solid waste management. Examples of 
water quality problems as outlined in a 1976 ABAG 
report include: (1) polluted Bay Delta outflows including 
contaminated agricultural drainage; (2) polluted runoff 
and overflows from sewage treatment plants that 
endanger water supplies; (3) significant annual fish kills; 
and (4) contamination in parts of the Bay, requiring bans 
on harvesting of shellfish.' 1 
The ABAG report also outlined critical air quality 
problems, including such interrelated matters as 
(1) failure to meet air quality standards, especially in the 
Livermore and Santa Clara valleys (where federal and 
state standards were exceeded at least 90 days in 1975); 
(2) pollution from stationary sources such as service 
stations; and (3) other motor-vehicle related pollution. 
In addition, the report described the Bay Area's solid 
waste management problems including: (1) more than 10 
million tons of unsightly, environmentally disrupting 
wastes produced annually in the region. with most 
current sites likely to be filled within less than 10 years; 
(2) pollution caused by disposal sites located near ground 
and surface waters; and (3) Jack of regional management 
programs for disposing of hazardous and toxic wastes. ' 2 
ABAG's Selection for the 208 Assignment 
ABAG was formed in 1961 to bring together cities and 
counties on a voluntary basis to deal with mutual 
problems. Since 1964 it has engaged in regional planning 
studies supported principally by federal funds under a 
variety of programs. This effort resulted in ABAG's 
existing Regional Plan, a policy guide for 17 different 
functions related to the region's environmental. social 
and economic well-being.13 
A combination of desirable structure and effective 
performance gave ABAG visibility as a likely candidate 
for the 208 planning job. First. most 208 agencies nation-
wide are Councils of Governments (COGs). Further. like 
other COGs, ABAG had federal authority for the A-95 
grant review. covering local governments' applications 
for nearly 200 federal aid programs. ABAG had made 
vigorous use of its discretionary review powers. particu-
larly with respect to wastewater developments (sewage 
connections). Finally. ABAG had worked effectively 
against an ill-advised Las Positas "new town" proposal 
in smog-prone Livermore Valley. 
When the rime came to establish the scope of 208 
planning and designate the 208 agency. the State Water 
Resources Control Board at first appeared reluctant to 
select ABAG. In anv event it soueht to limit 208 olannine 
to two relatively tiny sub-areas: Richardson Bay in Mann 
County, and the Livermore Valley in Alameda County. 
When the EPA pressed for~ larger scale. 208 planning 
was expanded to include virtually the entire drainage 
basin of San Francisco Bay. and the state water board 
agreed to ABAG's designation. Thereupon most of the 9 
Bay Area counties passed resolutions of intent and all 
signed contracts to participate with ABAG in the 208 
effort. 
EPA's Special Interest in the 
Bay Area's Program 
EPA had designated one hundred and seventy-six Sec. 
208 programs nationwide by February 1977.'" but in 
some ways the Bay Area program is unique. For 
example. Harry Seraydarian. 208 project officer for EPA 
Region IX including the Bay Area. noted that: 
Many agencies began before ABAG. and the 
earliest 208 plans concentrated ·largely on point 
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sources of water pollution. The institutional 
analyses conducted for these studies were often 
rather mediocre. whereas financial analyses were 
sometimes more innovative .... [these] agencies 
which began work in advance of ABAG are not 
really ahead in concept. and ... may need to look at 
ABAG's work instead.11• 
He suggested that several other combinations of charac-
teristics were "not found in any other 208 program." 
including the degree of local governments' involvement. 
the complexity of the 9-county governmental network. 
the considerable industrial development ringing the Bay. 
the area's interest in comprehensive approaches. and the 
primary emphasis on implementation. ' 6 
According to Seraydarian. the older 208 programs 
(funded in 1974) and the Lake Tahoe 208 program 
(funded in 1975) lacked adequate money and had only 
interim guiding regulations. Further. tight schedules 
forced the use of consultants instead of regular staff. 
limited program and planning efforts. and worked 
against continuity. 
The Bay Area 208 program. funded in 1975. benefited 
from a subsequent court-ordered release of 208 funds 
nationwide. Along with other financing. 208 monies had 
been impounded by the Nixon administration. The 1972 
act also intended that plans for location of local waste 
treatment facilities under Sec. 201 proceed simul-
taneously with Sec. 208 and consider its land use 
planning implications. But all except two of the area's 
current 201 projects are already located and exempt from 
EMTF's initial 208 planning. All future 201 projects. 
however. must be included in the EMP. and approval of 
future federal grants for construction of treatment 
facilities is contingent on their conformity with the 208 
plan. 17 
Court action also mandated a final completion date of 
November 1978 for the Bay Area's and all other 208 
plans in the country. Fmally. the court required EPA to 
issue improved regulations and policy statements: these 
were made available to 208 projects by November 1975.18 
Organizing ABAG's Environmental Management 
TaskForce 
In September 1975. the Air Resources Board 
established a 9-countv Air Quality Maintenance 
Planning Task Force to' provide assistance in meeting 
court-ordered federal clean air requirements. The 
following January. ABAG modeled the 208 Environ-
mental Management Task Force on the air quality group 
and included most of its membership. Headed by Super· 
visors Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco and John 
Tuteur of Napa. EMTF's membership of 45 includes 
city and county elected officials' 9 and representatives of 
business. labor (especially the building trades). ethnic 
minorities. agriculture and civic and environmental 
groups. 
Seven regional agencies are also represented: the Bay 
Area Air Pollution Control District, the Central and the 
North Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation 
Commissions, the Metropolitan Transportation Commis-
sion, the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality 
Control Board, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission and the East Bay Municipal 
Utility District. In addition, one person represents the 
Sub-Regional and Local Advisory Committee for the San 
Francisco Bay Area Wastewater Solids Study Group- a 
joint powers agency preparing a residuals (sludge) 
management plan for sewage dischargers. 
In pursuing its work, the task force has established 
several technical advisory committees as well as four 
principal subcommittees for (1) work program and 
budget, (2) plan implementation, (3) assessment pro-
cedures (to look into social, economic and environmental 
effects of carrying out the EMP) and (4) public partici-
pation. As noted earli!!!'· it was suggested that ABAG 
look into ways to combine the administration of regional 
agencies. In a small first step, an interagency manage-
ment committee was established - with management 
personnel from ABAG, MTC and the Bay Area Air 
Pollution Control District - to meet every two weeks to 
review progress on the air plannjng element. 
The 208 Environmental Management Plan 
An EMTF staff report outlined the status of the 
Environmental Management Plan as of January 1977: 
Surface Runoff: Contracts have been signed 
with ... [Bay Area] counties to prepare surface 
runoff plans .... Pass-through grants from ABAG 
will fund the planning effort and public participa-
jion. 
Air Quality Maintenance Plan: A base year of 1975 
has been selected for air quality data input and 
LIRAQ [Livermore Regional Air Quality Model, 
designed by the University of California's Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory] will be used as the prime 
computer model for developing this plan. 
Solid Waste Planning: County solid waste plans 
have been reviewed. . . as the basis for the solid 
waste portion of the EMP. An attempt will be made 
to integrate the State Solid Waste Board's study 
[Bay Area Solid Waste Management Project] 
and the county plans.20 
As noted earlier, provisions for implementing the EMP 
may focus on both immediate and future changes: 
(1) improvement of water quality, by (a) back-up 
measures promoting cleaner waste discharges and 
construction of treatment plants, (b) related measures 
like street sweeping and containment of dairy wastes to 
reduce runoff pollution, and (c) controlled location of 
new sewage facilities that indirectly allow addition of 
pollutants from industrial and housing developments; 
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(2) improvement of air quality, through (a) back-up 
measures promoting cleaner emissions, and (b) indirect 
means such as improvement of transportation facilities 
with consideration of motor-vehicle-related pollutants 
linked to developments, e.g., shopping centers with large 
parking lots; and 
(3) improvement of solid waste management, through 
better practices such as (a) improved methods of 
disposal, especially of hazardous wastes, and (b) coor-
dinated site location. 
When the initial Environmental Management Plan is 
ready, ABAG will recommend to the Governor and to 
EPA (a) the methods of regulation, (b) the agencies to 
carry out the plan, and (c) the manner of funding. The 
plan will also specify the agencies that will be eligible for 
future water quality grants. Moreover, the total plan will 
be incorporated into ABAG's Regional Plan for future 
Bay Area urban and regional growth. 
Processing the Plan 
ABAG and the EMTF have designed a complex 
approval process for the Environmental Management 
Plan, including informational notice and review by 
affected parties, followed by action and approval. Notice 
and inj(1rmation consist of (1) sending an integrated 
draft plan to affected parties; (2) allowing up to 30 days 
for EPA review and comment by local governments 
including special districts, and informal review and 
comment by all other interested parties (federal, state, 
regional and local agencies and the public); and (3) in 
early 1978, presentation to the ABAG General Assembly 
and to regional agencies. 
Action and approval include (1) hearings and approval 
by EMTF and ABAG's Regional Planning Committee; 
(2) public discussion and approval by ABAG's Executive 
Board; (3) approval by ABAG's General Assembly, 
tentatively scheduled for April 1978; (4) certification 
consideration by the State Water Resources Control 
Board by June 23, 1978; and (5) review and possible final 
approval by EPA by November 1978. 
Federal Funds and State-Directed 
Water Quality Programs 
The Bay Area's 208 water quality planning is not 
starting de novo, but builds on prior efforts by such 
agencies as the State Water Resources Control Board, 
the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control 
Board, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EPA and the 
Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Program (completed in 
1969), and by local agencies concerned with discharged 
wastes. Further, in addition to 208 planning, federal 
funds support several related state-directed water 
quality programs in the Bay Area. They include (1) basin 
planning for water quality (Phase 1 was adopted in 1975 
as the S.F. Basin Water Quality Control Plan and may be 
amended by the 208 plan); (2) Sec. 201 planning for 
waste treatment. as a basis for locating future sewage 
facilities and allocating future federal construction 
grants; and (3) continuing waste discharge permit 
pro~-:rams under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System. 21 
State and Regional Authority 
Over the Area's Water Quality 
The State Water Resources Control Board and the 9 
regional boards have authority over California's water-
pollution control programs. Before the 1972 federal 
program came along the state board had already taken 
responsibility for regional basin planning. In its first 
phase under the 1972 law, the Bay Area's basin plan 
dealt with water quality. and the nature and volume of 
discharged wastes acceptable under federal standards. It 
set priorities for constructing and modifying treatment 
plants to meet regional needs. Recognizing urban and 
nonurban runoff as heavy contributors to pollution. it 
did not yet identit)· this condition as a problem. Instead, 
the main thrust wa~ to specify treatment levels that 
would protect "beneficial uses" of the Bay. its tri-
butaries. and the region's ocean waters from pollution by 
discharges at specific locations (point sources), e.g., 
industrial or municipal sewage outlets. 
As the second phase of basin planning begins, pollu-
tion problems are being addressed from additional 
quarters: ABAG's EMTF is focussing on surface runoff 
in urban and nonurban areas, and the implications for 
land use. 208 planning will also deal with miscellaneous 
sources of pollution. such as wastes discharged from 
water-borne vessels. oil spills, septic tanks and salt water 
intrusion. Finally. ABAG will recommend basin plan 
amendments to the regional and state water control 
boards. When the EMTF's Environmental Management 
Plan is completed and it has won EPA approval, under 
the 1972 law it will then have a life of its own. 
The object is to provide adequate water quality for 
recreational use and aquatic-life protection by 1983. 
California anticipates reaching this goal through the 
combined contributions of the state's 208 programs, the 
construction of wastewater treatment facilities, and the 
operation of its permit program to control pollution 
sources. 
An Intergovernmental Program for the 
Region's Air Quality 
Air quality planning- one of the EMTF's three func-
tional assignments- will continue and complement the 
work of the California Air Resources Board (ARB), the 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, ABAG and 
EPA. Several regional bodies, including the MTC and 
the air pollution control district, will help EMTF with air 
quality planning. If, however, the resulting plan fails to 
win ARB approval. under the 1970 clean air amend-
ments either the state ARB or the federal EPA may 
prepare a plan for the region. 
Further, EPA has the power to disapprove ARB's state 
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implementation plan for California- which includes the 
Bay Area basin plan- a power it exercised in 1974. That 
disapproval was based on the plan's failure to designate a 
structure for implementation, and because emission 
controls were not considered effective for maintaining air 
quality. EPA's disapproval made the federal agency 
responsible for both the Bay Area and the statewide air 
quality programs with respect to federal standards. As 
indicated earlier, EPA has subsequently delegated some 
responsibilities to ABAG, some to ARB and some to the 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. Significantly 
however, ultimate authority in these matters remains 
with EPA. 22 
In compliance with the federal Clean Air Amendments 
of 1970 requiring air basin plans, the ARB has divided 
the state into 14 air quality regions (air basins). for the 
purpose of maintaining California and national air 
quality standards. EPA in turn, with ARB recommen-
dations, named the Bay Area air basin an air quality 
maintenance area, based on findings that there are major 
air pollution problems in the five southern Bay Area 
counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San 
Mateo and Santa Clara), with the remaining four 
counties (Napa. Marin, Solano and Sonoma) contri-
buting substantial wind-driven pollutants.* 
The Bay Area Air Pollution Control 
District's Related Activities 
The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District is the 
region's principal regulatory agency for air quality. In 
recent years its measures have been tightened in response 
to increasing environmental concern. Thus under 
pressure from EPA and ARB. the district is imple-
menting regulations to ban new stationary sources of 
pollution that would violate national ambient air quality 
standards. With ABAG it is studying trade-off measures 
that would permit development. 
An example of the district's stronger stance is its rejec-
tion of Dow Chemical Company's proposal to build a 
large petrochemical complex in predominantly rural 
Solano County. Bolstered by ARB's pressure to consider 
environmental factors, in August J 976 Air Pollution 
Control Officer Jud Callaghan announced the district's 
preliminary denial of Dow's permit request: 
. .. emissions from the plant would interfere with 
the attainment of federal and state mandated air 
quality standards in the vicinity. The action was 
taken pursuant to the District's permit regulation 
[No. 2] which was adopted in accordance with state 
and federal requirements. 23 
In another example of outside pressure, in August 
1976 the ARB responded to an EPA initiative by 
changing its Bay Area regulations to require that. before 
• A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY: Dc~ignation of a .. ,tate air hasin" 
or "air quality region" doe~ not necessarily imply the exi\tcncc of 
pollution problems. On the other hand. dc~ignation of an "air qualitv 
muintenunce area" means that observed pollution levels ha,c hccomc 
criticaL 
issuing permits. the district's control officer ;:onsider 
pollutants that might move to other air basins. That year, 
ARB also authorized $220,000 for a study of potential 
effects other major proposed developments would have 
on air quality in the Bay Delta area and the Central 
Valley. 
In addition to the district's air regulations. and in the 
interest of better air quality, transponation measures are 
also being considered. Prime examples are MTC's Trans-
portation Control Plan24 and local parking plans like 
those of San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland. 
Finally. in addition to these efforts to consider trans-
portation's influence on air quality. the effects of the 
energy .crisis and President Carter's proposed energy 
program must be acknowledged. In time these are sure to 
have major impacts on transportation and air quality in 
the Bay Area and elsewhere. 
Solid Waste Management: The Third Program 
The 1972 federal water quality act amendments and 
the EPA guidelines provide the framework for the 
EMTF's solid waste planning. which also coordinates 
work launched by California's Nejedly-Z'berg-Dills Solid 
Waste Management and Resource Recovery Act of 
1972.25 Although less generously funded than air and 
water planning, EMTF's solid waste effort will collect 
data on waste quantities as well as disposal sites, 
processes and needs. It will look at problems of 
hazardous and toxic wastes, and evaluate measures for 
recycling and recovery of resources. Finally it will take 
ABAG's growth policies into account in seeking to inte-
grate solid waste policies with air and water quality 
programs. 
Other Bay Area programs contributing to the 208 solid 
waste management element include: (1) individual 
county plans developed in compliance with the 1972 state 
solid waste act noted above; (2) a state-directed Bay Area 
Solid Waste Management Project; (3) the Sec. 201 waste-
water solids (sludge) study by a group of major dis-
chargers (the East Bay Municipal Utility District being 
the lead agency); (4) a study of sites for hazardous and 
toxic wastes, directed by the State Water Resources 
Control Board; and (5) the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers' management programs for dredging and for 
removing floating debris. 
Further contributions mav come from the national 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 noted 
earlier, although this must wait for congressional 
approval of funding. When implemented. the new 
federal act will require three types of waste disposal 
planning: institutional. to determine who does what; 
regulatory, to establish compliance controls for 
hazardous-waste disposal, especially on land; and 
planning for facilities and services. Presumablv, this act's 
implementation will be coordinated with that· of the Bay 
Area 208 program's solid waste element. 
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Program Review and Plan Approval 
The Program Review Board is an important 
mechanism set up by the State Water Resources Control 
Board to assist EMTF and to monitor the 208 program. 
Meeting every two months. it brings together some of the 
principal policy people, including representatives of the 
state water resources, air resources and solid waste 
management boards, the state Office of Planning and 
Research, the regional water board, and the federal 
regional EPA office. with ad hoc participation by ABAG 
and EMTF. The group's principal contribution is 
probably its potential for resolving interagency conflicts. 
In the past, it has dealt with questions respecting 208 
plan preparation, progress and scheduling, as well as 
representation, and coordination of multi-agency efforts. 
ABAG and the EMTF have expressed concern about 
the power of the state water board and EPA to alter the 
plan after its submission for certification and approval. 
But the state agencies and EPA have assured ABAG that 
the initial plan will not be changed unilaterally. Instead 
the agencies will respond by indicating aspects they find 
inadequate or unacceptable. How the local governments 
and regional bodies will respond, or how they will agree 
on the necessary plan revisions, remains unclear. 
Implementation 
Noting the crucial roles of state and federal agencies in 
review and approval, ABAG President Lenard Grote also 
raised questions about the plan's implementation. He 
pointed out that the state air and water boards and the 
federal EPA actually function as "real regional govern-
ments," and that all three are "implementing law, and 
ABAG is not." Grote also foresaw the "distinct possi-
bility" of state legislation giving these agencies further 
functions and powers: 
[Since] one of the major objectives of the 208 
plan ... [is] to redo the institutional arrangement in 
the Bay Area ... some of the cities and counties 
might have some. . . functions curtailed and ... 
other governments might have. . . powers 
added .... 
Reacting to such wholesale shifts of power to higher 
level bodies, Grote urged local-regional alternatives. 
Thus instead of a paramount state-federal role in plan 
implementation, he seemed to contemplate legislation 
like the Knox bills. noted earlier, which proposed to 
strengthen ABAG. He suggested that 
a better way of rearranging the institutional 
relationship ... would be to increase the powers of 
cities and counties and ABAG, and enable ABAG 
to play a role of coordinating an effective program 
in this environmental field. 26 
Further, while distribution of power and authority 
represent a major issue in structuring a management 
agency, the allocation of costs and benefits is equally 
crucial if not more so. An experienced planner warned 
that "if ... cost/benefits impacts ... are uncertain" then 
a "push to retain power" can be expected. 
A workable implementation system, he thought. would 
include at least one and preferably ·all three of the 
following "pieces of authority" at the regional level: 
(1) the authority to. . . guarantee an integrated 
areawide system, 
(2) the authority to finance the system, or 
(3) the authority to establish cost allocation rules. 
This authority may exist by state legislation, by 
joint powers action, or by contractual agreement 
among the local governments. 
The most important ingredient [however] is a 
commitment to do something - either from the 
top down as a federal/state commitment or from 
the bottom up as a citizen/local elected official 
commitment. Lacking both of these, nothing is 
going to be accomplished. 27 
To sum up, the Bay region still faces several imple-
mentation dilemmas. How much will the necessary 
measures cost, and how will the costs be distributed? 
Should the plan be implemented by existing governments 
through ad hoc arrangements? Should a stronger ABAG 
or regional agency be set up? Or should state and federal 
bodies play a greater role in charting the region's future? 
In any event, the plan's ultimate effectiveness rests 
largely on the realism of the 208 decision makers in facing 
the problem of implementation. If major institutional 
reforms are needed, can agency anxieties and self-protec-
tive responses allow significant special-district 
"sovereignties" to be ceded to a stronger regional 
mechanism? If not, can 208 planners devise a means of 
multi-agency collaboration for sustained imple-
mentation, capable of surviving the controversies that 
inevitably surround important decisions on a region's 
future? 
Future Planning and Broader Goals 
It should be acknowledged that planning comprises a 
process, not an end product; thus plans are never really 
finished, but need regular revision, periodic rethinking 
and continued implementation. How can this essential 
process be handled when the current 208 work is ended? 
In short, 208 planners face twin institutional questions: 
(1) how can their plans be carried out, and (2) who will 
continue the planning process? 
In seeking to free the region from pollution and waste, 
208 planning is an early phase of the quest for long-term 
goals. The latter should be built on residents' social and 
economic aspirations, and quality-of-life concerns. These 
go far beyond achieving a clean environment, precious 
though this is. 
Future plans will have to treat these broader issues. 
Meanwhile, if 208's environmental planning works 
reasonably well, it will be a big step ahead for the San 
Francisco Bay Area. 
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Association of Bay Area Governments 
Air Resources Board- state 
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission 
A voluntary regional Council of Governments. like 
ABAG 
Environmental Management Plan 
Environmental Management Task Force - established 
byABAG 
Environmental Protection Agency - federal 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
National Environmental Policy Act 
directive from the federal Office of Management and 
Budget. implementing advisory review and comment on 
federal grant applications 
Sec. 201 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972. Concerns location, design and 
construction of sewage treatment facilities 
Sec. 208 of the same federal act. Requires areawide and 
statewide planning to achieve federal clean water 
standards 
' Their performance, vigor and effectiveness in protecting the Bay 
Area environment vary considerably. For example, observers have 
criticized the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District for moving into 
strong pollution control only after urging by the Environmental Protec· 
tion Agency and others; and the MTC for failing to fulfill its direct 
legislative mandate to relate air quality concerns to transportation 
planning. 
2 Examples of environmental measures include the Oean Air 
Amendments of 1970 (Public Law 91-604), the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 - Sec. 208 (Public Law 92-.500), the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580), 
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, Public Law 
91-100). 
• Association of Bay Area Governments (hereafter ABAG), Environ· 
mental Management Program, Water Quality Ana(vsis and Pollution 
Control Strategies, Issue Paper No. 1, Water Quality Management 
Plans(December IS, 1976), pp. 2-3. 
• Paul De Falco, "What is 208? What Will It Do?" Bay Area 
Monitor (Berkeley: League of Women Voters of the Bay Area (hereafter 
LWVBA), Transportation Alternatives Project, with the assistance of 
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, October 1975), p. 3. 
• Holly O'Konski's remarks at the Seminar 76: 208 Planning 
Conference. "Benefit or Boondoggle," Davis, California. March 24 and 
25, 1976, pp. 2. 3, and 4 (variously paged) (State Water Resources 
Control Board in cooperation with U.C. Davis). 
• De Falco's remarks. ibid., p. 6. 
7 Ibid., p. 7. 
8 "What is 208???" LWVBA, newsletter, Bay Area Voter (January 
1977), p. 1. 
• ABAG. Legislation and Governmental Organization Committee, 
Minutes (October 28, 1976), p. 2. ABAG. a Council of Governments, 
includes only cities and counties, not special districts. 
' 0 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Planning Division 
WH-554, WQM: Highlights o.f"September 1·2 /1976/ Meeting (undated) 
p. I. 
"ABAG. Prospects: Environmental Management Program for the 
San Francisco Bay Region. public information report (1976), p. 1. 
Shellfish harvesting has been prohibited in San Francisco Bay since 
1930. 
•• Loc. cit. 
13 Prior to 208 planning. functions covered in ABAG's Regional Plan 
included: air quality. airport systems, community development, 
comprehensive health services. criminal justice, employment. growth 
management, housing. human services. ocean coastline use, open 
space, seaports. seismic safety, solid waste management. transporta-
tion. water quality and water resources. Updating wiiJ include housing, 
environmental quality, economic development, health. safety and 
recreation. 
Re: ABAG. see also Victor Jones. "Bay Area Regionalism: Institu-
tions. Processes. and Programs." in Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations. Substate Regionalism and the Federal System. 
vol. II: Regional Governance: Promise and Performance (May 1973), 
pp. 75-110; Jones. "Bay Area Regionalism: The Politics oflntergovern-
mentai Relations.'' in Kent Mathewson. ed., The Regionalist Papers 
(Detroit: Metropolitan Fund, lnc., 19741. pp. l2lS·l'RS; ana Jones. 
Regional Home Rule for the San Francisco Bay Area: Concepts for 
Constructing a Workable Plan. Regionalist Paper No. 2 (prepared for 
Associated Regional Citizens. September 1968), pp. 1-4. 
14 Interview with Harry Seraydarian, February 24, 19n. 
15 ABAG. Environmental Management Task Force Plan Implemen-
tation Committee. Summary Minutes (February 16, 1977), p. 1. 
14 See note 14 above. 
17 With EPA's concurrence. the State Water Resources Control 
Board has directed that EMTF not consider any ongoing Sec. 201 
planning, because resulting interference might delay funds needed for 
Bay Area project construction. Thus. while the EMP is being drafted, it 
will not affect current 201 planning; but as noted. after completion all 
subsequent 201 planning must conform with the EMP. The manage· 
ment plan must also show how and by what agencies 201 planning will 
be carried out after the initial plan is completed. 
1
• Coun order issued in 1974 in Natural Resources Defense Council. 
et aL v. Train. et aL. District Coun. D.C .. Civ. Act. No. 74-!485. See 
Fed. Reg. 40 (230), Friday, November 28. 1975, p. 55321. Grants were 
ordered for designated areawide 208 water quality management 
planning, and states made responsible for assuring that 208 provisions 
are implemented in areawide and state planning areas. Plans are to be 
submitted to EPA bv Nov. 1.1978. 
•a Elected officiais representing city and county governing bodies 
include: one city and one county official from 7 of the counties; in 
addition. at the recommendation of the task force. the two non-ABAG 
Bay Area counties of Solano and Sonoma were each allotted two city 
memberships because each of the other 7 counties had both a city and a 
county representative. (Subsequently, Solano County decided to join 
ABAG as of July 1.I9n.) 
20 L WVBA. newsletter, Bay Area Monitor (January 1977), 
"Update ... Environmental Management Program." p. J. EPA and the 
Air Resources Board have approved the EMTF contract with the Bay 
Area Air Pollution Control District for use of the 2-part URAQ Mode!. 
URAQ Part 1 is a "dispersion model" for measuring the generation 
and transportation of major air pollutants. URAQ Pan 2 is for mea-
suring photochemical pollutants. such as stnog. 
21 The National Pollutant Discharge Eiminarion System (NPDESl. 
authorized under Sec. 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972. includes EPA-approved stare permit programs. 
State and regional boards issue permits specifying levels of waste 
treatment. 
9 
22 In 1974, EPA tried to implement its air quality maintenance plan 
in the Bay Area and elsewhere through control of indirect sources of air 
pollution. using parking regulations. Proposed regulations included on· 
and off-street facilities and extended to developments that involve 
parking, e.g., subdivisions. commercial buildings and shopping 
centers . .Congressional and public pressure exerted locally and in five 
other affected areas nationwide - as well as fund limitations for fiscal 
1975-caused the EPA to suspend the program in July 1975. 
23 Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (BAAPCDl, newsletter. 
Air Currents. 19 (8) (August 1976). p. 3. In one month's rime the district 
studied the matter and denied the permit. Dow Chemical Company 
first appealed the denial, then withdrew the appeal and cancelled the 
project, with the intention of allocating the petrochemical activity 
among its existing plants. Subsequent reports, however, alleged tbat 
the disrrict had stalled. and erroneouslv stated that Dow would there-
fore build a replacement facility in "another country. A company 
spokesman later noted (in a telephone interview with IGS May 3. 19n) 
that some published accounts of the episode had been garbled, and that 
the plants Dow is building in Brazil and Canada had been under 
construction before the permit was rejected. 
Although the air pollution district acted promptly, the full govern-
mental review process for Dow"s project was admittedly protracted and 
involved many agencies. Partly in response to such complaints of delay 
and at the request of the Governor's Office of Planning and Research 
(OPR), ABAG and OPR have joined to conduct an indusrriallocation 
study of the Bay Area; ABAG has established a siting task force as a 
subcommittee of its Regional Planning Committee. The principal 
assignment is to survey available industrial sites and environmental 
standards for industrial development is well as existing environmental 
policies and permit procedures. 
24 Although no program has been proposed. the EMTFs 
ABAGIBAAPCDIMTC joint technical advisory committee on air 
quality planning could suggest a variety of progrants to reduce air 
pollution: limit growth in environmentally vulnerable areas; encourage 
development patterns that reduce the number and length of auto trips; 
set criteria for the location, size and timing of major new growth areas; 
reduce automobile-related air polluting emissions; control types offuei 
and methods of using it; and encourage the use of public transpor-
tation. 
25 SB S. Cal. Stars. 1972. Ch. 342. 
28 ABAG. Executive Board Meeting #172 (July IS. 1976). Summary 
Minutes. pp. 17-18. 
27 Robert C. Einsweiller. "'What is Needed to Implement the 
Management Plan?" distributed at a 208 workshop, Burlingame. 
Calif.. May S-7. 1976, sponsored by the National Association of 
Regional Councils (Washington. D.C.). Ensweiller is a planning 




AIR TRADE-OFFS: A 'IT.EMPTING TO 
RECONCILE INDUSTRIAL. GROWTH 
AND CLEAN AIR IN CALIFORNIA 
Aileen Alfandary 
Research Associate, 
Institute of Governmental Studies 
Introduction 
California is currently wrestling with the question of 
how to accommodate industrial growth in parts of the 
state that still have not met federal clean air standards 
designed to protect public health. The dilemma con-
fronts many areas throughout the nation where air qual-
ity standards are being violated, but at the same time in-
dustrial expansion is expected to provide new jobs. The 
growing intensity of the conflict, as seen in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, exemplifies the need for compre-
hensive ongoing planning and implementation related 
to "environmental protection and •.. consequent social 
and economic impacts."' 
Meanwhile, however, the federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) has devised a short-to-middle-
ra_nge approach to air pollution controls that it hopes 
will help reconcile the otherwise conflicting objectives 
of industrial growth vs. progress toward achieving clean 
air. Under this policy emission offsets apply to modifica-
tions of existing facilities, and air quality trade-offs to 
construction of new facilities. For the sake of simplicity, 
this paper will refer to both emission offsets and air 
quality trade-offs as "air trade-offs." 
The general concepts behind air trade-offs are as fol-
lows: A new industrial facility, or an addition to an 
existing facility, may be built in an area where pollution 
levels violate air standards only if the new source ( 1) 
has the "lowest available emission rate" (roughly the 
lowest emission rate actually achieved anywhere by a 
similar plant), and (2) reduces air pollution from ex-
isting sources in the same region (i.e., by paying for the 
clean-up of existing sources) sufficiently that air quality 
is actually improved. In other words, there must be a 
net reduction in air pollution. Air trade-offs and other 
1 See Ora Huth, "Managing the Bay Area's Environment: An Ex-
periment .in Collaborative Planning." Public· Affairs Report, 18 (2) 
April 1977 (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University 
of California) , p. 1. 
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regulations governing new facilities are intended to pre-
vent air quality from deteriorating further in already-
polluted areas, while sufficient additional controls are 
developed for existing sources to achieve and maintain 
air quality standards. 
~n December 1976, the EPA issued an interpretative 
ruling that for the first time stated a policy on air trade-
offs (discussed below). Individual air trade-offs have 
:Uso been negotiated in some parts of the country, e.g., 
m Oklahoma, where a new General Motors facility is 
~der constructio~ after making plans to reduce pollu-
tion from nearby oil refineries. 
California is the first state that has attempted to set 
up consistent statewide procedures for air trade-offs. 
Because this state has long been in the forefront of air 
pollution policy, the direction it takes in implementing 
air trade-offs is likely to have nationwide impact on the 
development of air trade-off policy. Accordingly this 
paper will examine provisions of an air trade-off bill 
currently under legislative consideration in California: 
Assembly Bill 471, authored by VictOr Calvo, who 
chairs the Assembly Committee on Resources, Land 
Use and Energy. 
The trade-off concept in turn raises questions about 
implementation. For example, what constitutes a net 
improvement in air quality, and within how large a 
~eographic area will trade-offs be allowed? Will pollu-
tion become a valuable commodity, with industries in 
effect buying and selling the right to pollute? 
Before dealing with these questions, and with the 
California bill, the following discussion examines the 
way air trade-offs fit into California's overall effort to 
meet federal clean air standards. 
The Federal Clean Air Act 
Air pollution control is a three-tiered system of reg-
ulation, with federal, state, and regional or local levels. 
The federal government sets certain clean air goals--
national ambient air quality standards-and retains 
ultimate authority to implement them. States are al-
lowed to set stricter standards than the federal require-
ments, but not weaker. A state must have a state imple-
mentation plan detailing how it will attain clean air 
standards. 
In California, each of the 4 7 air pollution control dis-
tricts submits to the California Air Resources Board 
plans for meeting state and federal air standards. The 
collection of air district programs forms the basis for 
the state plan, which also includes a statewide plan for 
controlling mobile pollution sources, e.g., cars and 
trUcks. 
The state can devise regulations for an air district, or 
revise the district's plan if it is considered inadequate. 
Similarly, the federal EPA has final review and approval 
authority over the state plan. California's implementa-
tion plan is currently under revision because the EPA 
judged that part of the procedures for meeting air stan-
dards was inadequate. Parenthetically, it should be 
noted that there are practical limitations to the EPA's 
authority. The EPA cannot force a state to implement a 
specific program if the latter chases not to do so. The 
EPA may itself implement such a program, but would 
probably find the administrative requirements prohibi-
tive in terms of costs and personnel needed. 
The federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 
specified certain air standards that were supposed to be 
met by 1975, but the 1975 deadline has now been de-
layed twice. First the EPA granted California and other 
states an extension until June 30, 1977. California, like 
many other states, did not meet clean air standards in 
1977, so in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
Congress granted another extension, this one until1982; 
for areas with severe oxidant or carbon monoxide prob-
lems, the extension may last until 1987. The recent 
federal amendments also require states to submit new 
implementation plans by 1979 detailing how air stan-
dards will be met. 
California is certain to have a problem meeting those 
standards, especially with respect to photochemical ox-
idants in both Southern California and the Bay Area, 
. and particulates in Southern California. In addition, 
California must meet standards for sulfur dioxide, nitro-
gen dioxide and nonmethane hvdrocarbons. 
Some air pollution obse~ are concerned that if 
the 1979 version of California's state implementation 
plan provides controls that would be inadequate to meet 
air standards by the 1982 and 1987 deadlines, then fur-
ther industrial growth would have to be prohibited after 
1979. However, considering the political forces favoring 
continued industrial growth, it seems highly unlikely 
that Congress would proscribe all industrial growth after 
1979 simply because air standards were not going to be 
met. After all, two deadlines for achieving clean air have 
already come and gone and industrial growth is still 
with us, although admittedly under certain restrictions. 
In any event, each state implementation plan is al-
ready required to contain rules regulating the construc-
tion of "stationary sources" of air pollution such as in-
dustrial facilities, power plants, or the proposed oil ter-
minal Standard Oil of Ohio wants to build at Long 
Beach in Southern California. 
These rules constitute what is called new source re-
view. More precisely, all state implementation plans 
must contain regulations requiring preconstruction re-
view, and disapproval of new or modified air pollution 
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sources that would interfere with the attainment or 
maintenance of air quality standards. 
Industrial Growth. in Dirty Air Basins 
The implications of new source review led to the 
concept of air trade-offs. The EPA said that allowing 
additional industry to locate in an area whose air was 
already dirtier than federal standards would be a viola-
tion of the Clean Air Act. But many labor and business 
groups opposed the policy of refusing to allow further 
development in regions violating air standards, calling it 
a "no growth" measure. 
The Clean Air Act did not specify how this conflict 
might be resolved. At the end of 1976, the EPA inter-
preted the act to allow the establishment of an air trade-
off policy. As noted above, the EPA issued an interpre-
tative ruling on air trade-offs in December 1976, and 
then held hearings around the country. The EPA said it 
hoped its ruling would focus congressional attention on 
the issue ;md lead to amendments to the Clean Air Act 
that would give guidance on how to allow trade-offs. 
Meanwhile in California, the state Air Resources 
Board adopted new source review regulations for the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District.' Part of 
that rule was interpreted to mean that air trade-offs be-
tween different companies would be permitted. But the 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District had its own reg-
ulations dating back to 1973, and those rules did notal-
low trade-offs between different companies. In short, 
California had a series of inconsistent air trade-off rules. 
Pressure For A. Califomia Policy 
Pressures soon developed for an integrated statewide 
policy on trade-offs in California. Concerns became 
more urgent when Dow Chemical Company withdrew 
its plans to build a huge petrochemical complex in So-
lano County, citing environmental roadblocks. There 
were several environmental problems with the Dow pro-
posal, including worker health and safety questions. But 
much attention focussed on the Bay Area Air Pollution 
Control District's denial of an air quality permit. Largely 
in respon·se to the uproar created by Dow's withdrawal, 
the state Legislature decided to move toward streamlin-
ing industrial siting regulations. One consequence of 
that effort was the development of air trade-off regula-
tions that, under certain circumstances, would allow 
major industry to locate in an area where air quality 
standards are already violated. Of course, air trade-off 
rules enacted by the state will also require review by 
the EPA before they can be applied. 
The most recent version (August 5, 1977) of the 
California trade-off bill leaves much of the decision-
making on specific issues to individual air pollution con-
trol districts, thus continuing to give local rather than 
state government primary control over stationary 
sources of pollution. This policy is to the liking of the 
California Council for Environmental and Economic 
'The Long Beach area, where (as mentioned earlier) Standard 
Oil of Ohio is negotiating for permission to build a huge terminal to 
receive Alaskan oil, is included in the South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District. 
Balance ( CCEEB), a business-labor organization and 
one of the major groups lobbying on the bill. CCEEB 
prefers leaving development of regulations to local 
boards rather than to the state Air Resources Board, 
which has the reputation of devising stricter air pollution 
controls. Another provision tightens control of existing 
facilities by requiring that regulations will periodically 
be made more stringent to reflect advances in pollution 
control technology. This provision was backed by the 
Sierra Club, the other major group lobbying on the bill. 
It may be helpful next to consider specific issues in-
volved in implementing air trade-offs, along with provi-
sions of the current version of AB 471. The suggestions 
of the Sierra Oub and CCEEB wll also be noted. 
Calculating Air Trade-Offs 
How is the amount of pollution available for trade-
offs to be calculated? Is it to be based on an existing 
facility's actual emissions, or its allowable emissions? 
The issue arises because some facilities are not currently 
polluting to the maximum extent allowed by law. For 
example, if a source were allowed to emit up to 500 tons 
per year of sulfur dioxide, but was emitting an average 
of only 460 tons per year, should the extra 40 tons be 
available to use as a trade-off? If so, a region could ex-
perience a net increase in actual air pollution as a result 
of a trade-off arrangement. The present version of AB 
471 specifies that trade-offs will be based on actual or 
allowable pollution, which ever is less. In any event, 
defining a source's actual emissions remains a problem. 
One air pollution control official said that the determin-
ation would be technologically difficult, because refiner-
ies, for example, emit different quantities of air pollution 
from month to month and year to year, depending on 
the grade of crude oil being processed and the refined 
product being made. 
As noted, EPA regulations state that each trade-off 
must have the effect of improving air quality. That is, 
the reduction in pollution mnst exceed the added pollu-
tion emitted by the new source-but how much greater 
must it be, i.e., how much must air quality be improved? 
CCEEB originally suggested a 1.5 to 1.0 trade-off ratio. 
Under this formula, if a new source emitted 100 tons of 
sulfur dioxide per year, it would have to reduce pollu-
tion from the old source by 150 tons per year. CCEEB 
later changed its position to advocate that each air pollu-
tion control district devise its own formula, taking into 
account the severity and frequency of violations of the 
particular air quality standard. The California bill con-
tains such a requirement. 
The Sierra Oub suggested requiring a trade-off equal 
to what the new facility would emit, plus an increment 
equal to the proportion by which ambient air standards 
were currently exceeded. For example, if sulfur dioxide 
standards were being violated by I 5 percent, a plant 
that would emit 1 00 tons of sulfur dioxide per year 
would be required to reduce another source's sulfur 
dioxide emissions by 1 00 tons plus 15 percent of 100 
tons, or a total reduction of 115 tons per year. (The 
question of geographic boundaries within which a trade-
off occurs is discussed below.) 
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A similar issue arose over how to set the baseline for 
air pollution trade-offs. Key questions were, how much 
pollution clean-up was required by law, and how much 
clean-up could be used for trade-offs? Setting the base-
line was complicated by the fact that California's state 
implementation plan had been disapproved by the EPA 
as inadequate to meet federal air standards. A new state 
plan had not yet been approved, so it was unclear how 
much pollution clean-up would be required by law, and 
how much would be available for use in trade-offs. 
This issue was resolved with the 1977 amendments to 
the Oean Air Act, which said that a state's current im-
plementation plan would be the baseline, until 1979 
when a new and presumably adequate state implemen-
tation plan must be prepared. 
Only "Major" Sources Must Comply With Trade-Offs 
Air pollution control districts are responsible for 
monitoring pollution emissions from individual sources, 
as well as general air pollution levels. This is done two 
ways: in-stack and ground level monitors measure the 
emissions of individual facilities, while ambient air qual-
ity monitors measure the general level of air pollution. 
However, air pollution control districts do not have 
enough staff to monitor emissions for all small busines-
ses. Moreover Congress and regulatory agencies have 
generally agreed that not all small businesses should be 
expected to spend the time, paperwork and money 
needed to meet trade-off regulations. Thus a determina-
tion must be made as to which new sources will be re-
quired to comply with trade-offs. 
The State Air Resources Board adopted a 25 tons-
per-year (250 tons for carbon monoxide) definition of a 
major source in the polluted South Coast air basin; EPA 
regulations require trade-offs for any source that emits 
100 tons per year for any air pollutant for which there 
is an air quality standard (except for carbon monoxide, 
which can be emitted at the rate of 1000 tons per year). 
The EPA has stron!rlv encourae:ed states to use a lower 
cut-off number "wh~r"ever resources permit," and is also 
considering reducing its cut-off figure to 50 tons per 
year ( 500 tons for carbon monoxide). The Bay Area 
Air Pollution Control District says it has enough staff 
to e~force the 50 tons-per-year figure." 
The Geographic Boundaries 
How far away can the new facility reach to obtain 
trade-offs? The Sierra Oub argues that a new facility 
should be required to obtain a trade-off from another 
facility at the same site or a contiguous location. Thus 
it says that a trade-off with a more distant location 
should be allowed only if the new source can prove that 
the emission reduction will have an actual effect at the 
site of the new plant. 
In contrast, CCEEB proposes that a facility be 
allowed to obtain a reduction from anywhere within the 
• Even the 100 tons per year figure would cover vi"ually all oil 
refineries and chemical facilities. For example, Bay Area Air Pollu-
tion Control District figures for 1975 show that Standard Oil of 
California's refinery in Richmond emitted more than 12 tons per 
day of sulfur dioxide. See Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, 
Air Pollution and the San Francisco Bay Area (June 1977). 
same air quality control region, if it cannot find a trade-
off in the immediate vicinity. If that is not possible, 
CCEEB says the source should be allowed to obtain a 
trade-off from a nearby air quality contrOl region, if the 
reduction would have an impact on the air basin where 
the new source was being constructed. This suggestion 
would allow air at the site of the new facility to become 
dirtier, as long as air at another site in the same air basin 
became somewhat cleaner. 
The Bay Area Air Pollution ContrOl District has dis-
cussed still another plan. For primary contaminants-
particulate matter, carbon monoxide and sulfur diox-
ide-trade-otis would be possible within a five-mile 
radius of the proposed new source. For hydrocarbons 
and nitrOgen oxides, trade-offs could be possible any-
where within the air quality control region. 
The state bill originally specified a five-mile radius, 
but later adopted the CCEEB proposal, allowing trade-
offs outside of the immediate vicinity of the new source. 
However, the local districts must make a finding that a 
trade-off will not result .. in any substantially adverse 
impact on the ambient air quality" in the immediate 
vicinity of the new source. This provision may still con-
flict with the EPA's current interpretative ruling, that 
the tnide-off for pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, carbon 
monoxide or particulates must be made at the same site 
or in the immediate vicinity. 
Exemptions and Pollution Credits 
A concept called banking would allow a pollution re-
duction-in excess of that required by federal, state or 
local law-to be employed as an air pollution "credit" 
for future use by the same owner or operator. 
The EPA's preliminary ruling does not allow banking 
because it does not represent progress toward clean air. 
The Sierra Club opposes banking for the same reason. 
On the other hand, CCEEB contends that banking is 
fair. and eliminates any possibility of deterring operators 
of existing sources from making improvements in their 
operations. The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 
also favors banking. In its current version, AB 471 
would allow the owner or operator of an existing source 
to hold onto pollution credits for banking purposes for 
five years. 
There is agreement that facilities ordered to switch 
from gas to fuel oil should be exempted from the trade-
off requirement. The Sierra Club holds that if air quality 
declines because of a fuel switch, the state implementa-
tion plan should require additional cut-backs from other 
sources. 
CCEEB suggests that industries be exempted from 
the trade-off requirement whether the fuel-switching is 
voluntary or involuntary. CCEEB also originally argued 
that new power plants should be exempted if they could 
not find offsets. contending that supplying electricity is 
a necessary public service. But CCEEB later dropped 
that proposal. 
Califomia As Pace-Setter 
Several political, technological and legal considera-
tions should be kept in mind when considering air trade-
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off policy. For example, the Clean Air Act allows states 
to pass regulations that are stricter-but not weaker:-
than the federal regulations devised by the EPA. Thus, 
as noted, the EPA defines a major source as one that will 
annually emit 100 tons of a pollutant, but it also says 
that .. States are strongly encouraged wherever resources 
permit to utilize a lower cut-off number." States con-
sidering bills considerably stricter than the federal rules 
may, however, face local political opposition. A strong 
nationwide constituency opposes a stricter air pollution 
law for a number of reasons, including the fear that jobs 
will be lost. The Clean Air Act amendments recently 
passed by Congress also reflect moves toward leniency 
in clean air regulation. 
The air trade-off bill was proposed in part because 
California's regulatory climate had been labelled "anti-
business," and it was hoped the bill would provide con-
sistency in state regulation. But if California passes 
controls (as in AB 4 71 ) that are much stricter than the 
federal interpretative ruling, California may be accused 
of still being hostile toward business. Conversely, the 
state's affinnation of strict reguhitions may provide pol-
itical support encouraging the EPA to do likewise. 
Confrontation with the EPA 
According to federal law, California's air trade-off 
regulation must be at least as strict as the EPA's rules, 
and if the EPA finds portions of the state rules weaker, 
they can be suspended. The EPA is itself in the process 
of reviewing its own air trade-off rules. If California, the 
state known to be the nation's toughest on air pollution, 
passed weaker rules than those of the EPA, the latter 
might find little political support for its policy and weak-
en its regulations. 
For example, the EPA ruled out pollution credits-
banking voluntary air pollution clean-up so that it can 
be used against future trade-offs. The EPA wants to see 
steady progress toward achieving clean air standards, 
and regards pollution credits as backsliding. But the 
California bill allows pollution credits. Thus either Cal-
ifornia or the EPA will have to back down on this issue. 
Reaching the Limits of Technology? 
Air trade-offs may provide an incentive for industry 
to devise technological innovations that reduce air pol-
lution. Certainly little incentive exists today. But as tech-
nology reduces emissions, the cost of eliminating the re-
maining increment tends to rise. Moreover, there is like-
ly to be a limit to major technological breakthroughs 
in reducing air pollution emissions. Thus the ultimate 
result of an air trade-off policy could theoretically be a 
no-growth policy. Realistically, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Congress is ready to sacrifice 
industrial growth for the sake of achieving strict air 
standards designed to protect public health. On the con-
trary, proposals for restrictive measures, other than im-
provements in technology, have been shortlived. For ex-
ample, in 1973, under prompting from the EPA, the 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District issued "indirect 
source review" regulations for projects such as shopping 
centers that attract large volumes of traffic. But the EPA 
came under political pressure and backed away from in-
direct source review, and the Bay Area regulations were 
rescinded by the local district one week after thei~ adop-
tion. In the 1977 amendments to the Oean Atr Act, 
Congress admonished the EPA not to require indirect 
source review, but told the local districts that they may 
do so. 
Air Pollution As A Commodity 
Another problem will arise if all extsung sources 
should refuse to allow trade-offs by new enterprises 
seeking to locate in a region. In some cases, the new 
source might be a potential competitor of the existing 
source, or the latter might wish to retain its "extra" air 
pollution for future development. Such eventualities 
could put the existing business community in the awk-
ward position of being labelled "anti-business." 
Even more interesting is the question of whether a 
polluting industry could sell its right to pollute. If_ for 
example, two enterprises were trying to locate in the 
same region, could an existing facility sell its pollution 
to the highest bidder? Conversely, if nearby residents 
wanted to reduce pollution levels once and for all, could 
they pay for the installation of pollution control equip-
ment, and then retain the pollution credit? As the air 
trade-off policy is applied in succeeding cases, less pollu-
tion will be available that can be readily traded off, and 
the value of the pollution still available will surely rise. 
Perhaps it is not absurd to foresee a day when pollution 
could become simply another commodity that is bought 
and sold. 
Some Further Questions 
Some observers of the air pollution scene have al-
ready expressed concern that an air trade-off policy may 
result in worsening air quality rather than reducing air 
pollution. For example, in Pennsylvania a Volkswagen 
assembly plant is under construction after receiving a 
rather questionable trade-off involving reduction of the 
solvent content of asphalt used in street paving. Many 
other states already use low-solvent asphalt and some air 
pollution officials believe this pollution control measure 
probably should not have been available for negotiating 
a trade-off. The net result is a pollution reduction that 
probably ought to have been required anyway, plus the 
addition of a new polluting facility. 
Another potential problem concerns the geographic 
area in which pollution trade-offs can be negotiated. The 
current version of the California bill seems to allow a 
trade-off between a new source located at one spot and 
an existing source at another-if the local air district 
staff verifies that the region where the new source is 
locating will not suffer "any substantially adverse im-
pact. ... " The determination of what constitutes a sub- · 
stantially adverse impact is obviously open to argument. 
It will probablv be left to the judgment of the local air 
district staff, who often come under heavy pressure from 
industrial facilities seeking to locate at a particular site. 
Still another ouestion remains to be resolved: How 
broadlv should the emissions associated with a "new 
source" be defined? An important precedent may be set 
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in the case of the SOHIO oil terminal proposed for the 
port of Long Beach. Both the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District Board and the California Air Re-
sources Board are demanding that SOHIO offset the ad-
ditional emissions caused by generating the electrical· 
power requirements of the facility. 
A Final Appraisal 
The ultimate success of air trade-offs in reducing air 
pollution will depend on the specific regulations devised 
to implement the concept, and on the enforcement of the 
regulations. The roundabout nature of the trade-off ap-
proach points up the political difficulties in cleaning up 
the air. Logically, a more direct approach would require 
old facilities to install the best pollution control tech-
nology currently available, bring air up to standards, and 
then selectively allow new sources to build; but there 
are two problems with this. · 
First, existing sources argue that installation of such 
pqllution control technology may be economically im-
. pOssible unless financial inducements are offered 
through subsidies, tax write-offs and other means. Ex-
isting sources are supported by the convention that they 
have vested interests entitling them to due proce$S be-
fore their rights (including the right to pollute) are re-
voked. 
Second, government has depended on industries to 
develop pollution control technology. Regulations there-
fore need to be "technology-forcing" in nature, inducing 
technological improvements not otherwise likely to be 
developed and installed. Some hope that air trade-offs will 
provide such inducements. Once the effectiveness of the 
new technologies is proven, air pollution control officials 
can then require other existing sources to adopt them. 
In short, a combination of trade-off policy and im-
proved technology may make it possible to further mit-
igate some pollution while allowing limited additional 
industrial growth. However, a single-purpose regulation 
snch as air trade-offs should not be expected to solve 
the nnderlying conilict between unlimited development 
of energy-intensive, polluting, industrial growth, and 
protection of public health and environmental values. 
For example, a recent staff task force report from 
the Association of Bay Area Governments anticipated 
some decrease in Bay Area smog under current regula-
tions until 1985. After that, however, the report noted 
that growth will cause smog to rise rapidlv until it 
reaches almost twice the national federal oxidant stan-
dards. (This estimate is based on the pollutants emitted 
by autos and other mobile sources as well as stationary 
sources.) · 
Accordingly questions need to be asked about achiev-
ing future land-use patterns and population distribution 
that can facilitate shorter journevs to work and greater 
use of mass transit. Questions should also be addressed 
to the kinds of economic growth that regions or local-
ities want to encoura~e. 
Energy planners in industrv, government and en-
vironmental circles are now debating how best to deal 
with the nation's future ener~;V needs. Should energy 
needs be met bv hi!!h-technology, capital-intensive nu-
clear reactors and coal power plants, or by using "soft" 
energy technologies such as solar and wind, as well as 
by conservation? 
The same kind of debate can focus on future econ-
omic growth. Should emphasis be placed on high-tech-
nology, energy-intensive, polluting development, or low-
technology, labor-intensive, low-polluting forms of ec-
onomic growth? What forces tend to encourage each 
type of growth? 
These are the kinds of questions that need to be ad-
dressed in considering the future of air quality. The 
controversy over air trade-otis may help shed light on 
the basic unresolved issues now emerging, issues we are 
likely to confront "head on" in the next five to ten years. 
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Traditional views of deserts have often dismissed them as 
desolate wastes having little or no value, and consequently 
expendable for whatever purposes humans might wish to 
put them to. Thus the California Desert1 has been the site 
of such activities as large-scale military maneuvers and races 
between off-road vehicles, which are severely damaging to 
desert environments unless carefully managed to limit des-
truction and minimize long-term harm. 
We are learning now that far from being only barren, 
useless wilderness, desert lands are in fact valuable resources 
that are also highly vulnerable to injury and slow to re-
cover. Thus recognition is growing concerning the Califor-
nia Desert's great intrinsic worth, which may be irreplace-
ably lost through inadequately regulated impacts of man 
and machines on the fragile, arid environment. 
For some years, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) has been surveying the desert's physical and biologi-
cal characteristics; the kinds, places, and duration of human 
activities there; numbers of persons involved; use conflicts; 
and the nature of impacts on the natural environment. 
Although the BLM planning process has been underway 
*This report is adapted from "Teaching and Research in the Cali-
fornia Desert," Research Report 78-1, forthcoming, Institute of 
Governmental Studies. 
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since the late 1960's, until now there has been little infor-
mation on uses of the desert in teaching and research. 
This article attempts to provide some of the additional 
information needed to evaluate the California Desert and 
its future. 
Emphasis is placed on use of the desert for teaching 
and research, and on its related values for scientific pur-
suits. These in tum, can also have highly practical appli· 
cations. For example, as we shall see, botanical research 
in the desert promises to provide valuable alternatives to 
resources that are endangered or in short supply. More-
over desert research may help in the development of plants 
and practices that can make arid lands more productive. 
While these possibilities deserve further exploration, they 
are only mentioned here and acknowledged. 
In addition to teaching and research uses, the article 
also touches on such other multiple-use demands and claims 
upon the desert as recreation, including both traditional 
uses (e.g., hiking) and new-style mecllanized uses (e.g., 
off-road vehicles-ORVs). Not discussed are industrial 
and residential uses, as well as the significant impact of the 
grazing of livestock, which in many desert areas can have 
a very destructive effect. 
The article assesses compatible and conflicting activities, 
and examines some of the consequences of conflicts. 
Finally, it summarizes some of the measures that can 
improve desert management, and suggests several fu'rther 
steps urgently needed if the desert environment is to be 
safeguarded from man-caused deterioration. 
Ufe F orrns Olaracteristic 
of the California Desert 
The California Desert is a region of unusually diverse 
natural terrain. It contains over I ,200 species of higher 
plants, and over 350 species of wild native vertebrates. 
More than 100 of the plant species are unique to the 
region; those of lower plants (fungi, lichens, and the like) 
and the invertebrates number in the thousands, but have 
been little studied. The variety of life forms is due to 
climatic and historical factors, as well as the varied topo-
graphy and soils of the desert. The region contains 
remnants of an ancient hydrologic (water drainage) system 
that existed during the last pluvial period (a time of sub-
stantial runoff from precipitation or glaciers), when rivers 
and lakes occupied the area. 
Many desert organisms are highly specialized to with-
stand extremes of aridity, temperature and light. The 
seeds of some annual plants may lie dormant for many 
years until conditions of moisture and temperature are 
suitable for germination. Then spectacular wildflower 
displays occur. 
Of great interest to the evolutionary biologist are the 
many isolated remnant populations of plants and animals-
fish, amphibians, reptiles, mammals and invertebrates. 
These populations often occur at remote springs, on humid 
mountain tops, or in the sand dunes or playas (desert 
lakes-usually dry). Some are classed as rare or endangered. 
Sand dunes, now a favorite playground for dunebuggy 
enthusiasts, are among the most interesting desert habitats. 
They contain specialized sand-burrowing insects, lizards, 
snakes and unusual plants adapted to life in shifting sands. 
On the dry lakes, eggs of fairy shrimp (primitive crusta-
ceans) can withstand a decade of desiccation, then hatch 
into beautiful translucent aquatic creatures when the 
playas fill after rare storms. 
The desert records much history, from prehistoric 
to recent, in its rocks and land forms. Many fossil deposits 
have yielded remains of plants, shells and vertebrates-
camels, sabre-tooth cats, three-toed horses, mastodons-
and lesser forms. Signs of human occupancy stretch back 
some 12.000 years and hint that man may have been pre· 
sent 50,000 to 80,000 years ago. These earlier occupants 
left a rich archeological heritage. The California Desert 
appears to contain the world's largest collection of pre· 
historic art. 
Thus, the desert provides extraordinary opportunities 
for both basic and applied research. Some examples 
drawn from zoology, botany and paleontology are des· 
cribed briefly below. 
Research in Zoology 
Studies conducted by students and staff of the Univer-
sity of California Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at 
Berkeley provide much of the available base-line infor-
mation on the distribution and habits of land animals 
(terrestrial vertebrates) in California. The Museum's 
collections of California vertebrates are the world's largest 
and constitute a major resource for studies in vertebrate 
evolution and for monitoring effects of environmental 
changes on wildlife. For example, the Museum's wild 
bird egg collection helped document the eggshell-thinning 
effect of the pesticide DDT, and contributed to the studies 
that Jed to its ban. 
Despite many years of exploration, new species and 
varieties and isolated populations of known forms continue 
to be found in California, as, for example when a new 
species of salamander was discovered in 1973 in the arid 
Inyo Mountains. The Gila Monster was discovered recently 
in the little-studied eastern Mojave, the flrst convincing 
evidence for naturally occurring populations of this animal 
in the state. 
The Museum's research program includes studies aimed 
at the protection and conservation of the state's vertebrate 
animal life, with special concern for isolated small popula-
tions. Some are officially classed as threatened, rare or 
endangered. Others remain to be discovered. 
In addition to distributional and natural history studies, 
many zoological investigations have focused on the physio-
logical adjustments made by desert animals in coping 
with environmental extremes, e.g., thermoregulation and 
water metabolism. Professors and students at the Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles and Riverside and Fuller-
ton State University have been particularly active in such 
research. In addition, the work of UCLA's Raymond 
Cowles and his student Charles Bogert, who studied the 
role of temperature in the lives of California Desert reptiles, 
stimulated a major investigation of temperature in the 
physiology, behavior and evolution of vertebrate animals. 
Thermal studies in the California Desert provided advances 
in understanding mechanisms of temperature control, 
and contributed to the understanding of such diverse 
phenomena as the evolution of fur and feathers and the 
extinction of the dinosaurs. 
The invertebrate life of the desert is abundant, varied 
and different from that of most other arid lands of the 
southwest. Much speciation (development of different 
species) is still occurring. There are often major differ-
ences in species populations from canyon to canyon in 
many desert mountain ranges, and from dune to dune. 
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Of particular interest are the ants. There are many 
species and they occur virtually everywhere in the desert. 
They are extremely important in food chain relationships. 
Studies of ants are being conducted at the Deep Canyon 
Desert Research Center of the University of California, 
Riverside, and by researchers at U.C. ·Berkeley and else-
where. 
Important interactions occur between ants and plants. 
In the Vizcaino Desert of Baja California, we found that 
cactus (Opuntia) roots appeared to selectively penetrate 
the nests of the harvester ant (Pogonomynnex) where 
moisture and nutrients were concentrated. A similar 
relationship perhaps exists between ants and plants in the 
California Desert. 
Invertebrate studies are also important in the develop-
ment of biological pest controls. In the desert, experi-
ments have shown the desirability of large natural buffer 
zones, about 10 miles wide, around agricultural areas. 
Wild, free-living predatory and parasitic insects move into 
the agricultural lands and attack the crop pests. A great 
reservoir of natural control species is thus available to 
cope with pest flare-ups. 
• 
Research in Botany 
The dearth of information on desert plants is so great 
and the probable benefits of their study so promising, 
that the National Science Foundation has given extensive 
support to the New York Botanical Garden for a major 
study of vegetation of the southwestern United States. 
Studies of the creosote bush, a dominant desert shrub, 
conducted by Frank Vasek, Hyrum Johnson, and Leone! 
Sternberg, University of California, Riverside, are of special 
interest. Aerial photographs reveal that some creosote 
bushes are arranged in rings. The rings appear to have 
originated from a central point by vegetative segmentation, 
and the individuals that compose them are members of a 
clone (asexually reproduced offspring of a single individu-
al). Cloning seems to be facilitated when the root crown 
is covered by wind or water-borne soil. The center of the 
bush dies, presumably due to drought, and new growth 
develops at the periphery. Ring expansion is very slow 
and is estimated to be less than 1 millimeter (mm.) a 
year, even under optimal conditions. Undecayed wood 
at the center of a ring 30 centimeters (ern.) in diameter 
was found to be approximately 580 years old;2 another 
contained wood approximately 700 years old (radio-
carbon dating). A ring 20.7 meters (m.) in diameter, 
or about 68 feet, has been observed, estimated to be 
over 5,400 years old.3 It is speculated that some of the 
rings go back to the time when the creosote bush was 
first establishing itself following the last ice advance, some 
10,000 years ago. The slow growth rate and plant frag-
ments in fossil middens of woodrats,4 which indicate vege-
tation changes in the desert, have contributed to this 
theory. Painstaking biochemical studies have been per-
formed to determine whether or not the members of a 
ring are all parts of an original fragmenting and expanding 
plant. These tests have required repeated trips to the desert 
to study the same rings. 
Desert botanical research has important practical- as-
pects. Deserts are the largest remaining uncultivated 
land areas with potential for agricultural expansion. Much 
of the world's arid lands research is going on in Australia 
and the southwestern United States, especially in the 
Mojave and Colorado Deserts. Many desert plants may 
prove to be important crop species. An example is jojoba 
(Simmondsia chinensis) under cultivation in Israel and the 
U.S. as a livestock forage plant and as a source of liquid 
wax from its seeds.5 The wax can replace sperm whale 
oil (obtained from an endangered species), an oil used in 
machinery that operates at high speeds and temperatures. 
At this stage all desert varieties of jojoba are considered 
important because it is not known which may prove most 
suitable for crop development. 
Also of interest is the photosynthetic process in "four-
carbon" plants.6 Many desert species are of this type, 
including the salt-bushes (Atriplex). Four-carbon plants 
utilize a four-carbon cycle of photosynthesis, and have 
certain anatomical differences from three-carbon plants. 
The four-carbon plants appear to represent an evolutionary 
adaptation that provides high-efficiency photosynthesis, 
and enables many of these plants to function in climates 
that are hot and dry. Experts suggest that four-carbon 
plants now found in desert environments could play a 
central role in developing agricultural practices and crop 
varieties especially adapted for use in areas having limited 
water supplies. 
Halophytes are also under study. They are salt-tolerant 
plants that take up salts from soils and exude the excess, 
or remove it by dropping parts of their structure as they 
dry. The desert box thorn (Lycium) and Mesembryan-
themum are examples. Salt tolerance is valuable to arid-
land agriculture in the development of crop species, weed 
control and soil desalinization. The U.S. Salinity Labora-
tory at Riverside is investigating such tolerance in crop 
plants. Halophytes can be grown to remove salts from 
soil, thereby preparing the soil for more productive species 
with less salt tolerance. The alkali flats are important 
desert research areas for the study of halophytes, but the 
sites are also attractive to ORV recreationists. 
The University of California at Riverside and the Austra-
lian National University have undertaken a joint study of 
the ecology, physiology and biochemistry of cacti in 
native and favorable exotic environments. One aspect of 
the study pertains to the action of cactus stomates, the 
"breathing pores." The stomates open at night when cacti 
take in most of their carbon dioxide, storing it in an acid 
medium, for use the next day in photosynthesis. In the 
daytime, water loss is minimized by closing the stomates. 
Cacti are used as forage plants. In some areas (Africa, 
Australia, portions of the southwestern United States) 
cacti constitute pests, and knowledge of their physiology 
is important for control purposes. 
Research in Paleontology 
18 
Some of California's richest vertebrate fossil faunas are 
found in the Barstow and Ricardo formations. These are 
famous, internationally known sites, about 12 miles north 
of Barstow, and near Red Rock Canyon, respectively, 
containing priceless scientific and educational resources 
that cannot be duplicated anywhere else on earth. Pale-
ontological exploration of these areas goes back to 1911, 
and study of the rocks at Ricardo to 1871. (The Barstow 
Formation is the namebearer for one of the 17 major sub-
divisions of mammalian evolution over the last 60 million 
years in North America.) Each yielded approximately 100 
kinds of extinct plants and animals, and additional new 
material is coming to light. The Barstow beds contain over 
200 localities; those of the Ricardo over 450. 
Studies on fossil animals in the desert have been con-
ducted by the University of California, California Institute 
of Technology, the American Museum of Natural History, 
the Los Angeles County Museum, and the U.S. Geological 
Survey. The desert has also contributed greatly to the 
paleobotanical investigations of Daniel Axelrod, Profes-
sor Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. More-
over paleontological research in the desert is growing in 
importance as new sites are discovered and old ones are 
more intensively worked. 
Teaching in the Desert 
In the desert as elsewhere research and teaching are 
closely allied and major educational centers located in the 
desert itself attract many students and teachers: notable 
are (1) the Philip L. Boyd Deep Canyon Desert Research 
Center, (2) the Living Desert Reserve at Palm Desert, 
Riverside County, (3) the Barstow Unified School District 
Research Station near Hinkley and (4) the California Desert 
Studies Consortium station at Soda Springs, San Bernardino 
County. Participants in the programs of these centers work 
not only at the centers themselves, but often range widely 
into other parts of the desert. 
To ascertain one recent year's use of the desert for 
teaching and research, the writers conducted a survey (in· 
eluding elementary, junior high school, high school, 
college and university use as well as special groups) from 
October 1975 to June 1977 _7 
With respect to colleges and universities, approximately 
500 questionnaires were sent to nearly all California state 
colleges and universities, all campuses of the University of 
California, most community (or junior) colleges, and most 
private universities and colleges, with a focus on life science 
departments. 
(1) One hundred and ninety respondents estimated a 
total of 47,617 person days (p/d) of use in teaching and 
12,522 in research. (Information is inadequate to estimate 
statewide use.) 
(2) A total of 201 sites were visited. 
(3) Common topics taught were biology, natural 
history, ecology, plant taxonomy, herpetology, ornithol-
ogy, entomology, environmental studies and mammalogy. 
In addition, of the 41 State Chapters of the National 
Audubon Society contacted, 14 reported desert use and 
estimated a total of 8,838 p/d. We also surveyed desert 
use by 9 museums, natural history organizations, and other 
nature-oriented groups; they reported 3,997 p/d for a 
combined total of 12,835 person days. 
Perhaps more unexpected is the extent to which Cali-
fornia's public and private schools make use of the desert 
for teaching purposes. At this level, the survey and its 
results were as follows: 
(I) Most of the public and private schools in 8 Southern 
California counties in or near the desert (part of Los 
Angeles County excepted) were queried as to teaching 
use. Approximately 3,000 questionnaires were mailed. 
Three hundred and thirty-five respondents estimated a 
total of 132,374 person days of use. We project actual 
use to have been at least 182,000 p/d. Adding spot-check 
returns from elsewhe.re in the state to projected use, brings 
the total to over 183,000 p/d. (There are insufficient 
data to estimate statewide use.) 
(2) Many additional schools would go to the desert 
if funds, transportation and other needs were met. Out 
of 1,082 negative returns, 683 (63 percent) expressed 
such a desire. 
(3) A total of 187 specific sites of use, widely dis-
tributed over the desert, were reported. 
(4) Topics most commonly studied were general science 
and biology by elementary schools and biology and geology 
by junior high schools and high schools. 
Total Estimate for 
Desert Educational Use 
Combining information reported by precollege, higher 
education and the organized groups, we obtained a figure of 
207,328 p/d; adding to this our projected public and 
private school use, we estimate a minimum of 256,892 p/d 
of educational use of the desert by this group of respon-
dents (548 persons) during a recent average year (since 
1975). We calculate our margin of error in interpreting 
results as less than 4 percent. The public and private 
schools and colleges and universities together, visited a 
total of 272 sites in the desert. 
Human Impacts and Demands 
Upon the Desert 
Until quite recently the desert remained relatively un-
disturbed by man's activities. But now the pressure of 
rapid growth and ·economic and recreational demands 
threatens natural environments. The desert faces the same 
fate that has befallen many other natural places in the 
United States and elsewhere. Situated near high density 
population areas in Southern California, the desert serves 
as a safety-valve, relieving some of the effects of crowding 
and the pressures of city life. Its own rigors and the fact 
that its values were little known, once protected it from 
substantial intrusion by civilized man. However, with the 
popularization of campmobiles and off-road vehicles which 
provide comfort and mobility, the desert has become 
readily accessible even in remote areas, and is attractive 
for outings to large numbers of people. 
Moreover, increasing demands for energy have intensi-
fied the search for sites for solar, geothermal and atomic 
plants. Powerlines, housing and agriculture are on the 
increase, and overgrazing has seriously disturbed natural 
environments in some parts of the desert. Many of these 
developments conflict with each other, as well as with 
traditional, usually benign, uses of the desert, such as 
"on foot" recreation, sight-seeing, picnicking, tent-camping, 
nature study, and teaching and research. 
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Desert lands are particularly vulnerable to mechanical 
disturbances, overgrazing, and other kinds of human-related 
impact. Activities that damage or destroy soil structure 
and vegetation increase water erosion and wind erosion. 
Dust can be expected to increase,8 accompanied by pro-
perty damage, soil loss, and perhaps increased health 
hazards.9 Following the Barstow-Vegas motorcycle race, 
November 30, 1974, dust fall in one area was recorded 
as approximately 30 percent above normal during a period 
of one month.10 Plant cover-damaging activities may 
increase the ground surface albedo (reflectivity), so that 
light reflection from the desert surface may increase, with 
possible significant effects on local climate. 
In the open unobstructed terrain of the desert, environ-
mental features lie exposed, readily visible, accessible and 
vulnerable. The desert's antiquities are especially in danger. 
These include ancient creosote bushes; rock pavements 
that have remained undisturbed and exposed to the sun for 
2,000 years; rare plant and animal species, remnant popu-
lations found nowhere else; fossil deposits; and prehis-
toric and historic human artifacts. 
Effects of Conflicting Uses 
Survey respondents were asked to ·note any disturbances 
that interfered with their educational pursuits in the desert. 
Off-road vehicles were ranked as most disturbing by all 
educational groups, followed by vandalism (noted by 
schools and college and university groups) and urban and 
housing expansion (noted by organizations). Vandalism, 
which includes damage to study sites and equipment, 
and destruction of the natural objects of study, is aided 
by the mobility of ORVs. 
Of the 17 respondents who ranked disturbances, 14 
scored ORVs as highest. Reasons for the high scoring of 
uncontrolled ORVs are apparent. ORVs damage, and 
sometimes completely destroy, the subjects of study-
geologic features, soil, plants, animals, fossils, and arche-
ological sites.11 They make it difficult to fmd protected 
sites for field observations and research. People who are 
interested in nature study avoid areas where cross-country 
ORVs occur because of the noise, dust and threat of in-
jury to persons on foot. 
Many desert studies require months or even years of 
close attention, and a researcher's investment in his project 
grows with time. This emphasizes the vulnerability of 
desert research to the impact of vehicles. 
Vehicles off-road can quickly degrade natural environ-
ments. A single motorcycle travelling 20 miles impacts 
one full acre of soil; an average four-wheel drive vehicle 
affects one full acre in only 6 miles of travel. Even a 
single pass by an ORV, under some conditions, can start 
deleterious changes in a natural community by spreading 
weeds. Tumbleweeds (Sa/sola) have been found growing 
in single motorcycle tracks. In some areas these plants 
have significantly altered the entire biotic community. 
F. R. Fosberg, an authority on alien plant species, has 
warned that unless it is desired to change the character of 
the vegetation and thus much of the landscape of the 
desert, vehicular traffic in the desert must be limited to 
established roads. A number of studies have now docu-
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mented the decline in abundance and diversity of native 
plants and animals in ORV areas in our wild lands. 
Fossil sites are also highly vulnerable. Deposits of bones, 
shells, petrified wood and leaf impressions have been ripped 
apart, scattered and pulverized. Tell-tale "signs," small 
fragments of bone and other fossil materials on the surface, 
that may lead a scientist to a new fossil discovery, are 
obliterated. ORVs have entered the famous Ricardo 
deposits, the Coso beds, and other important fossil-
yielding areas. 
There are more subtle damaging effects. The behavior 
of resident animals that are still present in ORV use areas 
may be altered. There may be damage to their hearing, 
interference with their communication signals, and physio-
logical stress induced by the noise, sight, ground vibrations 
and fumes of vehicles. Desert iguanas experimentally sub-
jected to motorcycle sounds at sound pressure levels 
found in the vicinity of ORV "pits" (areas of concentrated 
ORV "play") have suffered losses in hearing.12 The 
sounds are transmitted with damaging force even into 
their burrows. 
Many desert animals have daily routines of activity and 
rest that provide little margin of safety if disrupted. In 
warmer weather some desert lizards are active only about 
six hours a day. Prolonged inactivity is necessary for sur-
vival when temperatures are high and humidity low. ORVs 
disrupt patterns of foraging, breeding, thermoregulation 
and rest. They cause burrows to collapse, destroying re-
fuges that are crucial to desert animals in escaping environ-
mental extremes. By breaking desert crusts they make 
burrow construction for some animals difficult or impos-
sible in some areas, because an intact crust is required to 
prevent collapse of burrows near the surface. 
Any natural area is a complex mosaic of unique biotic 
features. No two square meters are quite the same. On a 
quarter-mile walk in the desert, for example, one might 
intersect a communal egg-laying site for lizards; a hiber-
nation site for snakes; an amphibian breeding area; spe-
cial soil conditions supporting growth of a community of 
rare plants; a wash bank containing burrows of tortoises; 
an isolated population of lizards found nowhere else in 
the area; a fossil site; and many features unseen and un-
known. All are fragile and readily damaged by cross-
country ORVs. Many are uncommon and several attract 
prime, breeding adults to a limited area. Such a range in 
biotic variety along short stretches in natural environ-
ments is not uncommon. Every time a vehicle is driven 
off-road in such lands there is the risk of damaging or 
destroying unique biological resources. 
Moreover unregulated motorized intrusions do more 
than damage the scientific and educational resources of the 
desert. They also destroy important visual and esthetic 
values. Thus a desert defaced by the long-lasting tracks of 
off-road vehicles is no longer primal desert, but has lost 
some of its worth as an undisturbed wilderness resource. 
While environmental disfigurement is usually abundantly 
clear to the layman's eye virtually anywhere mechanized 
equipment is used in the desert, it is perhaps most visually 
obvious during the periodic blooming of desert wild-
flowers. 
Management Responses: 
Plans for the Desert 
Since the late 1960's, the BLM has been studying the 
environment and use patterns in the desert. Environ-
mental damage in many areas was obvious, and problems 
of sanitation, littering, vandalism, traffic and personal 
safety of desert users were pressing. The planning effort 
was, in considerable measure, prompted by the very rapid 
increase in off-road vehicle recreation that began in the 
late 1960's. In 1973, President Nixon issued an Executive 
Order, no. 11644, pertaining to ORV regulation and con-
trol (it was recently amended but without much change). 
The Order called upon federal agencies to prepare regula-
tions controlling ORVs on lands under their custody. 
The planning process for the desert is now far advanced: 
Areas have been set aside for ORV recreation; a BLM pub-
lic education center has been established at Barstow, 
California; and many critical habitats and species popula-
tions have been identified and protection areas designated. 
Maps have been published showing places for recreational 
vehicle use. The BLM now has police power and a staff 
of desert rangers. Planning for the entire desert is to be 
completed by 1980. However, at this date, rapid deteri-
oration of the desert continues, chiefly because many 
people using it lack understanding of its fragile ecology 
and some are indifferent to its natural values. Conse-
quently adequate regulatory policies and policing measures 
are essential. This is principally the job of the BLM. 
In addition to the desert, other BLM concerns include 
the regulation of grazing, mining and other land uses as 
increasing numbers of people strain the capacity of the 
desert to withstand human impact. 
Special Areas Needing Protection 
There are now far more data available on the desert's 
natural values and on the effects of various kinds of human 
impact than when the BLM first began publishing its 
management plans. The present report adds further to 
this expanding data base. 
The natural lands of the California Desert constitute 
a unique teaching and research facility. There appears to 
be no other place on earth where such a biologically and 
historically rich desert environment has been subjected to 
such breadth of study over such a long period by a variety 
of academic disciplines. The desert is logistically well 
situated for such investigations. 
The arid lands of the southwestern United States, Mexi-
co, and in particular, the California Desert, and the desert 
lands of Australia and Israel are emerging as important 
foci for arid lands research. These are the areas where 
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manpower, funding and proximity provide unmatched 
opportunities and where research and teaching programs 
are exerting important guiding influences on the use and 
management of desert lands throughout the world. 
Our survey has helped identify a number of areas that 
we believe should be set aside primarily for their wild 
land values and long-term use for non-mechanized recrea-
tion, nature-study, teaching and research. These areas, 
which already have a long tradition of such use, include: 
(1) The Kelso Basin, including Kelso Dunes, Soda Dry 
Lake, and flanking mountains-the Providence Mountains 
and the Granites. This is an outstanding natural area, as 
yet little disturbed by man. It. may well qualify for Na-
tional Park or Monument status. The area presently vies 
with Death Valley, Joshua Tree National Monument and 
Anza-Borrego State Park in frequency of use by school 
groups. Eighty-one respondents reported use of the area-
more than listed for either Death Valley or Anza·Borrego 
State Park. 
(2) The Pisgah and Amboy lava flows. These lava areas 
conUlin alternating patches of. pale wind-blown sand and 
black lava, resulting in a remarkable mixture of sand and 
rock-dwelling organisms. 
(3) Jawbone Canyon area. This and nearby Red Rock 
Canyon contain major fossil deposits. 
(4) The Algodones Dunes and adjacent mesas. The 
area has one of the richest dune biotas in the world-
containing many endemic plants and animals. Major 
sections of it should be designated for teaching and re-
search and non-mechanized recreation. 
Conclusion: Second Thoughts 
on Multiple Use 
Finally, it seems essential to re-examine the multiple use 
concept as applied to open natural terrain, such as is found 
in arid lands. It is not possible, in our judgment, to pro-
tect wild land values while at the same time allowing a 
geographically fme-grain interplay of many uses. The broad 
desert expanses notable for their silence, the delicate and 
precariously situated biota, the lack of screening :vegeta· 
tion, which in forests impedes sights and sounds of human 
and vehicle activity, all call for special planning. It is 
evident from our studies that off-road vehicle recreation 
is incompatible with teaching and research in the desert. 
The two activities must be well separated physically. 
We have found that teaching and research in the en-
vironmental sciences have been major activities in desert 
use for many years .. Like traditional forms of recreation-
hiking, camping and sight-seeing-educational use usually 
leaves the land unmarred. The academic interests grade 
into the traditional recreational ones; both are oriented 
toward the land and its natural features. The knowledge 
and appreciation of the desert gained through teaching 
and research fosters respect for the land and develops 
the wisdom to provide for its proper management. 
The extensive use of the desert by nature-oriented 
visitors and by school classes and researchers, which 
is documented here, argues strongly for conservation of 
the desert's natural features. 
The future of our wild lands depends upon the develop-
ment of a land ethic in which all citizens see themselves 
as part of the earth's community of living beings, and as-
sume a moral responsibility for that community's welfare. 
There is also need for vigilance in seeing that governmental 
agencies and other institutions adopt and implement 
the protective policies necessary. 
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COASTAL CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT: 
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Diablo Valley College 
Under the California Coastal Act of 1976 the 68 cities 
and counties of the state's Pacific shore are required to 
draft plans for the conservation and development of the 
coast. In preparing, adopting and implementing plans, 
the local governments must relate not only to their usual 
local constituencies, but also to a new statewide constitu-
ency. While admittedly some members of the new con-
stituency reside in or own property within the jurisdiction 
of coastal local governments, this larger group is not con-
fined to coastal cities and counties. By definition the 
statewide constituency includes all the people of California. 
The coastal zone has been declared a resource to be 
managed for the benefit of this larger constituency .1 
The California Coastal Commission has been established 
to see that statewide interests in the conservation and 
development of the coast are protected. The commission 
relates to the coastal cities and counties through a planning 
and permit process-a process in which primary responsi· 
bility for balancing statewide and local interests has been 
placed upon the local coastal governments. 
The conservation and development of the coastal zone 
is further complicated by federal requirements that must 
be met to assure continued funding under the Federal 
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Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. In fact, there 
may be "national constituency" pressures, in addition to 
those from local and statewide constituencies. 
The zone's. ecology is declared by the state act to be 
especially fragile and in need of extraordinary protection. 
On the other hand, within this protective framework, 
development is also to take place. Furthermore, develop-
ment is intended to benefit the new, larger statewide con-
stituency by contributing to its economic well-being, 
as well as meeting some of its recreational needs. 
Proposition 20-the California coastal initiative of 
1972-set up a temporary state coastal commission. That 
commission was empowered to regulate coastal develop-
ment (1973 through 1976) while it prepared a plan for 
California's coastal zone and adjacent territory. The plan 
was submitted to the Legislature in December 1975, setting 
forth a land use map and calling for the creation of a 
permanent successor agency. In 1976, after debate and 
compromise in which the Governor played a significant 
role, the Legislature did establish a permanent state coastal 
com111ission, and inserted it into the existing web of govern-
ment, effective January I, 1977. However, the Legislature 
did not adopt the plan or _the accompanying land use map. 
Generalized though they were, the plan and map were 
more specific than the environmental elements in most city 
and county plans. Thus, if the California coastal plan and 
map had been adopted, they would have had a strong, 
official role in the future planning of the coastal zone. This 
would have placed the coastal commission in a position 
comparable to that of the San Francisco Bay Conservation 
and Development Commission (BCDC) with respect to the 
Bay and local governments around the Bay. 
Editor's note: Since 1961 Lenard Grote has served as councilman, and three times as mayor of Pleasant Hill, a city of 25,000 population 
in Contra Costa County. Since 1974 he has been a member of the Executive Committee of the Association of Bay Area Governments. and in 
1976-78 he served a two-year term as President of ABAG. 
From the formation in 1973 of the North Central Coast Regional Commission-including coastal portions of San Francisco. Marin and 
Sonoma counties-he has been a member of that commission, serving as the appointee of ABAG. 
In 1976-77, while on sabbatical leave from Diablo Valley College. he spent some time in the Institute of Governmental Studies, reading 
and retlecting on the implications of coastal governance as observed and interpreted from his vantage points as a local elected official. presi· 
dent of a council of governments, and member of a regional coastal commission. This article outlines some of his principal conclusions. 
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The new law requires coastal cities and counties to 
develop their own local plans for their coastal areas, under 
guidelines laid out by the state commission. The local 
coastal plans (LCPs) must be reviewed and certified by the 
state commission.2 During the transitional period prior 
to certification the state commission has permit review 
authority over developmental proposals in the coastal 
zone. It will also provide permanent back-up controls 
over future modifications of local plans, over near-shore 
and sensitive areas, and as a guard against failures in local 
plan enforcement that would threaten statewide inter-
ests. 
While it may appear that the powers of the state coastal 
commission make it the governing body for the coastal 
zone, this is not really true. Legislative and administrative 
power for implementing the LCPs will be returned to the 
local governments. 
Traditional Land Use Planning and Zoning 
Land use planning and zoning has grown in complexity 
as new demands have been made on it. Traditionally, the 
principal function was to sort out private and public uses 
of land and integrate them so that the developing diversity 
of land uses could proceed with a degree of what the 
planners and decisionmakers consider to be rationality. 
The state delegated the power to carry out the planning 
and zoning to cities and counties, as an expansion of the 
local governments' police powers to guard and promote 
the community's health, safety and general welfare. 
In the case of planning and zoning, each local govern-
ment has its own body politic within the boundaries of 
its jurisdiction. Accordingly each local government has 
historically planned and zoned for its own constituency, 
ROt for the health, safety and welfare of the population 
of the state. This is the very essence of local home rule. 
Until the coastal law came into effect, state government 
had never established regulatory agencies or other machine· 
ry to monitor the contents of local general plans. 
Relation of Planning/Zoning to 
Local Government Revenue 
As local planning and zoning proceeded in California, 
its effects on the land market soon became apparent and 
impinged upon local governments' property tax resources. 
Every local government is expected by its constituency 
to provide services and finance them. The property tax 
rate is applied against the jurisdiction's tax base-the sum 
of the assessed valuation of all parcels of property within 
the jurisdiction. Those values ultimately depend upon the 
development that takes place on each parcel, which in turn 
depends upon the planning and zoning policies applied to 
each parcel. 
Those who deal in the land market-and this inchides 
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a great many people-have either a direct or indirect eco-
nomic interest in local plans and zoning. At the same time, 
local governments have a continuing interest in maintaining 
and expanding their property tax bases. In this process 
there are windfalls and wipe-outs for individuals, as well 
as great debates over what is in the public interest for 
the local constituency. 
These conflicts are likely to continue to accentuate 
the competition between different possible uses of land. 
Usable land is fmite, and will grow scarce, especially in 
the coastal zone, as additional ecological constraints are 
imposed. This emphasizes the urgent need to fmd a new 
balance between and among the uses ofland. 
It is frequently asserted that the private sector 
uses land as a commodity, while the public sector 
preserves it as a resource. To these assertions are 
often added the judgment that land as a commodity 
is "used up" in pursuit of self-interest, whereas land 
held publicly is retained as a resource for generations 
to come. At least these are the arguments of politi-
cal confrontation, but they do not help illuminate 
man's relation to the land. 
Virgin land is a source from which parcels are 
drawn for many kinds of uses. For example, some 
of it may be converted to agriculture and diligently 
worked as farms. Other portions may be enjoyed 
in a leisurely way as beaches for recreation. In both 
cases, the land used becomes a commodity-service-
able in the processes of production and/or consump-
tion. 
There is no necessity for land to be laid waste. 
Thus, if land is used so that its essential propenies 
are preserved, it may be used again and again for 
either production or consumption, and remain a 
resource. The use of land makes it a commodity; its 
C11Teful use makes it a resource. 
If land is not mistreated, the resource may be 
serviceable for generations. Through time it may be 
owned in a variety of ways-by individuals or groups, 
including the public. But the essential requirement 
is that it be protected against destructive misuse, 
and not treated as an expendable commodity. 
Land planning-including policymaking by elected 
and appointed officials-is an evolving art that at-
tempts to systematize the careful use of both private-
ly and publicly owned land. If the art matures and is 
universally practiced, all land, including the coastal 
areas of California, may be retained as a resource. 
Local governments are clearly in competition with each 
other in trying to attract the kinds of land development 
that fit into their zoning patterns and enhance their prop-
erty tax bases. Such competition was augmented when the 
state adopted its formula for subventing a portion of the 
state sales tax to cities and counties. The formula gives 
each local government a share of the total sales tax gener-
ated by the stores, markets, warehouses, and other com-
mercial activities within its jurisdiction. The local govern-
ments compete with each other for private facilities-
especially regional shopping centers-to locate within 
their boundaries. Since retail stores, for example, can 
only locate on land zoned for such activity, each city and 
county must work such zoning into its land use plan and 
zoning ordinances. 
For each city and county there is a relationship between 
revenue from the property tax and the sales tax. Given a 
level of expenditure for facilities and services, property 
tax rates can be lowered only if sales tax revenue increases, 
other things being equal. Again, every local government 
is in competition with neighboring governments for avail-
able development, while a continuing set of arguments with 
private developers goes on. Local governments hope to 
gain public revenue from each development, but also to 
put such constraints and conditions on developments as 
are necessary to achieve the public goals laid out in the 
general plan. All of this has been referred to as the "plan-
ning game." 
Mandated Responsibility to Protect 
the Environment 
To the complex set of planning and zoning practices, 
the state has added another function: protecting ecological 
relationships. Through the technique of Environmental 
Impact Reports (EIRs), required by the California Environ-
mental Quality Act (CEQA), each proposed development 
must be analyzed from the standpoint of its impact on the 
environment. All significant impacts must be mitigated 
to a degree in one way or another. Such requirements 
increase the incidence of wipe-outs for some private devel-
opers and add to the costs of development. On the other 
hand, the requirements charge each local jurisdiction to 
plan for the protection of the environment within its 
area. 
Some local governments-depending upon who had 
been elected to local office-had been moving in this 
direction prior to CEQA. With the mandating of this 
function, all local governments must be concerned, but 
there is still wide variation among the many cities and 
counties. This aspect of planning and development also 
enters into the local political arena as a basis for much 
debate over the degree of environmental concern that is 
in the constituency's interest. Once again, however, it 
should be noted that the state has not established a state-
wide agency to set specific environmental standards, or to 
monitor the content and quality of city and county en-
vironmental planning; nor has it declared the environment 
within city and county boundaries to be a resource for 
all the people of the state. 
25 
Disenchantment with City/County Planning 
Within the Coastal Zone 
The responsibility' of cities and counties for regulating 
land usage has gradually increased, and the goals to be 
achieved by planning and zoning have expanded. City and 
county responses to this responsibility have also varied 
increasingly. Perhaps this tangle of responses-plus the 
competition already noted-contributed to some Califor-
nians' disenchantment with local governments' ability to 
plan and zone for the environment's protection. Or, per-
haps it was the growing realization that ecological relation-
ships are not confined to the boundaries of cities and 
counties, but instead spread out in a seamless web across 
geographic regions. At any rate, fueled by dissatisfaction 
with city and county performance, environmentalist 
groups united and campaigned successfully for Proposi-
tion 20. The measure took ultimate planning and develop-
ment decisions affecting the coastal zone (i.e., in the 
permit area) away from the cities and counties and gave 
it to a temporary coastal commission. 
Thus for four years, 1973 through 197 6, cities and coun-
ties lost power to control development in the zone's permit 
area and the traditional planning game was interrupted. 
While private owners and public agencies could still initiate 
development proposals, ultimate governmental control was 
exercised by the state commission. That commission had 
no motivation to advance the goals contained in the 68 
general plans and zoning ordinances of the coastal cities 
and counties, nor any responsibility or power to provide 
services and facilities within the zone. It was not account-
able to voters in the 68 jurisdictions, nor for that matter 
to the voters of the state; members of the state commis-
sion and its six regional commissions were appointed in a 
variety of ways and were responsible for applying the 
criteria contained in Proposition 20. 
Motivation for each perrnit application came from a 
developer. Environmentalists or others could oppose the 
application at public _hearings conducted by the regional 
and state commissions. In short, environmentalists had 
a new political arena that was comparatively free from local 
governmental, fmancial and other trade-off considerations. 
Proposition 20 contained planning goals which for four 
years were used in lieu of a general plan for the zone. 
The fundamental approach of Proposition 20 was to leave 
to the Legislature the fmal determination of how the 
coastal zone was to be controlled. The temporary com-
mission had the power to allow environmentally sound 
development, and to prepare a plan for the zone for the 
Legislature's consideration. The plan was to recommend 
a permanent governmental and financial structure for the 
zone. On schedule, in December 1975, the plan was laid 
before the Legislature. 
Coastal Act of 197 6 Restores the Planning 
Powers of Coastal Cities and Counties 
From the opening of the 1976 legislative session it 
was obvious that there was well organized opposition 
to the commission's proposal as introduced. Included 
was a coalition of developers and labor unions, as well 
as the statewide organizations of counties and cities. Later 
the League .of California Cities supponed the coastal 
legislation, after changes were amended into the bill. 
The first bill containing the nlan. though amended many 
times, was killed in a Senate committee. A second bill 
was also amended many times. 
The legislation fmally enacted-The Coastal Act of 
1976-does not include a state-adopted general plan for the 
zone. Thus, in effect it lacks the fundamental planning 
tool submitted by the temporary commission. However, 
many of the policies upon which the temporary commis-
sion based its coastal map are found in the coastal act, 
and coastal cities and counties are directed to incorporate 
these into their local coastal plans. 
Whatever its reasons, the Legislature in effect restored 
to the 68 local jurisdictions coastal planning and zoning 
responsibility. The coastal act's irmova tive steps are to 
outline the planning goals and policies the coastal cities and 
counties should include in their LCPs, and to establish a 
permanent commission to monitor their initial drafting 
and future amendment. Also the concept of a permit 
procedure, with a public hearing for each coastal zone de-
velopment, is retained but will be conducted in the ftrst 
instance by local cities and counties. A limited appeal 
procedure to the state commission is retained. But the 
new process cannot avoid the trade-off considerations 
in which all local governments are involved. 
Among the many policies coastal cities and counties 
must consider in developing their LCPs are these concepts: 
(1) the coastal zone has a particularly fragile ecology that 
needs protection; (2) it constitutes a resource that must 
be conserved, restored, and where appropriate, developed 
for all of the people of the state; (3) agricultural ust of 
land is to be encouraged and aided; and ( 4) visitor-serving 
facilities are· also to be encouraged. The act provides no 
additional funding for cities and counties to accomplish 
any of this.3 In fact, the Legislature offers little money to 
the cities or counties, or to the new commission, to pay for 
costs of developing the LCPs, but instead looks to the 
federal government for planning funds-assuming that 
such grants will be available in the years ahead. 
Probable Consequences of the Restoration 
During a transition period the state commission and the 
six regional commissions will continue to exercise permit 
control over development in the zone. In this period, 68 
coastal cities and counties will work on LCPs, trying to 
meet a strict time schedule, but many cities and counties 
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already appear to be behind schedule. While the Legislature 
can amend the .. due dates," even scheduling probably will 
become a political question. As in all such matters, some 
cities and counties may have fallen behind schedule deliber-
'\ately as a matter of strategy. In the interim, the commis-
sion does not perceive its role to be the actual drafting of 
a plan to reflect statewide interests. Rather, it will be at-
tempting to see that each of 68 LCPs reflects such inter-
ests-encouraging each local government to interpret the 
act's policies for the benefit of a statewide constituency, 
as well as for the benefit of each local constituency. This 
is a monumental task. 
The pressures of the old planning game still operate on 
each coastal city and county government. Each must still 
view every parcel of land in its jurisdiction, and existing or 
potential development on it, in light of the government's 
fmancial position. Each is still in competition with its 
neighbor for potential beneficial development. Each act of 
a local official is still accountable to the local voters. Few, 
if any, could gain political strength locally by championing 
the rights of a statewide constituency in the development 
of an LCP, if it runs counter to irnponant local-constitu-
ency interests. Consequently as the 1981 certification time 
draws near, the commission will probably be confronted by 
countless debates with many if not most coastal cities and 
counties. How decisively can the commission act as these 
debates unfold? 
Weakness in the Coastal Commission's Position 
In effect the Coastal Act of 1976 injects the state com-
mission into the planning games of 68 coastal jurisdictions. 
(Proposition 20 did not do so.) Furthermore, the 1976 
act gives the commission only limited ability to prevail 
in the impending debates. It is import~t to remember that 
the Legislature in 1976 almost failed to act-the planning 
and permit procedures established by Proposition 20 
almost came to an end. Since then, the Legislature is 
widely believed to have become more anti control. This 
is frequently referred to as the emergence of the "Dow 
Syndrome"; an impatience with environmental controls 
that might discourage private development. Many people 
involved in the act's administration seem to fear that the 
Legislature will weaken the act if the commission even 
appears to be discouraging development. Also to the point, 
there is still apparent opposition to the commission as a 
threat to "home rule" of cities and counties. 
The act itself contains another threat to the commis-
sion's effectiveness. By law, the six regional commissions 
will soon terminate. In addition, another round of appoint· 
ments to the state commission is soon to begin. Six mem-
bers of the state commission will continue to be chosen 
directly by the Legislature and the Governor. The remain-
ing six, however, will be appointed through a complicated 
process involving nominations of city councilmen and 
county supervisors by coastal city and county representa-
tives, with final selections to be made by the Governor 
and Legislature from among the local officials nominated. 
When the new appointment formula is fully operative 
after the regional commissions have gone out of existence, 
a significant shift in the composition of the state coastal 
commission will occur. Presently it numbers only one 
locally elected official in its membership. The new ap-
pointment formula, however, will mean that at least six of 
the 12 voting members are locally elected officials. This 
will be a major change that is likely to have a substantial 
effect on the state commission's voting pattern.
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Presently, some of the state commissioners already 
favor weak control over the LCP process. After the next 
round of appointments, this position will probably pre-
vail. If the appointment process and the commission's 
composition thus influence the certification of LCPs, the 
commission will undoubtedly continue to have a major 
influence thereafter. Once an LCP is certified, the permit 
approval process passes from the commission to the local 
governments. At that point local governments' inter-
pretation of the LCP and its application to each permit 
proposal becomes paramount and, once again, develop-
ment along the coast will be returned to the control of 68 
competing local governments. Mter certification, certain 
kinds of appeals can still be taken to the state commission, 
but the numbers of permit decisions appealed to the state 
level will depend on the actions of applicants and so-called 
"watch dog" environmental groups. In any event, a gloomy 
prediction is that not many appeals carried by environ-
mentalist groups will be successful before a commission 
dominated by those sympathetic to local control. 
The Consequences of Inadequate Funding 
The temporary commission established by Proposition 
20 had no powers of acquisition, development or taxation. 
It had no ability to undo coastal development that had 
damaged the environment. It was not intended to have 
such ability; it was a holding device, a means of arresting 
trends for four years until a permanent mechanism was 
created by the state. 
The· absence of implementing powers was understand-
able for a temporary agency, but even the plan submitted 
in December 1975 was deficient in recommendations as 
to how an effective restoration program for the zone could 
be paid for. The proposed plan analyzed the damage 
already done and outline~ policies which, if instituted, 
would prevent further damage. There were, however, no 
estimates of the money needed to undo the development 
already in place, nor recommendations of sources for such 
money. Furthermore, the plan, through its recommended 
policies, asserted that new acquisitions and public facilities 
were needed to achieve goals for the statewide constituen-
cy, but once again, no reliable source of revenue such as 
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new taxing power was proposed. The Coastal Act of 1976 
does not address these fmancing needs. 
Furthermore the state has not provided sufficient 
funds to finance, or even to match the enormous sums of 
federal assistance that might be available to finance the 
public transportation systems, low cost housing, subsi-
dies to farmers, additional sewer and water systems, and all 
of the other facilities that are required to convert the coast 
into a usable resource for all of the people of the state. 
In fact, the permanent coastal commission really does not 
even have state funds adequate to support the preparation 
of state-mandated LCPs. Two possible sources that might 
provide significant fmancial help-whose dimensions and 
future are unknown at this writing-are Governor Brown's 
Urban Strategy, and President Carter's forthcoming urban 
programs. 
In 1976, the Legislature also created, by separate act, 
the state Coastal Conservancy, with power to acquire land 
and to grant and lend money. It may purchase agricultural 
lands that are in danger of falling to other uses, as well as 
land within Resource Protection Zones. The conservancy 
may-make grants to local governments, or to the state 
Department of Parks and Recreation, to do some kinds of 
restoration work and to develop public access to regionally 
significant portions of the coastline. The conservancy can 
also lend money to the Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion to preserve some kinds of sites. 
Significant sums of money spent annually over a sus-
tained period of time could address many problems. To 
date, however, the funding of the new agency has consisted 
only of a small portion of a state bond issue passed in 1976. 
Whilt: the conservancy is not now funded adequately, 
the situation might change in the future. In fact, if some of 
the fmancing mentioned above materializes, it may come 
through the conservancy. If such funding attains signifi-
cant proportions, however, one must also note that the use 
of this separate agency would further divert power away 
from the coastal commission. Moreover, a new set of 
actors-the five-member board of the conservancy and 
its staff-will in any case be added to the already complex 
governmental equation. In any event, so long as the con-
servancy has little money at its disposal, the agency will 
not have much effect. 
Most assuredly, coastal cities and counties have acquired 
no new source of funds for achieving statewide goals. Of 
course, the act charges the cities and counties with plan-
ning for such statewide goals in their LCPs, but is silent on 
new sources of revenue. Even if the coastal city and county 
governments could persuade their local constituencies that 
the zone ought to be used for statewide purposes, it is 
doubtful that they could ever persuade local voters that 
funds from the local property tax and sales tax should be 
used to pay for such facilities. In fact, few if any coastal 
city council members or county supervisors would approve 
such procedures. 
Instead, it is predictable that local leaders will try to 
construct LCPs that reflect local goals more than they do 
state goals, and later will also probably interpret certified 
LCPs to local advantage. They will resist any attempt to 
use local monies to fmance facilities for statewide use, and 
will contest the coastal commission if it tries to force them 
to do otherwise. They will battle the commission by lobby-
ing in Sacramento to change the act, and by seeking the 
appointment to the commission of sympathetic commis-
sioners; in brief, by co-opting the commission. 
Needed: A Balance of Powers 
As things stand, effective provision has not been made to 
undo the considerable damage already done to the coastal 
environment by years of unwise development. True, the 
trend toward further damage was changed at least tem-
porarily by Proposition 20's coastal commission, and this 
policy is being continued by the present interim commis-
sion. But as basic control of the zone passes back to cities 
and counties, the policy of conservation, restoration and 
development, with a balance of local and state interests, 
is likely to be blunted because of the conditions under 
which cities and counties must operate. 
If the Legislature had a strong majority that was deter-
mined to secure environmental and developmental balance 
in the coastal lands, it might have created-and could still 
establish-mechanisms sufficient to accomplish the complex 
task. If the coastal zone is to be a statewide resource, then 
sufficient and reliable statewide funds should be provided 
to fmance the facilities and services entailed by that state-
wide designation. Such funds could be channeled to cities 
and counties, if it is desired to retain power for their 
governments within the zone. This would seem appropriate 
in order to have a means of balancing the rights and inter-
ests of the local constituents against the rights and inter-
ests of the state constituency. 
To insure that the local city and countY· officials use 
such funds for state purposes, however, the state funds 
should come through the coastal commission. Coastal cities 
and counties would then receive funds from the commis-
sion on demonstrating that their LCPs contained policies 
that would advance state goals, as well as local goals. This 
would give the commission an effective means of main-
taining its end of the balance. 
Finally, the membership of the commission should be 
as fully responsible to the state constituency as local 
officials are responsible to their local constituencies. The 
threat of co-optation should not hang over it. Perhaps 
the membership of the state commission should be re-
duced to the six clearly state-level positions now filled by 
the state appointing authorities. Or perhaps the number of 
state-level positions should be increased, maybe to nine or 
11, in order to insure a broader base. But the additional 
positions should be filled in the same manner as the basic 
six state seats are now, i.e., chosen by state appointing 
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authorities, without requirements that any members be 
locally elected officials. 
The Basic Change: 
The Shift Back Toward Home Rule 
Both Proposition 20 and the coastal act made a basic 
change in local home rule in the coastal zone. That change 
requires a governmental structure that recognizes a new, 
larger constituency with coastal rights and interests that 
should be actively advanced. 
First, the state spelled out, as never before, how the 
environment was to be protected from certain kinds of 
development. Second, local coastal governments were 
directed to carry out the LCP process. But the state law 
did not relieve those governments of their local involve-
ments and responsibilities. As a result, some important 
questions remain: How can local government be faithful 
to its role in community representation, while also being 
responsible to a second, statewide constituency'? How can 
any government be responsible to two constituencies, 
especially when the two have conflicting interests? 
If the Legislature had been willing to take coastal zone 
control from cities and counties, it might have established 
a structure similar to the Bay Conservation and Develop-
ment Commission in its relationship to the cities and 
counties around San Francisco Bay. By adopting a plan 
submitted by BCDC and making the latter-a regulatory 
agency-the administrator of the plan, the Legislature 
permanently transferred power over the Bay and a narrow 
band of Bay frontage from the cities and counties to 
BCDC. . 
Admittedly, there are significant differences in the two 
situations. In the case of the Bay, the principal target for 
control is the Bay waters. The 1 00 foot strip of bayshore 
was transferred to BCDC's regulatory jurisdiction as a 
means to that end. In the case of the coastal zone, the 
target for control is not the ocean as such, but the land in 
the zone itself -a little under 1,000 yards wide on the 
average, although narrower in some places and much wider 
in many areas of recreational or environmental significance. 
BCDC was given powers adequate to achieve the objec-
tives for which it was established, i.e., to conserve the Bay 
and its immediate shoreline, while allowing appropriate 
non-damaging development. On the other hand, the 
coastal commission has not been given adequate power 
to conserve the California coastal zone and guide its restor-
ation and development "in a manner that protects the 
irreplaceable resources of coastal land and waters."5 
A state commission so constituted could be expected to 
represent effectively the statewide constituency which the 
coastal act brought into the governance of the coastal zone. 
Cooperation between governments more or less equal in 
power is the only alternative to the domination of one over 
the other. By returning planning, zoning and permit is-
suance to cities and counties through the LCP process, 
the state is glVlng those governments and their constitu-
ents a strong voice in coastal policy. We need assurance 
that the commission also has a strong voice in coastal 
policy, adequate to protect the interests of the statewide 
constituency. 
NOTES 
California Public Resources Code. sees. 30000 et seq. As de-
fmed in the 1976 statute, the coastal zone inciudes land and water 
areas of California extending seaward to the state's outer limit of 
jurisdiction, and including all offshore islands. The zone extends 
inland generally 1,000 yards from mean high tide line, but with 
important exceptions. Thus in "significant estuarine, habitat, and 
recreational areas" it goes inland to the fttst major ridgeline, or 
five miles from mean high tide, whichever is less. In developed 
urban areas, the zone generally extends inland less than 1,000 
yards. The specific boundary lines of the zone are detailed on maps 
identif'led by the enacting legislation. 
2 If a local government's coastal plans have not been certified 
and zoning and implementing devices made effective by January l, 
1981, the coastal commission may prohibit or restrict the local 
government from granting permits to develop, or may require state 
comiiUSSlon permits in the case of developments that would be 
contrary to the coastal act. Public Resources Code, sec. 30518. 
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3 The enactment of the Jarvis.Cann Initiative, or any other 
restrictive measure limiting the traditional funding sources of 
cities and counties, will impinge sharply on their already heavily 
taxed ability to respond to any new demand. 
4 One group of researchers examining the record of the South 
Coast and San Diego regional coastal commissions found evidence 
suggesting that "whether a commissioner is a public member or an 
elected official appears to be a significant factor in explaining voting 
behavior." (p. 47) They found that "Public commissioners vote 
pro-environment twice as often as elected commissioners .... " (p. 51) 
and also noted that commissioners who were city councilmembers 
were particularly likely to vote pro-development, as compared with 
other commissioners. They concluded: "there is now some em-
pirical evidence to suggest that city council members, because of 
the 'pull' of local control, may not be the best suited to serve on 
commissions where they have to make land use decisions which 
are in conflict with the decisions of local authorities." Judy B. 
Rosener, with Sallie C. Russell and Dennis Brehm, Environmental 
vs Local Control: A Study of the Voting Behavior of Some Cali· 
fornia Coastal Commissioners (Claremont Graduate School, Clare-
mont, Calif., Apri11977). 
5 Quoted material from M. B. Lane letter of December 1, 1975 
to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., transmitting the California 
Coastal Plan. 

COASTAL PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA: 
Introduction 
A PROGRESS REPORT* 
Stanley Scott 
Assistant Director 
California's state coastal planning program was enacted 
in response to certain shortcomings seen in the performance 
of local government. Critics believed that local govern-
ments were often not effective with respect to the environ· 
mental aspects of land-use regulation on the coast, were 
incapable of dealing with big projects, usually proved un-
willing to consider the needs of their neighboring communi-
ties, and tended to give developers too free a rein. Mter 
several years of trying to gain satisfaction from the state 
Legislature, conservationists went directly to the people 
with a coastal initiative (Proposition 20). It was approved 
by a 55 percent vote at the November 1972 general elec-
tion. 
Proposition 20 gave California a temporary four-year 
mechanism for coastal planning and regulation; the system 
was then made permanent, although with significant modi-
fications, by a 1976 law. The 1976 legislation sought to 
resolve some serious controversies by formulating a sort of 
uneasy compromise between local government supporters 
and conservationists. 
While real disputes and a certain lack of trust underlie 
the coastal act, it represents major opportunities for re-
solving conflicts and arriving at workable compromises 
on coastal issues. The conflicts help emphasize the dif. 
ficulty of preparing plans concrete enough to meet the 
requirements of the coastal act, while allowing enough 
flexibility to take into account future uncertainties and 
leaving ample room for future creative action in matters 
that cannot now be foreseen. 
California is thus a year and a half into the exceedingly 
difficult process of implementing the 1976law. Obviously 
the-end result cannot now be foretold, but there is already 
*The research on which this article is based· was supported by the 
Sea Grant Program of the University of California. Other publica-
tions analyzi.ng and reporting on California's coastal experience will 
be forthcoming. 
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enough evidence, some of it impressionistic, to assess 
problems and accomplishments so far. This "coast-watch" 
may help Californians judge whether and how well the legal 
mandate is being carried out, and what the next steps in 
coastal planning should be. 
Mter a brief look at the federal coastal program, Cali-
fornia's experience under Proposition 20 and the 1976 
coastal law will be explored. 
The Federal Program 
California's coastal planning has received a big push 
under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, passed 
in 1972. This act in turn was stimulated largely by the 
example of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and De-
velopment Commission and its successful experiment 
in Bay fill control and shoreline regulation.1 Passage of 
the federal law was part of a larger environmental move-
ment that-beginning with the National Environmental 
Policy Act in 1969-brought about wide-ranging federal 
legislation. Examples include the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, requirements for environmental impact 
reporting, and encouragement of comprehensive plan-
ning, particularly the "208" environmental planning 
efforts now in progress in most metropolitan areas. 
The federal program under the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act offered funding for state coastal planning and 
held out the promise of additional money to help carry 
out approved state plans. Further incentive was offered 
the states in the law's "consistency" provisions requiring 
that federally related activities on the coast be consistent 
with (federally approved) state coastal plans, in the ab-
sence of a cabinet-level decision otherwise. The state 
work is monitored by the federal Office of Coastal Zone 
Management under general criteria outlined in the act: 
, . . fa state J must have a management program ... suf-
ficient to implement its coastal plan. Although states 
are given maximum flexibility ... each state manage-
ment program is expected to provide clarity, unity, and 
definite assignments of responsibility . . . . [with] a 
single state agency or entity ... in charge of the overall 
program, at least for administrative and policy pur-
poses.2 
In qualifying for the federal program, states may exer-
cise direct controls over land and water uses; they may 
collaborate with their local governments by setting state-
wide standards for local implementation; or they may pro-
vide for administrative review of coastal plans and regula-
tions proposed by state and local agencies and the private 
sector. The coastal states are trying to comply with the 
federal programs; California is one of the front-runners, 
largely because its own coastal program was initiated in 
1973 under Proposition 20. 
California's Program 
Proposition 20 established a four-year coastal planning 
process backed by a state comrn:lssion and six regional 
commissions to oversee planning and regulate coastal 
development in the interim.3 Meanwhile the state coastal 
plan, including recommendations on how to carry out the 
plan, was delivered to the Legislature at the end of 1975.4 
The Legislature had a year to pass a new coastal statute, or 
the entire system would have ceased to exist January 1, 
1977. At the end of the 197 6 session and after a hectic 
struggle, a coastal bill was approved continuing the system 
established by Proposition 20, but with 'important modifi· 
cations. 
The 1976 law continued the state commission; the 
regional commissions are to be continued only until mid-
1979 unless the Legislature passes a bill in the current 
session to extend them, as seems likely. Local governments 
were given a key role in coastal planning, under policies 
in the 1976 act and guidelines set by the state commission. 
They are to prepare local plans and implement ordinances 
for their portions of the coastal zone, subject to review 
by the regional commissions and certification by the state 
commission. 
The local planning effort is being funded largely with 
federal money available through the Office of Coastal 
Zone Management, with an additional 20 percent matching 
share provided by state funds. A major part of the planning 
process is supposed to be fmished by 1981. After the state 
commission certifies that a local plan complies with the 
1976 coastal act, the local government will make the 
principal decisions on land use and development in the 
coastal zone, subject to appeals in carefully limited situ-
ations.5 In addition, of course, the state commission 
must approve any amendments to a state-certified local 
plan. 
A forthcoming shift in the membership formula of the 
state commission should also be noted here because of the 
increase in local representation. This is how it works. 
Presently the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, 
and the Speaker of the Assembly each select two state 
comm1ss10ners. The other six state commissioners are 
appointed by and from the regional commissions, one 
from each region. The regional commissions in tum are 
composed equally of public members chosen by the 
Governor, Senate Rules Committee and Assembly Speaker, 
and by local councilmen and supervisors chosen by their 
city and county governing bodies or by regional councils 
. of governments. 
As of summer 1978, only two state coastal commis-
sioners were locally elected officials. When the regional 
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commiSSions go out of existence, however, former re-
gional commissioners will be replaced on the state com-
mission by persons selected by the state appointing author· 
ities, who will choose from lists of county supervisors 
and city council members sent up by the coastal cities and 
counties. This change would therefore cause "a signifi-
cant shift in the composition of the state coastal commis-
sion .... "6 At least six of the 12 voting members will 
be locally elected officials, and perhaps more. 
An "Impossible" Job? 
To sum up, California's coastal law initiated a new set 
of collaborative planning processes, while continuirlg most 
of the old ones-especially coastal regulation-at least 
temporarily. The basic planning job was assigned to coastal 
cities and counties, under guidelines and policies outlined 
by the state commission, subject to review and certification 
by the state commission, and with a tight set of deadlines. 
Some have called the assignment an impossible job, given 
the limitations on human and information resources and 
the time constraints. 
Guidelines and Other Documents 
Local coastal programs (LCPs) will comprise each local 
jurisdiction's plans for its portion of the coastal zone, 
with implementing ordinances. First, local governments 
were asked to identify coastal issues in their areas, and 
then to develop work programs-including proposed 
budgets-for completing the LCPs. 
The state commission prepared guidelines and other 
documents giving local governments advice and instruc-
tions. The written materials drew a mixed response. Their 
volume seemed to overwhelm many local planners. al-
though some documents were called "invaluable," and 
"very helpful." But the LCP regulations were character-
ized as "too vague" and "hard to interpret." Use of 
excessive legalese was a major source of criticism: 
Whoever wrote the LCP Regulations was a prisoner 
of his own jargon. For example, the first sentence 
in paragraph (b) on page 10 contains 75 words, and if 
you read it carefully is almost meaningless, or at least 
open to wide and varying in_terpretation ... [and there 
are many similar examples] . 1 
Early Phases of Local Planning: 
Some Initial Difficulties 
While a few local governments had conducted pilot 
projects in 197 6 and 1977, almost all the coastal cities 
began issue identification in 1977 and started developirlg 
their work programs. Most are being submitted to the state 
commission around mid-year 1978. (In 1977 a very few 
front-runners also began work on their land use plans 
as such.) 
In most cases, new local staff had to be hired, or con-
sultants employed for the plarming work. Some local staff 
appeared to develop good working relations with regional 
or state coastal staff, while others voiced a variety of com· 
plaints. These complaints included difficulties in inter· 
level staff relationships, inadequacy of communication and 
understanding between levels and agencies, and an ap-
pearance of conflicting goals and interpretations between 
state and regional commissions.8 Some local people and 
other observers believe that with better guidance from the 
state commission and more authority to make decisions, 
the regional commissions and staffs could play stronger 
roles in coastal planning, working more closely with local 
governments. 
There was also some local unhappiness with funds made 
available for coastal planning. By urging local governments 
to include a wide range of topics in their early identifica-
tion of issues, the state commission may inadvertently 
have encouraged local overshooting of the mark by sketch· 
ing ambitious planning efforts, including studies of numer-
ous topics. In any event, as localities proposed work pro-
grams and budgets for approval by the coastal commissions, 
the latter found many too elaborate and expensive for 
available time and funds, and called for cut-backs. Sub-
sequent budget reductions led to uneasiness on the part 
of some local governments who feared that the prepara-
tion of acceptable plans would force them to spend much 
larger sums than would be available through the state 
commission. 
At this point in mid-1978, it is unclear to what extent 
local governments will have to go back to the drawing 
board to produce local plans to comply with the coastal law 
as interpreted by the state commission. It seems certain, 
however, that virtually all local governments will have to 
do appreciable additional work to bring their plans into 
conformance. 
Implications of Professional Styles: 
Some Conflicts 
Some recurring problems relate to the professional 
styles of staff members and questions about the most pro-
ductive enforcement methods. Many observers have sug-
gested that controversy over approaches to the LCPs has 
resulted partly from differences that stem from staff back. 
ground, training, and experience, as well as the profes-
sional "tools" they are accustomed to use. For example 
some coastal policies and procedures may have been too 
heavily influenced by a legalistic cast of thought and a 
permit-review style of decisionmaking. One observer 
of the reception of early local plans suggested that LCP 
submissions were being treated as "giant permit appeals." 
Joseph E. Petrillo, Executive Officer, State Coastal 
Conservancy, and a former state coastal staff member who 
was one of the principal drafters of the coastal bill, res-
ponded as follows to the "giant permit appeal" comment 
(letter of August 3, 1978): 
. . . in drafting the fmal Government, Powers and Fund-
ing section of the Coastal Plan, I intended the Local 
Coastal Programs to be very much ... [a giant permit 
process]. The permit staff ... realized that a project-by-
project review of proposals did not get at the "cumula-
tive impact" problem .... Although the regions, en-
vironmental groups and others . . . wanted a simple 
adjustment of the current permit process, the permit 
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staff prevailed upon them the wisdom of handling the 
"cumulative impact" issue through one giant permit, 
the LCP .... I think the fact that ... the coastal bill 
. . . retained the specific coastal policies ... indicates 
the Coastal Act was meant to concentrate on imple-
mentation of the policies and not further planning ..•. 
In any event, lawyers and plarmers obviously sometimes 
do not see eye-to-eye, and in many situations misunder-
standings can arise between them, especially when they 
must work together in controversial, high-pressure enter-
prises like coastal governance. To some degree this is 
probably inevitable: 
.•. lawyers tend to see plarmers as fuzzy-minded, im· 
precise people with grand schemes but no ability to put 
down the fme print that really determines whether the 
plans will work or not. Plarmers, on the other hand, 
tend to see lawyers as narrow minded, prissy people who 
have no vision and can't understand people who do, and 
who are always trying to shoot down things by insisting 
.on more detail than can reasonably be provided .... In 
an operation such as ours, you obviously need both 
kinds of people, but you also need to arrive at a bal-
anced planning approach.9 
Plarmers increasingly emphasize the need for new skills, 
capabilities and sensitivities, as planning shifts from a 
"product to process orientation" and as negotiation and 
mediation are recognized as crucial planning tools: 
Open, complex, collaborative planning processes such 
as [are] required to carry out the Coastal Act need 
people that can facilitate a "diplomatic" rather than 
an "authoritative" resolution to the problem.1 0 
A New Mission 
Many saw the principal success of the fzrst commission 
(under Proposition 20) as based on enforcement, used to 
reduce damaging impacts by guiding coastal development, 
and also employing the permit system as a learning process 
to facilitate completing a comprehensive coastal plan on 
time. The second commission, created by the 1976law, 
continues vital enforcement by permit hearings until local 
coastal plans are completed and certified. Meanwhile, 
however, its principal new mission in 1977-1981 is to see 
that local governments develop good local plans and imple-
menting ordinances that comply with state goals and 
policies for the coast, and that they are accepted and 
supported at the local level. 
In this effort, success may depend on persuasion, ex· 
planation, and negotiation as much as it does on state en· 
forcement of detailed regulations, or "strong arm" 
methods . 
The Specificity Controversy 
Some other big questions are: What major policy 
changes in local plans will be required, if any, and how de-
tailed will the coastal plans have to be? \Vhi.ch state coastal 
policies will apply, how stringently, and in what areas? 
Which policies must give way in certain circumstances? 
Local governments sought clarification and guidance on 
these questions as they prepared their work programs. In 
the spring of 1978, a basic controversy emerged over the 
degree of specificity and amount of detail to be required 
of local plans before certification. 
In drafting coastal plans, many decisions must be made 
regarding which options are to be kept open, and which 
.. closed down." Making plans more specific means giving 
up more future options. It is often difficult for a local 
government to decide fmally what ought to be done with 
individual parcels on a "crash" basis, unless it already has 
reached a consensus on policies or until it receives and 
responds to specific developmental proposals. In a con-
tinuing process of planning, things are presumably never 
really fmished. Although some fmal decisions can be made, 
others must be held over for further consideration and to 
await future developments. On the other hand, an ap-
proved plan presumably means approved development, and 
the approving body needs to have a reasonably good idea 
of what they are authorizing. 
Much of the coastal commission's present power to 
enforce and implement coastal policy is to be delegated 
to local government when local plans and zoning ordinances 
are certified. Local plans as interpreted by local govern-
ments will then govern the coastal zone except in carefully 
limited situations, noted earlier. Thus it can be argued 
that detailed plans written in specific terms will increase 
the assurance that current commission policies for the 
coast will determine its long-term future. This view, 
drawing on past experience, led to concern that failure to 
require detail might limit the commission's (and the state's) 
future ability to be sure that local plans conform to state 
policy. Accordingly early this year, a state staff member 
proposed highly specific criteria for local plans. He empha-
sized "decisions at the first major fork in the road-the 
land use plan ... "arguing that" ... the [local] plan must 
be 'sufficiently detailed' ... to leave no major questions 
unresolved .... " 11 The memo continued: 
precise, well-defined land use designations and 
precisely drafted policies are essential. . . . Thus the 
[local] Land Use Plan must designate the principal 
permitted use(s), the specific conditional uses, the 
specific policy (i.e. performance) standards applicable 
to the types of permitted and conditional uses, and 
the precise policy standards that will be applied in re-
viewing uses for specific geographical uses. [emphasis 
in original] 
In early April 1978 the League of California Cities 
responded by arguing that the state commission should 
concentrate on. major policy issues rather than on details 
oflocal plans: 
The specificity needed in the land use plan should be 
obtained through the inclusion of policies rather than 
site specific plans or designs. The land use plan should 
not contain specific easements and setbacks on a lot 
by lot basis. . . .There needs to be flexibility in the 
plans to assure that projects can be made economically 
viable. 12 
Shortly afterwards a workshop of local coastal planners 
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echoed these sentiments, ranking .. degree of specificity" 
highest among pressi.Rg coastal issues causing great concern: 
The coastal commissions may intend to require greater 
specificity than is prevailing practice in land-use plan-
ning. This may make the planning process more diffi. 
cult and rigid, force decisions prematurely, and close 
off future options too soon.13 
The Agua Hedionda Case 
The first land use plan submitted for state commission 
approval related to Agua Hedionda Lagoon and adjoining 
areas in the City of Carlsbad (San Diego County). At the 
outset the plan seemed likely to be judged by the detail-
emphasizing criteria. Coming before the commission in 
February 1978, the initial staff comments on the Agua 
Hedionda proposal were lengthy, calling for many changes 
and ·much detail. Statewide attention focused on the issue, 
with many local governments expressing concern because 
it was widely believed that decisions on Agua Hedionda 
were likely to be precedent setting. 
Meanwhile there was a top-level change in state staffmg, 
and the new Executive Direcror Michael Fischer took office 
in mid-March, replacing the retiring Executive Director 
Joseph E. Bodovitz, who had served with distinction for 
five years since the inception of California's coastal plan-
ning under Proposition 20. Prior to his appointment 
Fischer had spent two years carrying primary responsibility 
for preparing Governor Brown's urban strategy for Cali-
fornia, working closely with business, labor, environmental 
interests, plarmers, and local governments. In armouncing 
Fischer's selection, state coastal commission Chairman 
Bradford Lundborg emphasized his view that the commis-
sion's most important task was developing "a strong, co-
operative relationship with local governments up and down 
the coast," and noted that Fischer's earlier experience in 
local government and as a plarmer should help. 
Recognizing the significance of the specificity issue and 
the precedent-setting nature of imminent decisions, Fischer 
gave priority to Agua Hedionda and relations with local 
governments as demanding his close and continuing at-
tention. He worked with coastal staff to prepare a new 
set of recommendations and conditions for the Agua 
Hedionda proposal, focussing on principal objectives 
rather than on design detail. The state commission also 
asked the City of Carlsbad for its view. 
Seeking to permit flexibility in local plans along with 
reasonable assurance that state policies will be complied 
with, Fischer asked the League of California Cities to pre-
pare a second memorandum, issued in late May. They 
suggested several alternatives for conditional or partial 
certification of local plans that would retain the state 
commission's basic jurisdiction over unresolved issues 
while permitting coastal planning and zoning to proceed 
in an orderly marmer with respect to areas and issues 
where agreement can be reached.14 Partial certification 
could apply either to a geographic portion of a local govern-
ment or to certain portions or policies of its land use 
plan. This proposal would allow local governments to 
begin implementing ordinances for approved areas and 
policies while the state commission and the local govern-
ment continue to address policies or areas not certified. 
New Criteria: Priority Issues 
Focussing on high priority issues and giVIng further 
guidance to local governments in LCP preparation, coastal 
staff prepared new criteria (adopted by the state com-
mission on June 20, 1978).15 The new criteria are sum-
marized as follows: Undeveloped land that would be 
affected by coastal act policies should be given highest 
priority, especially if it is under developmental pressures, 
and natural resource protection (e.g. lagoons and agri-
culture) should be given high priority. In areas already 
highly urbanized, LCPs should focus on beach access, park-
ing and traffic congestion, visitor-serving uses, and low-to-
moderate cost housing, usually in that order. Development 
design, bulk, height and setback requirements should be 
dealt with only in very general terms, except on scenic 
routes, shore areas or other specially significant areas. 
Where the potential impact of new development would be 
comparatively small, the LCP should not try to resolve 
the issues. 
In all cases, original research or new data ~ollection 
should be minimized. Moreover, ''low cost" sqlutions 
to problems should be used where possible. For example, 
review procedures could be established for future deter-
mination of geologic stability of proposed developments, 
rather than actually conducting costly geologic studies in 
preparing an LCP. To give local governments further 
guidance, the new criteria were accompanied by one-
paragraph summaries for each local coastal jurisdiction, 
highlighting the principal issues to be resolved in LCP 
preparation. 
State, Local and Regional Tensions 
Presumably local governments will welcome the new 
criteria, which should provide some degree of the desired 
flexibility. Nevertheless some of the tensions between the 
state and local levels are likely to remain. After studying 
coastal planning in nine states, Jens Sorensen likened the 
shifting relationship to a tennis match, "with the burden 
of responsibiliry and work bouncing back and forth be-
tween state and local government."16 _ 
The state must be realistic in its expectations. If its 
demands exceed local planning capabilities, the locals may 
see this as demonstrating state staffs failure to recognize 
local limitations or understand local goals. But Sorensen 
also emphasizes that state guidelines need to be "de-
manding enough, (otherwise} local programs may not even 
come close to achieving the objectives" of the coastal 
legislation.17 For their part, the principal question of most 
local governments will be: "What is the minimum amount 
of ef[on needed to modify the way we are now doing 
business in order to receive state approval?" [emphasis 
in original] 1 8 
In other words, with some significant exceptions, most 
local governments will try to get by with only marginal 
adjustments in their existing local plans, whereas the state 
coastal authority will push for more searching review, and 
1 .th b. . 19 overhaul where needed to comp y w1 state o JeCtives. 
Previously, local governing bodies -had been accustomed 
to dealing with their own local constituencies. Each local 
unit planned and zoned to meet the interests and concerns 
of those who could effectively make their influence and 
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preferences felt in the local halls of government. As Lenard 
Grote observes: 
This is the very essence of local home rule. Until the 
coastal law came into effect, state government had 
never established regulatory agencies or other machinery 
to monitor the contents oflocal general plans.20 
In short, some basic ground rules of the planning process 
were changed rather abruptly. Local governments and the 
coastal commissions are both feeling their way in new rela-
tionships that are inevitably somewhat strained, and will 
surely be characterized by much maneuvering and bargain-
ing. It will not be easy to reduce tensions because they are 
built into the process, which was established in large part 
to deal with "real world" conflicts between those who want 
special protection for the coast, and developers and their 
presumed allies in local government. Further, as Sorensen 
notes: 
... in states that are beleaguered by rapid growth and 
threatened with an avalanche of development activity, 
such as California, Florida and Oregon, the first round of 
program approvals may be the only good shot the 
administrative agency will have to assert state interests; 
the state might not get a "second chance." 
(Presumably] . . . the California Coastal Commission 
will attempt to tie down local government plans with 
as much specificity as possible to protect against ava-
lanche losses. 21 
A Stronger Role for Regional Commissions? 
As noted earlier, some local staff believed that the 
regional commissions could play better-defmed and more 
important roles in the negotiating process, but to do this 
would need more guidance from the state commission. 
Moves in this direction seem imminent. Thus Executive 
Director Fischer has said that he intends to schedule 
workshops in each of the coastal regions, where he and 
each respective regional executive director would meet 
jointly with city and county planning directors to review 
policy differences and try to negotiate their resolution. 
Subsequently regional workshops could also be held with 
mayors and supervisors, at their request. 
As the review of draft LCPs by the regional and state 
staff proceeds, another device could help insure state-
regional coordination and give local governments the policy 
guidance many have been asking for. State and regional 
executive directors would send a joint letter indicating 
their views of the LCP to each local government before the 
council or board of supervisors reviewed it. 
A stronger role for the regions would also clearly be 
furthered if Assembly Bill 34 78 should pass. The measure 
would extend the life of each regional commission until 
it has certified all local plans, or until mid-1981, whichever 
is earlier, instead of dissolving it by rnid-1979. 
In 1976 the Legislature virtually ignored the regional 
commissions partly because there was strong opposition 
to their continuation on the part of labor and builders. 
This opposition was apparently based on "gut reactions" 
and may have been stimulated by what appeared to be 
arrogant behavior by a single regional commissioner. 
Moreover the conservationists, who might have been ex-
pected to support the regional commissions, did not do so 
actively, but concentrated instead on the hard-fought 
struggle to continue the state commission. As an astute 
observer then on the staff of the League of California 
Cities observed: 
The decision to abolish the regional commissions was 
not made after a thorough analysis . . . of the need 
to continue them, rather they were in a sense sacrificed 
so that the State Commission could continue.22 
In addition, state coastal staff may well have harbored 
some ambivalence toward the regional commissions. The 
former chairman of the state commission, Mel Lane, had 
these perceptive comments: 
The planning process could have been organized better. 
The way it was set up ... begged for civil war between 
the regional commissions and the state commission. 
A tremendous amount of energy and time was spent 
trying to prevent that civil war .... 
. . . the state commission and staff just kept pushing. 
Furthermore the regional commissions and staffs had a 
sense of responsibility. They had to go along with "our" 
schedules for the overall good. This meant they went 
along even when they strongly disagreed.2 3 
Lane attributed the tension to distance, the size of the 
1,000-mile coastal zone, time pressures, and the difficulty 
of getting state and regional commissioners together regu-
larly, since state and regional commissioners rarely met, 
except for the six regional members who also sat on the 
state body. On the other hand, the relationship improved 
markedly over time. Lane believed that all the regional 
commissions were cordial . to him personally, noting no 
animosity but a feeling that he "was on a different wave 
length than the regional commissioners due to a lack of 
communication." 
Of course, the tensions also were partly due to genuine 
regional differences of opinion with respect to coastal plan-
ning goals. For example, the North Central Coast regional 
commission (San Francisco, Marin and Sonoma counties) 
was seen as strongly in favor of coastal conservation, while 
the North Coast regional commission (Mendocino, Hum-
boldt and Del Norte counties) was considered lukewarm if 
not down-right negative to coastal conservation. The 
commissions tended to reflect attitudes believed to be 
widely held in their respective regions. 
Negotiation and Consensus Building 
In addition to reflecting regional opmwn, however, 
regional commissions can provide certain important ser-
vices, especially playing intermediary, consensus-building 
roles in coastal planning. AB 3478 now has virtually 
universal support, including that of labor, realtors, de-
velopers and contractors, suggesting that opinions have 
changed drastically on the usefulness of the regional com-
missions: 
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There is general agreement that allowing the regional 
commissions to go out of business just as local plans 
are coming together would, at a minimum, cause intoler-
able delays ... and might lead to enough confusion to 
make it impossible to fmish some of the plans.24 
Despite severe work pressures the regional bodies and 
staffs have handled a heavy permit-hearing load and made 
other significant contributions to the coastal planning 
process by reviewing and commenting on draft plans. 
When asked if the regional commissions would be missed, 
a strong proponent answered 
... indeed they will be. The state commission cannot 
give the necessary perspective .... [with the regional 
commission] there are few parts of my region where 
if a person felt he was asking for something consistent 
with a plan, he could not get to the commission meeting 
to discuss it .... it is possible for [regional] commis-
sioners to look at the problems on the lands them-
selves. The regional commissions will be sorely 
missed.25 
In fact, the shift to local coastal planning under the 
1976 law .. may have opened a stronger potential role 
[for the regional commissions] in monitoring and reviewing 
local performance. as well as in helping negotiate future 
issue conflicts."26 Such negotiations, involving local of-
ficials as well as state and regional staff and commissions, 
may be one of the most effective ways of seeking local 
cooperation and accommodation to state objectives. 
Ultimately the entire . . . effort . . . boils down to 
whether local government will eventually take the at-
titude that implemeQ.tation of the certified program is 
in their best interest."" 7 
Additional Responsibilities of the State Col'DJilission 
In addition to collaborative state-local planning and per-
mit appeals, the state commission also has other respon-
sibilities. Substantial work has already been done on most 
of the following: serving as lead agency for the coastal 
energy impact program (fmanced under the federal act); 
ranking possible coastal sites for liquified natural gas (LNG) 
terminals; designating portions of the coast where power 
plant development would be inconsistent with the coastal 
act; identifying coastal zone forest land where special 
logging procedures are needed (advisory to the state Board 
of Forestry); considering relationships between coastal 
management and controls of San Francisco Bay Gointly 
with BCDC); and certifying port master plans for Cali-
fornia's four major commercial ports. 
Earlier, other Sacramento-based state agency staff may 
have resented the coastal commission, sitting in San Fran-
cisco, with its good publicity and strong permit review 
powers. "Turf' problems with several state agencies came 
to a head during the 1976 legislative session when the 
coastal bill's early version would have given the coast com-
mission some control over the actions of other agencies 
affecting the coastal zone. Opposition from the agencies 
caused an entire chapter of the bill to be painstakingly 
drafted, reducing duplication of authority and interagency 
conflict, while giving the coastal commission a clearly 
acknowledged though largely advisory role with respect 
to such agency policies and actions. This removed the 
active opposition, although some coolness persisted in 
certain quarters. 
In any event, the state coastal commission has recently 
been mending fences with the state agencies, especially 
since January 1977 when Peter Douglas joined the state 
commission as deputy director, with agency relationships 
as one of his principal assignments. Interagency agree-
ments are being concluded to facilitate state agency involve-
ment in the coastal planning process in a meaningful way. 
This is important, because without increases in manpower 
the state agencies nevertheless have a good deal of coastal 
planning to do. The agencies need to participate in LCP 
preparation in order to be sure that appropriate provisions 
for future state projects are included in local coastal plans, 
otherwise later on there will be problems in obtaining 
permits. 
A Stimulus to Local Planning 
The infusion of federal and state funding and the de-
mands for coastal planning staff work at the local level 
have brought in some capable new planners and given pre-
existing planning staff exciting new challenges. Of course, 
the local revenue cuts under Proposition 13 could have a 
severe negative impact on this pr9mising start. Only time 
will tell, plus the extent of continued state and federal 
fmancial support. Meanwhile, in a variety of ways coastal 
planning is helping shake up and alter the environment 
many planners have worked in. This paraphrase of com· 
ments at a recent conference suggests one view of the 
status quo that the coastal program is helping to change: 
Most . . . planners have been in their positions for per· 
haps 15 years. The job many of them have been doing 
is itself "negative," consisting of saying "no" to develop-
ments that do not conform to zoning and other require· 
ments. Added to this, they have been working with 
out-dated ordinances. Finally, the staff in time comes 
to mirror the outlook of the board of supervisors or 
city council, which can sometimes be downright anti-
planning.28 
Some local jurisdictions that were already doing a com· 
paratively sophisticated job of planning have had their 
attention directed more forcefully toward the coast, and 
are being required to consider state coastal goals. Other 
local jurisdictions that were lagging are having to gear up. 
The following comment (by a coastal workshop partici· 
pant and experienced local planner) may overstate the case 
a little, but probably not much: 
We should acknowledge that the coastal law got local 
government out of the dark ages in planning. Most or 
all of us were doing sloppy plannirig, but have stopped 
fooling around. Despite complaints about some of the 
details
2 
I am very pro-coastal act over the longer 
sweep. 9 
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This optlmiSttc view of improved local performance 
relates principally to the work of professional staff plan-
ners and consultants. It remains to be seen how local 
governing bodies and community political leaders will 
respond to the coastal planning program. So far, city 
councils and boards of supervisors have scarcely been in-
volved. Before long, of course, they will have to enter 
the action and necessarily play a crucial role in determining 
the outcome. 
Retrospect: Permit Review and 
Other Accomplishments 
From th~ California program's start-up in 1973, coastal 
planning has been back-stopped by permit power, with 
the regional and state commissions hearing appeals from 
city and county decisions with respect to development or 
land-use change within the area of permit control.30 
Many thousands of permit appeals have gone through 
the coastal mill since early 1973. In 1977 alone, for 
example, more than 7,700 applications were processed by 
the six regional commissions, and over 95 percent of them 
were approved. Such widely quoted figures on the high 
approval rates may have led some observers to the mistaken 
conclusion that the coastal process has made little dif. 
ference, except in a handful of cases. 
Admittedly, in the words of Paul Saba tier, "the vast 
majority of permits involved essentially routine decisions 
by the regional commissions."31 On the other hand, 
substantial numbers of the permits counted as "approved" 
by regional commissions were actually approved with 
conditions or modifications. 32 Robert Healy comments: 
Our own observation from attending many permit 
sessions of the South Coast Commission is that the 
conditions imposed . . . were frequently quite signifi-
cant, often involving major changes in design or reduc-
tions in density .3 3 
Moreover the state commission generally took a stricter 
approach· to permissible development thin the regional 
commissions. Thus many applications approved by the 
regional bodies were later denied by the state commission, 
or had other conditions attached to the approval. In fact, 
when the state commission on reviewing an appeal found a 
substantial issue and therefore heard the case, "it was 
virtually certain to either impose conditions or deny the 
application altogether. " 3 4 
Conditions often related to bulk, height and design of 
structures, landscaping, provision of. public access, trans-
portation and parking, reduction of the density of multi-
unit developments, erosion, or water quality controls. 
The commissions were "very tough on residential projects 
of five or more units considered significant . . . enough 
to be appealed to the State Commission.''35 A major 
nuclear reactor addition-San Onofre-was allowed to 
proceed after some redesign and other conditions were 
met. Urban redevelopment projects were required to be 
scaled down, and other decisions attempted to prevent 
urban encroachment onto agricultural or forest land. 
In addition, another elusive but important factor was at 
work. When builders and developers saw how the coastal 
law was being enforced, many voluntarily began anticipa· 
tory planning, "upgrading" their proposals before sub-
mitting them. 
Developers, local government, and state agencies are all 
showing a lot more environmental awareness than they 
used to. And ... they are acting on this awareness. Not 
as much or as fast as most environmentalists might want, 
but not badly either.36 · 
Healy sums up his view of California's recent coastal 
development under commission regulation: 
In general, we fmd modest growth, mainly in the form 
of infilling of semi-developed areas or slow increases in 
intensity of land use in older, built-up areas. No new 
large-scale subdivisions were allowed in the near-coast 
area. Owners of lots in existing residential or recre-
ational subdivisions were generally allowed to build, 
provided the~ built structures no larger than those on 
nearby lots. 3 
Drawing on his study of controversial permit decisions, 
Paul Sabatier concludes that "the coastal commissions sub-
stantially altered the developmental outcomes that would 
have existed in their absence."3 8 In short, California's 
coastal program clearly has effectuated higher standards 
in coastal development and environmental protection. 
Complaints About Permit Processes 
Despite Proposition 20's "vested right" protection. 
California's coastal regulation and the permit process 
caught some projects in mid-stream, creating awkward 
policy questions such as : Which projects should be per-
mitted to "build out" and which should not, and why?39 
Some owners of small lots have been unhappy when build-
ing plans were slowed, modified or denied. Larger develop-
ment proposals have also gone through the regulatory mill, 
and the coastal commissions took a rather strict line with 
some of them. 
Coastal property owners have lodged a number of 
complaints about the permit decision process, and recent 
legislative hearings catalog many such grievances. Appel-
lants have alleged that 
(1) actions were sometimes arbitrary, discriminatory 
or capricious; 
(2) the process was much too rigid, and tight time 
limits during hearings precluded adequate presentations; 
(3) staff documents were sometimes received by 
appellants only a short time before hearings, preventing 
adequate study and response; 
( 4) last-minute conditions were imposed without ade-
quate study or time for appellant to respond; 
(5) staff recommendations were based on inadequate 
or inaccurate information, and appellant had little or no 
opportunity for rebuttal; 
( 6) some owners have been forced into costly long-
term holding actions until completion of local coastal 
plans; 
(7) limits on building size and height were unrealistic 
or architecturally infeasible; 
(8) required conditions made projects too costly or 
economically infeasible; 
(9) staff or commissioners were not available for 
preliminary negotiating sessions; 
(10) staff were too young and inexperienced for the 
difficult tasks; 
(11) staff were seen socializing with "Sierra Club 
types," contributing to appellants' fear of possible un-
fairness; and 
(12) insuffient allowances were made for owners of 
single family lots who got caught by the coastal act un-
expectedly. 
While the merits of such complaints are unevaluated, 
those relating to procedure and due process ought to stimu-
late improvement of the regulatory machinery's functioning 
so as to insure equitable treatment for all.40 
Private Sector Cooperation and Acceptance 
Despite complaints from the private sector, however, 
there are many bases for constructive cooperation between 
private-sector interests and coastal management. Admit-
tedly there is widespread sentiment that private persons 
owning individual small parcels or lots (on which they 
perhaps hoped to build retirement homes but got "caught" 
by the coastal law) are probably the most deserving group 
for some form of relief or compensation.41 
On the other hand there is persuasive evidence that 
larger developers are learning to live with coastal planning, 
and in fact look forward to completion of its current 
phase, which should remove many ambiguities and much 
uncertainty.42 In short, a good deal of understanding 
and even acceptance of the coastal planning process seems 
to be emerging. 
After reviewing grounds for agreement between environ-
mentalists and developers, and noting the learning process 
the environmental movement has spurred, Robert Healy 
commented: 
... beyond heightened interest and concern, some 
builders have developed a remarkable sophistication 
about how their constructions interact with natural 
systems. They have had to do so in order to stay in 
business in an era of impact assessment;environmental 
planning, and stringent land-use controls. [In this 
regulatory environment] ... the developer himself 
receives and digests the reports of his soils engineers, 
and revises his projects to meet the public's demands. 
Having gone through this process again and again, the 
developer is increasingly likely to understand the tech-
nical basis of environmental control.4 3 
Of course a host of other interests and cont1icts also 
confront communities as they move into coastal plan-
ning. Recent interviews with local recreation and park 
administrators disclosed a wide range of concerns with 
future coastal policies and the ways these will affect coastal 
communities. For example, the concept of "coastal access" 
generated many relevant definitions and interpretations as 
well as numerous examples of the consequences of access, 
and conflicts over access policies.44 
Public Participation 
The 1976 coastal law and state commission guidelines 
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strongly support "public participation" in coastal planning, 
prompting the publicizing of agendas and announcements 
of meetings, and the availability of planning drafts and 
documents. To alert citizens about coastal issues, local 
governments are mailing notices in larger numbers, en-
couraging media coverage, and contacting a variety of 
special interest groups. But local government observers 
point out that "all of these methods cost money, and 
... [we] will need substantial fmancial help." Further-
more they complain that, despite such efforts and expen-
diture of additional funds, "for the most part, regular pub-
lic meetings and hearings do not get good results" in the 
form of public participation.45 
If these methods of encouraging wide public participa-
tion have not appeared sufficient, what further measures 
may be more realistic? One approach is to make oppor-
tunities for participation available through as many chan-
nels as feasible but to expect only a relatively few well-
informed and highly motived citizens actually to come 
forward. Some of the most effective "public participa-
tion" is provided by individual citizens who have the time 
and inclination to become familiar with coastal issues in 
their communities. Most of these participants will probably 
be affiliated with organizations like the Planning and 
Conservation League, the Sierra Club, the League of 
Women Voters, or local community groups, who have 
banded together out of mutual interest in public policies, 
and who rely on their organizations to provide informa-
tional services reaching their fellow members and other 
citizens. 
Sierra Club observers, for example, emphasize the im-
ponance of working with a relatively few active citizens 
and knowledgeable people, focusing on concrete, pragmatic 
coastal planning issues, rather than on general policies or 
concepts.46 Experience with other public interest organi-
zations also underlines the imponant roles a comparatively 
small number of citizens can play when allied with appro-
priate community groups, if they are able to become well 
informed on issues, attend meetings, and communicate 
their fmdings and recommendations to others. 
Capitalizing on this potential, governmental mailing 
lists should include-but of course not be limited to-a 
wide variety of organizations known to be interested in 
planning concerns. Foreign observers have frequently 
remarked on the American "genius" for organizing around 
shared goals and interests through networks of citizen 
groups. Information provided to such networks-from the 
coastal commissions and other appropriate sources-will 
be most likely to reach citizens who have already indicated 
their willingness and ability to participate in planning 
discussions. Finally, since such groups play an essential 
role in public participation, outright subsidies from public 
funds have been suggested as a way of helping give them 
continuity and staying power.4 7 
Acquisition and Implementation 
Even proponents of strong regulation acknowledge that 
it cannot protect all of the coast that needs preservation, 
hence "there is a need for a substantial acquisition program, 
as well as for an expanded watchdog role (over local 
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governments and the coast] on the part of the commis-
sion.'>48 Because fee-simple acquisition of coastal property 
can quickly become prohibitive in cost, it is essential 
to explore measures short of full acquisition. Coastal 
researcher Jens Sorensen concludes: 
Many state and local plarmers do not see a bright future 
for collaborative planning until it can move beyond mere 
permit regulation toward such positive activities as the 
acquisition of development rights, low interest loans 
for promoting socially desirable projects, and tax in-
centives for retention oflands in open space uses .... 49 
State bond issues and other actions in 1976 provided 
substantial funds for urban and coastal parks and other 
properties. About $150 million could be applied to coastal 
acquisition and related activities, with $110 million of this 
slated for coastal parks and beaches to be acquired by the 
Department of Parks and Recreation. These sums are clearly 
modest when compared with the magnitude of the coastal 
resources needing protection in some way. Further, a 
coastal observer disputes the frequent assumption that 
coastal property will necessarily be properly managed and 
afforded better protection if publicly acquired: 
State Parks with its 10 to 12 years lag time from ac-
quisition to development and staffmg will pose some 
serious problerm in the area of resource protection .... 
hence it is mandatory that this limitation be recognized 
early in the planning process.5 0 
Another alternative device is offered by the State 
Coastal Conservancy, set up as part of the 1976 package of 
coastal legislation. The agency has imponant powers to 
acquire coastal lands, or assist in their acquisition by other 
state or local agencies for purposes of preservation, restor-
ation or redevetopment. Lacking major funds, however, 
and necessarily feeling its way, the new agency has so far 
kept a rather low profile. 
Even before Proposition 13 passed, Lenard Grote, 
city council member, regional coastal commissioner and 
President of the Association of Bay Area Governments, 
argued for substantial state funding to help local govern-
ments implement the state's coastal goals. He complained 
that cities and counties have not received new funding 
sources for achieving such objectives, and thought it un-
likely that local governments or voters would willingly use 
local propeny or sales tax revenues for such purposes. 
Grote emphasized the pressures on local governments 
that would demand more positive state measures: 
The pressures of the old planning game still operate 
on each coastal city and county. . . . Each must still 
view every parcel of land in its jurisdiction, and existing 
or potential development on it, in light of the govern-
ment's fmancial position. Each is still in competition 
with its neighbor for potential beneficial development. 
Each act of a local official is still accountable to the 
local voters. Few, if any, could gain political strength 
locally by championing the rights of a statewide con-
stituency in the development of an LCP, if it runs 
counter to important local-constituency interests .... 51 
Federal Funding 
A critical future issue is the need for continued and sub-
stantial federal funding of coastal planning. The federal 
government often encourages state and local governments 
to start up new programs with "seed money," and then 
eliminates or reduces federal support when the programs 
are in progress. Such reductions are usually urged by the 
money-conscious Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
seeking to economize. Failure to provide sustained federal 
support for the coastal program is likely to have serious 
adverse effects on the now-promising effort: 
The state and local governments won't pick ... up 
[coastal costs] because they can't. They are not going 
to shut down schools and libraries and discharge ftremen 
so they can hire coastal planners; therefore without the 
incentive of federal money and federal support, these 
programs aren't going anywhere. 
[Moreover] federal leadership creates the impression 
that this is an important matter ... so for the feds to 
pull away is by contrast to say it is no longer very 
important.5 2 
... without renewed Congressional efforts the program 
might peter out after current funding expires in Septem-
ber 1980.53 
These remarks were made before passage of California's 
Proposition 13 on June 6, 1978. Approval of the taX-
cutting constitutional amendment, withdrawing massive 
funds from local governments, further emphasizes the 
importance of continued federal funding to the success 
of coastal planning in California. 
A '"Stretched-Out" Process 
The period of greater public fiscal austerity that seems 
to lie ahead makes even more attractive a suggestion by 
Jens Sorensen who calls for phased funding and a 
"stretched-out" process. Under his proposal, selected 
localities would be chosen by the state commission, pre-
sumably with local governments on the coast having some 
say in the matter. Resources would be focused on these 
chosen communities, enabling them to push ahead with 
their programs, while those of other localities would be 
deferred or pursued at a slower pace. When the selected 
initial programs were reasonably complete and further 
funding becomes available, the other programs could be 
pursued. Meanwhile the permit system would continue 
to apply in the "deferred areas," affording them protec-
tion in the interim. 
Coastal Waters and Seaward-Side Issues 
Coastal planning has so far dealt almost exclusively 
with land-use issues, involving that area from the water's 
edge inland to the coastal zone boundary. The great 
immediate pressures are on the land, and the fledgling 
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coastal processes are hard put to deal with them effectively. 
On the other hand, a wide range of important issues 
involving management of the coastal waters is already 
present and promises to become more pressing. There are 
extraordinary difficulties in dealing with seaward-side 
issues, partly b,ecause states have only limited experience 
with matters significantly beyond the shoreline, and partly 
because of the intricate intermingling of state and federal 
authority, jurisdictions and interests in the seaward side.54 
These seaward-side issues may soon become an impor-
tant testing ground for new organizations and intergovern-
mental relationships needed to reconcile and achieve federal 
and state objectives. We have begun experimenting with 
federal-state regional councils authorized to formulate 
fishery management plans under the federal Fishery Con-
servation Act of 1976. That law established the 200-rnile 
zone within which foreign vessels can ftsh only with a 
federal permit, and otherwise strengthened offshore flshery 
management. 
It is also important for the coastal states to establish 
comprehensive coastal water management programs. In 
their new book, coastal researchers Armstrong and Ryner 
urge that the need is far greater than many states realize. 
Moreover they acknowledge the states' comparative in-
experience with coastal water management, and recognize 
the difficulties that must be overcome. But they also point 
out that the federal Coastal Zone Management Act provides 
the states with several useful tools, including national 
recognition of the states as appropriate vehicles, and of the 
right of the states to review federal activities that may 
affect coastal waters. 
They conclude by urging the states to build on existing 
estuary, river and coastal land management programs 
in developing comprehensive coastal water management 
capabilities: 
. . . a creative use of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act, along with the other local, state and federal pro-
grams, should allow the establishment of a basic inte-
grated management program that can protect, enhance 
and allocate the submerged lands, water column and 
surface waters of the coastal zone, as part. of an overall 
state resource management effort.55 · 
A Look to the Future: Clarifying Coastal Issues 
Coastal planning in California has so far been a success 
story of some magnitude: initiative petitions for Proposi-
tion 20 were circulated in the summer of 1972 and a 
coastal regulatory and planning process has been in place 
since early 1973. Virtually all of many tight deadlines have 
been met, and a hard-fought legislative struggle in 1976 
established state-local coastal planning on a permanent 
basis. 
State and local bodies are in the early phases of the 
collaborative effort to make the process work. Proposed 
local programs are being reviewed by the state coastal 
commission, which will later examine and certify ac-
ceptable local plans and implementing ordinances. 
The state and regional commissions need to focus 
attention on the major issues that local plans must deal 
with in order to protect the coast and achieve state goals. 
In providing needed guidance, the state commission ought 
to decide which policies are more important and in what 
circumstances, and identify those that may require further 
interpretation. 
With such state. leadership, the regional commissions 
and staff can, in turn, play a stronger role in coastal plan-
ning, working with local governments more closely in the 
bargaining and negotiation that lie ahead. Such state-local 
collaboration will be a central need during the next three 
years, when a host of issues must be resolved both within 
coastal communities and between the state and regional 
commissions and local governments. 
Coastal decisionmakers must strike a balance between 
proposals that may be too lenient to provide coastal pro-
tection and others that may be so strict or detailed as 
to be unworkable, unenforceable or otherwise unac-
ceptable. Clarifying state coastal priorities will give the 
state and regional commissions additional yardsticks 
to guide future judgments on local plans. 
While refming its policy priorities for the coast, the 
state commission needs to work closely with other state 
agencies having major coastal zone responsibilities. Those 
agencies, in turn, need to develop coastal priorities and 
plans in cooperation with the coastal commissions and local 
governments. The concept of collaborative state-local 
plarming includes accommodating the goals and objectives 
of both local communities and state agencies in the local 
governments' LCPs, which, when certified, will govern 
future state activity on the coast. 
Other Important Considerations 
As suggested earlier, a number of additional consider-
ations must be addressed as coastal planning develops. 
First, the 1981 deadline for completing the current 
phase of coastal planning may be unrealistic. A "stretched-
out" planning process permitted under the 1976law might 
be useful. Resources could thus be funnelled into selected 
local governments, and the deadlines for the others post-
poned. The lessons learned in approving the first round of 
local plans woUld probably facilitate the second round. 
Second; regardless of the deadline, substantial state 
and federal funding will continue to be essential to effec-
tive coastal planning, probably for a long time to come. 
The tasks looked formidable even before passage of 
Proposition 13 in June 1978. The massive diversion of 
property tax revenue away from local government seems 
almost certain to affect coastal planning adversely. On 
the other hand, if major federal funding continues to be 
available for California and the other coastal states, the 
initial momentum may be continued. 
Third, implementing coastal plans is a big job that 
must be addressed soon. It is not clear how effective regu-
lation alone can be in preserving the coast. On the other 
hand, large-scale acquisition of coastal property could be 
prohibitively expensive, especially if not accompanied 
by measures to restrain speculative market forces and land 
price inflation. 
Fourth, while difficult problems remain in resolving 
conflicts between the public's interest in coastal resource 
preservation and the interests of property owners, regula-
tion will nevertheless continue to be the heart of the 
coastal protection program. Critics have complained that 
coastal regulation has sometimes been arbitrary or other-
wise faulty. Environmentalists have expressed concern that 
new regulatory agencies may fall into the same traps as 
the old-line state and federal agencies, i.e., cumbersome, 
legalistic and costly court-like procedures that discourage 
public participation and help pave the way for "client 
capture" of the agencies. Accordingly the rich experience 
of California's coastal permit appeals ought to be mined 
for evidence of what has worked well, and what changes 
might improve regulatory processes. 
Finally, interested private citizens should also monitor 
coastal planning in their communities, especially since 
public participation is encouraged and solicited under the 
law. While widespread participation is hard to achieve in 
practice, coastal planning nevertheless offers excellent op-
portunities to citizens having the time and energy to study 
and understand coastal issues. Even a relatively few active, 
well-informed persons can have significant influence, es-
pecially if allied with one or more organized community 
groups. 
In a National Perspective 
It is appropriate to conclude by viewing coastal planning 
-in national perspective, emphasizing its accomplishments 
and promise. In California and elsewhere the new processes 
signal an attempt to break with the history of uneven and 
often poor results of using unassisted local land use powers 
to protect the environment. Local governments have been 
required to yield some of their control over land use 
decisions. Technical planning processes in local govern-
ments are being improved, or being installed where to ali 
intents they may have been virtually lacking. 
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Federal policy is also providing guidance for future 
state coastal land use decisions. The states will review local 
efforts to implement the coastal law for compliance with 
state and federal objectives. The forums created by coastal 
planning have helped involve new community-minded 
clientele groups, in addition to those with special interests 
in the profits that could be made under lenient regulation. 
The emerging processes of coastal decisionrnaking will 
force ali governments with coastal interests-federal, 
state and local-to plan more carefully. Long-term com-
mitments will have to be made as coastal plans emerge. 
These changes will be of major significance to the private 
sector. While some investors and developers may object 
to the more stringent regulations, others may fmd well-
defmed coastal plans to their liking, and much preferable 
to uncertainty and delay. 
Finally, the federal-state coastal programs may be setting 
precedents for new experiments in federalism. Federal 
policy seems aimed at a federal-state partnership, with 
most of the planning and policy decisions delegated to the 
state level. The states in turn are free to shift important 
responsibilities downward, and in most states, local govern-
ments will play a major role. So far California's experiment 
has been one of the nation's foremost successes in coastal 
planning. With much luck and hard work, it may be pos-
sible to keep the momentum. 
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Introduction 
This report analyzes a major issue in the current congres-
sional debate over the future of Reclamation policy-the 
water subsidy. It will be argued that there is little justifi-
cation for its continuation under either (1) the present 
policies of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) or (2) 
those contemplated by most of the proposed Reclamation 
Act amendments currently before Congress. 
The subsidy no longer meets the original objectives of 
the Reclamation Act. Its elimination would restore fiscal 
stability to the Reclamation program, provide a measure 
of equity in the distribution of project benefits, and 
change the incentives that now encourage wasteful devel-
opment and use of water, an increasingly scarce natural 
resource. The only justifiable way to continue the sub-
sidy would involve a major revision of Reclamation policy 
to bring it into line with its original objectives. Few if any 
of the legislative proposals before Congress would effec-
tively do this. (See Table, pp. 6-7.) 
These arguments will be illustrated with examples drawn 
from the recent experience of the Westlands Water Dis-
trict, which contains the newest and most expensive of 
all Reclamation irrigation projects, and which demon-
strates, in the extreme, many of the irrationalities of 
current Reclamation administration policy. 
Brief Background to the Current Situation 
In 1902 Congress established the Reclamation program 
to achieve two different policy goals. On one hand, it 
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wished to encourage greater development of water re-
source~ and to bring apparently useless western land under 
cultivation and produce more food and fiber. On the other 
hand, Congress wanted to promote broad social and eco-
nomic development, with widespread land ownership and 
a family farm system of production.1 To insure achieve-
ment of these broad social goals, Congress further stipu-
lated that in order for a family to be eligible for project 
water, it must not own more than 160 acres within federal 
water projects, and must reside on or near its land. Con-
gress also provided a small additional benefit to stimulate 
such economic development by permitting water users to 
repay the full cost of irrigation construction over a ten-
year period, interest-free. 
In the intervening 76 years, Congress has not amended 
the acreage or the residency requirements. It has, how· 
ever, extended the original ten-year, interest-free repay-
ment period to 40 years, and has changed the repayment 
criteria so that water users are no longer,liable for full re· 
payment of all project costs. Since 1939, water users re· 
pay only the portion of irrigation costs they can "afford" 
to repay (measured by an ability-to-pay formula) and the 
remainL11g costs are paid from other project revenues, 
mainly from sales of hydroelectric power. The effect of 
these amendments has been to increase the water subsidy 
dramatically, although tlus was presumably not the inten-
tion of Congress. Instead, Congress amended the law to 
provide relief to hard-pressed farmers who could not pay 
the high costs of federal water during a period of extreme 
agricultural depression, and to stimulate the Reclamation 
program during the New Deal in order to provide massive 
public employment. In sum, with these amendments 
Congress did not intend to create a system of subsidies 
that would, in more prosperous times, give huge windfalls 
to those fortunate owners of land in Reclamation projects. 
The current crisis in Reclamation policy arises from a 
growing discrepancy between the stated goals of the Re· 
clamation Act and the actual implementation of the pro· 
gram by the USBR. Through a variety of questionable 
administrative interpretations of the law, USBR has all 
but eliminated the effectiveness of the residency and acre-
age requirements, and has thereby disregarded the broad 
social and distributional goals that remain part of its 
legal mandate. These administrative procedures, in combi· 
nation with the growing magnitude of the water subsidy, 
have led to the construction of increasingly expensive 
water projects that impose considerable costs on the tax-
payer, misallocate water resources, and give highly con-
centrated benefits to a few landowners. 
The discrepancy between the Reclamation program's 
stated goals and its actual implementation has received 
considerable attention from public interest groups, who 
have forced the issue on Congress and the courts in recent 
years. Congressional hearings and reports by public 
agencies have documented the abuses of the current ad-
ministration of the program and have led to the intro-
duction of legislation to enforce more strict compliance 
with the intention of the existing law. Moreover, recent 
court decisions require the enforcement of acreage restric-
tions in the previously exempted Imperial Valley and 
Army Corps of Engineers' districts in the Kings River 
Basin. Consequently landowners in these regions face 
divestment of about 750,000 acres (which are held in 
excess of the 160-acre requirernent).2 In response, these 
landowners, through sympathetic legislators, have intro-
duced legislation to repeal the offending requirements. 
Another court order (National Land for People vs. the 
Bureau of Reclamation) required the Department of the 
Interior to issue a set of written regulations on the adm.ln-
istration of its Reclamation program in order to achieve 
greater congruence between the practices of the USBR 
and the law's stated objectives. In August 1977, the de-
partment issued a set of regulations that would have 
ended many of the procedures now used by the USBR to 
avoid enforcing residency and acreage restrictions. Pre-
dictably, these regulations stirred bitter debate. Land-
owners obtained an injunction against the implementa-
tion of the new regulations until completion of an envi-
ronmental impact report. Meanwhile, legislation has been 
submitted on their behalf to legalize the status quo. For 
its part, the Department of the Interior has modified its 
original proposed regulations and had its own bill placed 
before Congress. Thus at present about 30 pieces of legis-
lation are before Congress, containing at least six major 
alternative approaches to modernization of the 1902 Rec-
lamation law. 
The Issues in the Congressional Debate 
Much of the debate over the future administration of 
Reclamation projects centers on questions of efficiency 
and fairness. Large landowners have argued that a stricter 
interpretation of the Reclamation law, forcing a reduction 
in farm size, would be out of step with modem agricul-
tural technology and would therefore increase production 
costs, reduce farmer welfare, and raise food prices. 3 They 
further contend that any reversal of current administrative 
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procedures constitutes an unfair use of public power since 
most project participants based their decisions to accept 
federal water on past practices and interpretations of the 
law. 
Proponents of a stricter interpretation respond that 
smaller 160- to 320-acre farms are economically viable 
and efficient enough to produce food at current prices. 
This position has considerable academic support.4 They 
also contend that the broad social and economic develop-
ment goals encouraged by the original Reclamation Act of 
1902-widespread land ownership and family farms-re-
main important and relevant policy objectives today, and 
can be implemented only by returning to the strict en-
forcement of existing acreage and residency requirements. 
Neither side of the debate has given the subsidy issue 
much attention, mainly because neither side wants the 
subsidy eliminated. In the fmal analysis, however, the 
most important question confronting Congress is whether 
or not to continue subsidizing water. 
The Magnitude of the Water Subsidy 
As noted above, the major subsidy to Reclamation water 
users is the exemption from paying interest on the costs 
of irrigation facilities. Most house buyers are aware that 
interest costs account for the major portion of total mort· 
gage payments. Thus over 40 years, at the modest interest 
rate of 7 percent, the interest on a project amounts to 
about 7 5 percent of total project costs. If water users had 
to fmance their irrigation development privately, assuming 
the same interest rate and cost of development, they 
would have to pay roughly four times as much for their 
water as under the federal system. 
This is an additional subsidy to water users, for they are 
not required to repay the full construction costs, less 
interest. For example, on those projects completed be-
tween 1903 and 1976, the total irrigation construction 
costs (excluding costs of flood control, recreation, and 
wildlife refuges) amounted to $3.62 billion. However, 
water users were originally liable for only 60 percent of 
the $3.62 billion, or $2.09 billion, with the rest to be paid 
out of revenues from hydroelectricity sales. 
But water users have not even been repaying the $2.09 
billion because of the impact of inflation on project 
operation and maintenance costs. On most projects, it 
has been the practice to sign a 40-year repayment con-
tract with the irrigation district; during this time the price 
of water is fixed. The price is initially established to pro-
vide sufficient revenues to meet the costs of operating and 
maintaining (O&M costs) the project as well as the repay-
ment liability for construction costs. As inflation in-
creases the O&M costs, fewer and fewer project revenues 
are available to meet the repayment liability for construc-
tion costs. Thus if total O&M costs accruing between 
1903 and 1976 are subtracted from total payments made 
by water users during the same period, it is found that 
only about $0.07 billion of the $2.09 billion of construe-
• 
tion costs for which water users are liable have actually 
been repaid, or 3 3 percent. Moreover, at current collec-
tion rates and costs (even assuming no further inflation) it 
would take 432 years for water users to repay their share 
of construction costs. This means that of the irrigation 
construction costs of $3.62 billion, roughly 56.7 percent 
will be paid from electricity sales, 40 percent from general 
tax revenues, and the modest remainder by farmers. It 
might be added that since inflation also increases farm 
prices and incomes, water users could afford to pay the 
inflated O&M costs as well as their share of construction 
costs with no significant loss.5 
In summary, an explicit subsidy in the form of the in-
terest exemption and the use of hydroelectric revenues is 
granted to water users, which reduces their share of total 
construction costs to about 15 percent. Inflation adds an 
unintentional subsidy by further reducing this share to 
about 5 percent. Using conservative assumptions, these 
figures imply that the present value (1976 dollars) of the 
water subsidy throughout the Reclamation program aver-
aged at least $500 per acre and was probably twice that 
figure. A more definite estimate for this subsidy is avail-
able for the Westlands, the newest of the irrigation pro-
jects, where water users repay all irrigation construction 
costs and receive no explicit subsidy from electricity 
revenues. Nevertheless, the estimated present value of the 
subsidy is between $1 ,800 and $2,200 per acre, depending 
on the outcome of water price negotiations between the 
. government and the water district. This means that the 
total public cost of irrigating 160 acres averages $77,000 
throughout the program and about $353,000 in the West-
lands. 
The Rationale for Water Subsidies 
Public-sector involvement in water resource development 
is frequently rationalized with the justification that a 
variety of institutional reasons-e.g., the right of eminent 
domain, access to cheap fmancial capital, and the ability 
to spread risk-enable the government to build large-scale 
projects more cheaply than the private sector. Therefore, 
it is argued, governmental involvement increases overall 
economic efficiency. But this efficiency argument only 
justifies government intervention, it does not justify the 
provision of water at below its cost of production. Under 
this rationale, government should undertake only those 
projects that the private sector would produce, were it 
not impeded by the above restrictions. If efficiency is to 
be maximized, the government would develop only those 
projects capable of producing a profit, and it should 
charge the user the full cost of water. 
The originators of the Reclamation Act believed that 
irrigation would create so much productivity that the Re-
clamation program would easily repay itself and still 
provide additional economic benefits, hence the program 
was originally set up to be self-fmancing. In imposing the 
acreage and residency requirements, Congress wanted to 
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distribute the extra economic benefits remaining, after 
full repayment of irrigation costs, to as many family 
farmers as possible in order to stimulate western rural 
economic development. 
As the high costs of western water development became 
more apparent, Congress was forced to recognize that 
irrigation in the West could not expand rapidly if develop-
ment was restricted to only those projects capable of 
paying their own way. Therefore, in amending the law to 
increase the irrigation subsidy and permit the more rapid 
development of western water resources, Congress made a 
decision to sacrifice some efficiency in order to create 
more important nonefficiency benefits. The justification 
for expanding the subsidy has generally been the promo-
tion of widespread land ownership and rural economic 
development based on small family farms. Congress may, 
of course, have had other less noble reasons for sacri-
ficing efficiency. For example, the greater subsidy per-
mitted an expansion of the pork barrel. In summary, non-
efficiency goals may outweigh efficiency goals in the 
formulation of public policy and provide a legitimate 
rationale for the water subsidy. 
Policy-makers today need to ask whether the sacrifice 
of efficiency in water resource development is still justi-
fied, given different social and economic conditions. 
Does the subsidy create enough nonefficiency benefits to 
warrant its existence? Those who would repeal or modify 
the acreage and residency requirements argue that these 
provisions must be changed to meet the needs of modern 
agriculture. In other words, these requirements are 
alleged no longer to provide sufficient social or economic 
benefits to justify their existence. But if this is true, 
similarly, there would also be little justification for a 
subsidy or for continued inefficient resource development. 
Yet the proponents of reform would retain existing water 
pricing practices and hence the subsidy. 
The Nature and Magnitude of Project Benefits 
As indicated earlier, there is no necessary relationship 
between the economic benefits created by irrigation and 
the overall costs of irrigation projects. Efficient resource 
development consists of funding only projects whose total 
economic benefits are greater than their costs. These were 
the kinds of projects that Congress originally envisioned in 
1902 and that modern resource development policy guide-
lines are intended to foster. Under such conditions, water 
users would experience benefits from project develop-
ment, even if they were required to repay full project 
costs. If such projects are subsidized, the water user 
simply earns an even greater benefit at someone else's 
expense. 
As already implied, many Reclamation projects do not 
meet these efficiency criteria. Inefficient projects would 
not be built if water users were forced to repay their full 
costs (including interest) because the benefits received 
through increased land productivity would not compen-
sate for the higher repayment obligations. But when 
water users are not required to repay a very significant 
portion of project costs, this means that highly inefficient 
projects will nevertheless provide landowners with sub-
stantial benefits. For example, as noted above, the West-
lands subsidy amounts to $2,200 per acre. The writer's 
research shows that this expenditure creates benefits equal 
to about $1 ,000 (or less) per acre. If landowners were re-
quired to pay the full costs of irrigating this region, they 
would not have supported the project, since they would 
have been worse off with the project and better off with-
out it, even though contending with declining ground 
water supplies. 
The Westlands example does not appear to be an anom-
aly in the Reclamation program. As pointed out above, 
the early projects did not support themselves. Moreover, 
most recent economic analyses of the Reclamation pro-
gram also conclude that wa~er resources have been pre· 
maturely and inefficiently developed, and have been mis-
allocated between agriculture and the rest of the econ-
omy.6 
Subsidized irrigation has encouraged expanded crop 
production in the arid West, and has thereby imposed 
increasing costs on the taxpayer through the effects of 
expansion on the creation of surpluses, and on farmers in 
competing rain-fed agricultural regions who have lost their 
competitive position in some crops. For example, after 
the cotton quotas were eliminated in 1972, cotton pro-
duction expanded rapidly in California, especially in the 
Westlands, to the detriment of smaller southern farmers 
and the related rural economies that lost a profitable 
market. This shift in location would have been much less 
pronounced without the public subsidy. Also, since 40 
percent of Reclamation cropland is planted in crops sub-
ject to government commodity programs, the irrigation of 
the West has encouraged greater production of crops al-
ready in surplus supply. This in turn has helped force the 
government to impose price supports and supply controls 
throughout the nation (at considerable taxpayer expense) 
in order to maintain farm prices at politically acceptable 
levels.7 In short, the expansion of irrigation in the West 
has several invisible but nevertheless costly side-effects. If 
these were accurately estimated and incorporated into our 
cost-benefit analyses, the overall inefficiency of Reclama-
tion would be seen as even greater than is generally under-
stood. Briefly, subsidized water permits lands of lesser 
quality ("scrub lands") that would otherwise not be culti· 
vated, to be put into production. But once they are in 
production with subsidized water, they have a "heritage" 
and as time goes by it is difficult if not impossible to stop 
the subsidy. Yet it is a wasteful use of good water, which 
is increasingly in short supply. Thus, the subsidy encour-
ages putting good water on bad land, and on a long-term 
basis. 
Supporters of Reclamation, including the USBR itself, 
attempt to justify the subsidy by arguing that even ineffi-
cient projects can create sufficient benefits to justify their 
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existence.8 It is contended that irrigation projects pro-
duce substantial indirect benefits in terms of additional 
employment, secondary development, and higher taxes, 
and that these are more than enough to justify the large 
subsidy. 
But this is a fallacious line of reasoning. That is, when 
the choice is made to irrigate a region such as the West-
lands, a choice is implicitly made not to irrigate some 
other area, not to commit the tax revenues to some other 
government project, or not to allow the private sector to 
use the funds by lowering taxes. In other words, if the 
project were not built, the funds released would be used 
for other investment or consumption. This would have in· 
creased income, raised taxes, and added to employment, 
thus producing the same kind of alleged indirect benefits 
elsewhere in the economy. Consequently unless a case 
can be made that the indirect benefits of the Westlands 
were greater than those which might have accrued in some 
other project, these cannot be taken as a measure of pro· 
ject effectiveness. 
In summary, the subsidy favors the selection and devel-
opment of inefficient projects. It helps the USBR to 
maintain an ever-expanding program, although the effi-
cient irrigation sites have long since been exhausted and 
the nation continues to face agricultural surpluses. It also 
encourages the inefficient use of water, which is in short 
supply. Moreover, since the inefficiencies are often sub-
stantial, once projects are in being any attempt to elimi-
nate the water subsidy would lead to economic hardship 
and possible bankruptcy for many producers. In a sense, 
we are trapped by our past mistakes. 
The Distnoution of Project Benefits 
Under the Current Regulations 
It could be argued that, despite the project inefficiencies 
noted earlier, Reclamation subsidies might still be justified 
if they facilitate achievement of the nonefficiency goals 
described by the Reclamation Act. This leads to the ques-
tions of whether these goals have been fulfilled in the 
past, and whether they can best be achieved through the 
use of water development policies. Before attempting to 
answer these questions, it is first necessary to discuss the 
nature of project benefits in more detail. 
Benefits to Initial Owners 
Providing irrigation water increases arid lands produc-
tivity and value. The capitalized value of the annual in-
crement to income, equivalent to the rise in overall land 
values within a project produced by water deliveries, is 
generally taken as the measure of project benefits. These 
benefits accrue to owners who had purchased land before 
its price rose to reflect the increased productivity made 
possible by project water. These owners who have 
acquired land within the projects before authorization or 
construction are the primary beneficiaries of project 
water. As long as these individuals are able to sell their 
land at the increased market price, they will be able to 
capture the entire windfall benefit associated with the 
project. 
New Buyers 
Anyone purchasing land after the authorization of a 
project will take the increased eamin~ potential into 
account and will pay a price for the land such that the 
expected profit on the investment will approximate that 
on other investments of comparable risk. The water pro-
ject does not provide a windfall for such an investor, as it 
does for the original landowner. Of course, if water prices 
were unexpectedly raised, or if future regulations were to 
prohibit the new landowner from using the land in some 
way, he would experience a net loss of his income or 
wealth, not compensated by a prior windfall benefit. 
One of the critical issues in the Reclamation debate 
hinges on whether benefits conferred by past administra-
tive practice can be recaptured by new public policies and 
made available to a different set of beneficiaries. In fact, 
once the land has changed hands, recapture of benefits is 
virtually impossible. Policies intended to achieve recap-
ture would redistribute income, but only at the expense 
of owners who purchased the land at higher prices that 
reflect its new productivity made possible by subsidized 
irrigation. In short, bygones must be bygones. 
Westlands' Benefits 
The writer has investigated the distribution of project 
benefits in the Westlands Water District, fmding that 
under the current administrative practices of the USBR, 
virtually all project benefits accrued to the original land-
owners of record at the time of water deliveries in 1968. 
This accrual of benefits to original owners has been facil-
itated by the USBR's administrative interpretation of the 
Reclamation law, which has led to several questionable 
practices. 
The most important of these practices is the agency's 
failure to impose the residency requirement, allowing 
absentee owners to keep their land and lease it out. These 
actions have all but eliminated the incentives for owners 
of excess land to place their holdings on the market for 
new family farmers. Instead, owners can redistribute their 
holdings under new titles, using the names of family 
members, relatives, or corporations, in order to conform 
to the 160-acre restriction on ownership. Next they can 
lease the land to large agricultural management firms that 
farm the land in major tracts, using hired managers and 
laborers. If residency were required, most of this re-
organization of titles would be pointless, since the new 
"owners" do not live on the land, and could not qualify 
for water. 
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The second most important practice that allows the 
original owners to capture project benefits is the ten-year 
grace period for the sale of excess land, during which time 
the original owner is allowed to purchase subsidized pro-
ject water for his entire holdings. In the Westlands, the 
total value of access to subsidized water and the addition-
al income created over a ten-year period was estimated to 
be $950 per acre. In addition, when a landowner sells 
during the grace period, the USBR has permitted selling 
prices well in excess of the true "non-project" land price, 
thereby allowing the seller to capture additional project 
benefits. In the Westlands this has amounted to an addi-
tional benefit of about $400 per acre. Finally, the USBR 
has permitted land sales whereby all price controls were 
effectively avoided and the original owner captured the 
entire capitalized value of the subsidy. 
In 1968, when water deliveries began, there were 
approximately 2,500 individuals and corporate land-
owners in the 545,000 acre Westlands Water District. 
About 84 percent of this land was held by 280 individuals 
or corporations, with an average holding of 1,650 acres. 
The_average benefit received by this group was therefore 
about $1.6 million per owner. On the other hand, the 
2;!00 other owners, with holdings averaging about 40 
acres, received about $40,000 each in benefits from the 
subsidy. 
In 1968 the Westlands was organized into 97 farms 
(with "farms" defmed in terms of production units). 
Absentee landowners leased their holdings in these farms, 
which are generally run by hired management and labor. 
Today, with only half of the land classified as "excess" 
and possibly available for subdivision into smaller farms, 
there are only about 216 farms (also mostly leased) 
averaging about 2,200 acres each.9 Even if the remaining 
excess land were subdivided in a similar manner the dis-
trict would not have more than 350 to 400 farms when 
the last of the excess land had eventually been sold. 
In short, under the current administration of the Rec-
lamation Act, a project has been built whose costs ex-
ceed benefits by a ratio of two to one. The public will 
have spent over $1 billion to irrigate 545,000 acres and 
create about 300 new farms ($3 3 million per farm). 
Moreover these farms will be run mainly by hired man-
agers and workers. The benefits of this project will have 
been captured by a small number of individuals and cor-
porations, many of whom have little interest in or contact 
with farming, and certainly could not be called "family 
farmers." 
The Westlands experience, though perhaps the most 
extreme of all Reclamation projects, helps demonstrate 
the irrationality of the way the Reclamation program has 
been administered. The large subsidy, never intended by 
Congress, is used to make an inefficient project politi· 
cally desirable. USBR administrative practices give a 
major share of project benefits to the original landowners, 
helping insure their active support for the program. This 
arrangement allows the expansion of the Reclamation pro-
gram, thereby satisfying the agency and select members of 
Key Provisions 
Maximum land ownership 
for water eligibility 
Maximum size of farm 
(owned and leased land} 
Leasing 
Residency 
Method of establishing 
price of excess land; 
duration of price 
controls 
Compliance period1 
Selection of buyer 
Exclusions and exemp-








20-640 acres; average 
of 200 acres overall; 




farmer must reside 
within 15 miles 
of farm 
sale price of excess 
land equals market 
value less project 
benefits for duration 
of project life 
3 yea,rs 
lottery2 
none; requirements apply 
to all users receiving 
water by or through 
federal facilities 
government land 
purchase equal to 20% 
of excess land sold each 




160 acre~ per adult and 




farmer must reside 
on or near 
the land 
sale price of excess 
land equals seller's 
cost plus consumer 
price indexing for 10 
years after initial sale ; 
then no price controls 
1 year 
seller selects buyer 
none; requirements apply 
to all users receiving 
water by or through 
federal facilities 
government land 
purchase and lease 
program and loan 
guarantees; water 




320 acres per adult in-
volved in significant farming 
activities 
960 acres 
maximum 160 acres 
per owner 
farmer must reside 
within 50 miles 
of farm 
Secretary sets excess 
land price to reflect 
market value less 
project benefits, for 15 
years after initial sale; 
then no price controls 
5 years 
lottery2 
certain districts when 
contract payout is 
complete and others 
when payout is com-
pleted if family farms 
are established 
accepts the concept 
of "commingling" and 
thus implies regulations 
apply to any joint state-
federal projects 
1. Refers to excess landowners. Leased land, foreclosed or inherited land may have different terms. 
2. Lottery arrangements grant preferences to certain groups such as family members, neighbors, and employees who otherwise meet 
remaining criteria. 
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S. 2867; H.R. 11944, 
S.2818;H.R.13350, 12187, 12552, 
S. 2606; H.R. 11638 H.R.l3404 13480 12708 
Church; Baucus Krebs FARM/WATER Alliance Goldwater; Stump 
1 ,280 acres owned or 640 acres owned 320 acres per owner no limit 
leased per family per family; owner(s) 
involved in day-to-
day farming with 50% 
of income from 
farming 
1,280 acres 1,920 acres unlimited unlimited 
only within the only within the no maximum no maximum 
1 ,280 acre limit 1 ,920 acre limit 
not required not required not required not required 
no controls Secretary sets excess sale price of excess no controls 
mentioned land price to reflect land equals seller's 
market value less cost plus consumer 
project benefits, for price indexing for I 0 
15 years after initial years after initial sale; 
sale; then no control then no controls 
10 years 5 years not given not applicable 
seller selects buyer seller selects buyer seller selects buyer seller selects buyer 
no controls after Kings River districts district repayment of not applicable 
repayment of project exempted; no other project interest costs 
costs with termination provisions for relief (lump sum or annual); 
of contract restrictions do not 
apply to underground 
water beneficiaries 
water prices reviewed 
every five years 
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Congress, while giving large windfall benefits to those who 
are fonunate enough to own land in the right places at the 
right time. 
On the other hand, the would-be family farmer in whose 
name this large expenditure is justified receives few bene-
fits. The general public pays much of the bill, both 
through taxes and through the less visible costs of mal-
allocated resources. 
The Effects of Pending Legislation 
A number of bills have been introduced in Congress 
dealing with Reclamation policy (see Table). None of 
the proposals would remove the water subsidy. With one 
possible exception, none of them would increase the 
social or "nonefficiency" benefits of water resource 
development-e.g., widespread ownership and family 
farms-enough to justify the continued subsidy of water. 
Several of the bills would, however, reduce the incen-
tives that encouraged inefficient water resource develop-
ment. To illustrate these points, the pending legislation is 
discussed in three categories, each analyzed with reference 
to its possible impact on the development of a hypo-
thetical project like the Westlands. 
Removing Acreage and Residency Requirements 
The fu:st set of bills comprises those that would repeal 
the acreage and residency requirements outright, thereby 
in effect legislatively approving the current administra-
tive procedures described above. These bills include those 
of the FARM-WATER alliance, Goldwater, and Stump. 
Obviously if acreage and residency requirements were 
dropped, but the subsidy continued. projects like the 
Westlands would become even more attractive to those in 
a position to benefit, and the benefits would be as con-
centrated as the initial concentration of ownership. 
In short, while the water subsidy remains, such bills 
will simply assure continuation of the irrationalities of 
water resource development. They would also allow large 
landowners to consolidate their existing project benefits 
and prevent any further dispersal of these benefits to new 
farmers. In older projects, this fegislation might insure a 
measure of fairness to landowners who never benefitted 
from the original project windfalls. But this policy would 
be inappropriate for new projects such as the Westlands, 
where the original owners are still in possession of much 
of the land, as well as for future projects where it would 
encourage inefficient development. 
The problem of older, established projects and fairness 
of administrative treatment could be handled more effec-
tively through exemptions. That is, each of the projects 
could be examined and exempted from new legislation 
where conditions warrant. 
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Tightening Current Interpretations 
The second set of bills includes those that would enforce 
a stricter interpretation of the spirit of the existing law 
than is currently observed by the USBR. These bills 
would place a ceiling on land ownership (ranging from 
160 to 1,280 acres) and also on farm size (ranging from 
320 to I ,920 acres). They would require most benefits to 
go to landowners who were also farmers (by restricting 
leasing and in some cases requiring residency). They 
would control the price of land to prevent speculative pur-
chases. Several would also provide for periodic review and 
adjustment of water prices. These bills include those of 
Nelson-Haskell, the Administration, Krebs, and Church 
and Baucus. 
Although there are major differences among these bills, 
all would have two effects of varying impact. They would 
(1) reduce incentives for construction of projects like the 
Westlands, and (2) force a wider distribution of project 
benefits than has occurred in the Westlands. The flrst 
effect is the more important of the two. 
All the proposals except the Administration bill would 
reduce the time period for compliance with excess land 
provisions. The Nelson-Haskell and Church bills would 
require landowners to sell their excess holdings within one 
year, while the Krebs bill requires sale in five years. The 
current ten-year period would thus be shortened, and the 
benefits made available to excess landowners reduced by 
varying degrees, depending on the ownership maximum 
established (Nelson -Haskell would be the most restric-
tive). 
All of these bills would require the project beneficiary 
to be an active farmer, thereby eliminating the current 
practice of conferring benefits on absentee owners who 
otherwise meet the acreage restrictions. In· short these 
bills would reduce the incentives for the original owners 
to support a large program, because many would be 
forced to give up most of their holdings, in return for 
which they would receive relatively small benefits. This 
would be particularly true for potential projects wherein 
landholding is highly concentrated, as in the Westlands. 
The establishment of a maximum on farm size and 
ownership would force a broader distribution of project 
benefits. The Nelson-Haskell measure would produce the 
most progressive distribution of benefits, but even under 
this bill, the distribution of project benefits would not be 
adequate to justify continued subsidy of water. This can 
be illustrated by the impact of the Nelson Haskell bill on 
a project like the Westlands. If farm size were restricted 
to 3 20 acres, there could have been at least I, 700 farms in 
the Westlands, instead of the projected 400 farms that will 
eventually be formed under the current administrative 
practices. The increase in number of farms would appear 
to imply a major change in the nature of the region's 
farming. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the actual impact of 
• 
imposing the 320-acre limit on a region such as the West-
lands appears less profound than may be thought. For 
example, on a 320-acre farm the family could provide the 
management as well as perhaps some of the field labor for 
certain crops, but the farm would continue to be depen-
dent on hired, seasonal labor. Thus at least 40 percent of 
the labor required by a 320-acre farm would be supplied 
by low-wage, temporary farmworkers, the same propor-
tion as under the current system.10 
In other words, the structure of the rural economy will 
not be fundamentally changed. Resident family farmers 
would displace hired managers and permanent farm-
workers, but the reliance on seasonal farmworkers, the 
chief source of rural poverty, would continue. Moreover, 
such a change in farm management does not imply a new 
increase in the number of families associated with the agri-
cultural system, so there is little reason to believe that the 
Nelson-Haskell bill would encourage rural economic 
development. 
Equally important, under the Nelson -Haskell bill the 
subsidy will remain highly concentrated. It is estimated 
that a 320-acre farm in the Westlands would derive about 
$320,000 in windfall benefits under existing water prices. 
This benefit amounts to about $20,000 per year, in 
addition to the normal return on management and labor, 
estimated at between $15,000 and $50,000, depending on 
prices and crops grown. In short, the subsidy would 
create a new wealthy landowner class, but would leave the 
sources of rural poverty untouched. Given these con-
siderations, it seems clear that the water subsidy cannot 
be justified under even such a strict interpretation of the 
existing Reclamation Act. 
Encouraging Widespread Rural Development 
The third category of bills includes only one-that of 
National Land for People (NLP)-which would attempt to 
restructure the Reclamation Act to make the most bene-
ficial use of the subsidy in supporting widespread rural 
development. The NLP bill proposes an average parcel 
size of between 150 and 200 acres, with minimum parcels 
of 20 acres and maximums of 640 acres. It would require 
a lottery to distribute excess land, and include a 15-rnile 
residency requirement to force farmers to live near their 
land. The bill would also provide for a perpetual subsidy 
through indefinite control over land prices in the district. 
Finally, the bill apparently would require compliance with 
the acreage and residency provisions within three years. 
It seems certain this bill would render a project like the 
Westlands politically infeasible, because it would require 
landowners to give up most of their land with little in 
return. Such a bill would therefore likely rule out much 
of the additional planned water resource development in 
California, whether the resource development were effi-
cient or inefficient. This might be preferable to the 
current situation, but obviously might also restrict useful 
development. 
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If this bill were imposed on the Westlands, it would dis-
tribute the subsidy benefits to a relatively larger number 
of households and stimulate more overall rural develop-
ment than any of the other bills. For example, a study of 
the impact of enforcing a 200-acre average maximum on 
farm size concluded that population and employment 
would roughly double in the Westlands, and household 
income would rise by about 75 percent and be much more 
concentrated in the middle income groups than under the 
existing system. The average farm family income would 
be about $30,000 per year, and with this greater pur-
chasing power there would be more retail purchases and 
hence new jobs, more community development, and a 
doubling of nonagricultural employment.11 
If one can accept the Bass/Kirshner analysis of the 
impact of the 200-acre restriction and its implications for 
the Westlands, the NLP bill appears to offer Congress an 
alternative that would help to re-establish the original 
purpose of the Reclamation Act, i.e., stimulating rural 
development. The author has reservations concerning the 
economic feasibility of this bill in its present form, but 
does not doubt that an agricultural system of interdepen-
dent production units could be devised to_ support even 
more families than estimated by Bass and Kirshner.l2 
Admittedly, if enacted the measure would probably re-
strict water resource development, especially in regions 
of high concentration of land ownership. If, however, the 
law were enforced in such projects as the Westlands, it 
could help to make the best of a bad investment by 
helping transform the agrarian system and providing new 
economic opportunities for individuals who have not 
shared in the past benefits of agricultural and water re-
source development. 
Conclusion 
Large water subsidies are the source of most of the 
problems in the current Reclamation program. Unfor-
tunately, these effects are not well understood, and have 
been lost in the current congressional debate over acreage 
and residency requirements. The subsidy has created 
political incentives encouraging the construction of "pork· 
barrel" projects which, in turn, require the overdevelop-
men! of rivers and streams and the overconsumption of 
water by agriculture at a very high public cost. 
The subsidy was originated to facilitate the rural devel-
opment goals of the Reclamation Act. But in fact the 
record shows that under the program's current adminis-
tration the subsidy has increased the economic and 
political power of the original landowners. It has not 
promoted small family farms or rural development. In-
stead, the subsidy has contributed to inefficient water 
resource development and regressive social development. 
What is to be done? The previous analysis suggests the 
following approaches. 
First, the subsidy should be withdrawn from all future 
projects. Rural development no longer is the most press-
ing issue. instead, the main concern is efficient resource 
development. No matter how widely distributed the 
subsidy might be, its benefits cannot justify the continued 
inefficient overdevelopment of irrigation facilities. Where 
rural development is desirable, other kinds of public 
policy can achieve these goals more efficiently. If the sub-
sidy for new projects is withdrawn, it is unlikely that 
there will be any large-scale water development projects 
in the future, at least until agricultural prices have risen 
to much higher levels than now prevail. 
Second, with respect to projects already completed or 
under construction, the minimum appropriate reform 
would reduce the subsidy by requiring water users to 
repay their share of construction costs, plus orration and 
maintenance costs, within a reasonable time.1 
Third, with respect to restrictions on acreage and resi· 
dency, appropriate reforms would depend on the extent 
of the subsidy and the age of the program. 
(I) Future projects are considered first. If the subsidy 
were eliminated from future projects, the case for such 
restrictions would be weakened. Moreover strict acreage 
and residency requirements might prevent efficient pro· 
jects from being built, because of landowner reluctance. 
Even if the subsidy should be continued for future pro· 
jects, however, strict requirements would still inhibit con-
struction of water projects, both efficient and inefficient. 
Accordingly, removal of the subsidy seems clearly pre· 
ferable to acreage and residency restraints, although the 
latter would be better than continuation of present prac-
tices. 
(2) With respect to projects under construction or 
completed in the comparatively recent past, if partici· 
pants are willing and able to make full repayment of costs 
plus interest, an exemption from acreage and residency 
requirements would seem appropriate. But the situation 
is different if a substantial subsidy continues indefinitely 
and the land remains in the hands of the original owners-
as is true of Westlands. ln these cases strict acreage and 
residency requirements-like those in the NLP bill-can 
appropriately be imposed without unduly penalizing such 
owners, who would already have benefitted from land-
value appreciation. 
(3) Finally, in older projects like those in the Imperial 
Valley, we must acknowledge that to impose acreage and 
residency restrictions would inflict large uncompensated 
losses on existing owners, who are not the original owners 
and beneficiaries from the initial land-value appreciation. 
Accordingly, such old projects should either be exempted, 
or if restrictions are imposed they should be accompanied 
by some form of compensation. 
To sum up, the greatest opportunity for experimenta· 
tion is with future projects yet unbuilt, where elimination 
of the subsidy seems the most appropriate policy. Sub-
stantial experimentation is also possible with projects 
under construction or recently completed-such as the 
Westlands-where strict acreage and residency require-
ments are appropriate policies, along with other measures 
to encourage rural development. 
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RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSERVATION: 
POLICY LESSONS FROM THE 
CALIFORNIA DROUGHT* 
William H. Bruvold 
Depanment of Social and Administrative Health Sciences 
School of Public Health 
University of California, Berkeley 
Introduction 
How do residential water users respond to severe water 
shonages? Are they willing and able to conserve, and if so, 
to what extent? What are the implications of water users' 
behavior for long-term conservation in California, a state 
with a permanent water deficit? Some answers are found in 
a study of actual experiences during the recent California 
drought. 
In the winter of 1976-77 Central California got far less 
than average precipitation. I Thus a very dry year followed 
the relatively dry winter of 1975-76. In the San Francisco 
Bay Area these two successiye years of short supply meant 
that, to get through the summer of 1977 and prepare for 
the possibility of a third dry season in the winter of 1977-
78, water districts had to adopt emergency conservation 
programs involving their residential users. Fortunately the 
rain and snow returned in abundance during the winter of 
1977-78. Accordingly conservation and rationing programs 
were removed early in 1978. 
Experience with the water districts' different kinds of 
residential conservation measures during 1977 represented 
a "natural experiment," whereby the equity and effec-
tiveness of these various programs could be evaluated and 
compared. Research on water conservation programs in 
the Bay Area has revealed a remarkable reduction in resi-
dential consumption. People actually saved more water 
than they were requested to, even in areas like Marin 
County where a critical shortage forced the imposition of 
*This material is based upon research supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation under Grant Number ENV77-16171. 
Any opinions, fmdings and conclusions or recommendations ex-
pressed in this publication are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
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stringent rationing programs. These results are encouraging, 
especially as the Pacific Southwest and many other areas 
suffer permanent water shortages or deficits, accentuated 
from time to time by periodic droughts. If people can thus 
dramatically cut down the use of residential water, con-
servation as a strategy for dealing with chronic shortages 
can be much more effective than previously believed. 
The research was done in nine selected San Francisco 
Bay Area water districts shown in Table 1, chosen as 
follows.2 Three districts were selected from those having 
rigorous conservation programs (a conservation goal of 30 
percent or more below previous use, coupled with stringent 
regulations and penalties). Three districts were selected 
from those having moderate conservation programs (a 
conservation goal of 25 to 30 percent below previous use, 
and less stringent regulations and penalties). And fmally 
three districts were selected from those with mild conserva-
tion programs (a conservation goal of 25 percent or less 
below previous use, and with few if any penalties or regu-
lations). 
The investigation had four major objectives: (1) to 
determine how co'l:;umers rated the equity and effective-
ness of the water conservation program they had exper-
ienced, (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of each conserva-
tion program in terms of water actually consumed, (3) to 
investigate relationships between consumer beliefs and 
behavior, and ( 4) to assess opinions about regionalization 
of the San Francisco Bay Area water supply. The fmdings 
are presente_d in full in a report for the National Science 
Foundation;3 highlights and policy implications are offered 
here. 
Ratings 
In rating the programs, respondents focused on equity or 
fairness, as well as effectiveness and overall performance of 
the water districts' conservation measures. In general, all 
ratings were quite positive. The three rigorous programs 
were rated as fair, effective, and quite satisfactory overall. 
Exceptions to the generally positive evaluations were (1) 
the fairness ratings of the three moderate programs and (2) 
the effectiveness ratings of the three mild programs. 
Respondents rating the moderate program districts 
recommended improving fairness by basing rationing allot-
ments on numbers of people served, rather than on past 
Table 1 
Major Residential Surveys 
Conservation Percent Basis 
program reduction of 
City or area surveyed Water service agency County rating sought allotment 
San Rafael and Southeast Marin Municipal Marin Rigorous 57 Per capita 
Marin County Water District 
San Leandro, San Lorenzo, East Bay Municipal Alameda Rigorous 35 Per capita 
Castro Valley Utility District 
Concord Contra Costa County Contra Costa Rigorous 30 Prior use 
Water District 
Palo Alto Palo Alto Santa Clara Moderate 25 Prior use 
San Francisco San Francisco San Fran cisco Moderate 25 Prior use 
San Mateo California Water San Mateo Moderate 25 Prior use 
Service Company 
Southeast San Jose Great Oaks Water Santa Clara Mild 25 Prior use 
Company 
Napa Napa Napa 
Vallejo Vallejo Solano 
use, size of lawn, or ability to pay. This recommendation 
on fairness is a major finding of the study. Thus the per 
capita allotment system adopted by the rigorous programs 
probably accounts for their positive fairness ratings, 
because they were seen as equitable despite their strin-
gency; 
Respondents rating the three districts with mild pro-
grams emphasized improving effectiveness by making 
rationing mandatory rather than voluntary. They seemed 
to be saying "Something worth doing is worth doing well." 
Respondents from all nine water districts also recom-
mended (1) improved communication between the district 
and its customers. (2) stricter enforcement of rationing 
rules and prohibitions, and (3) avoidance of ambiguous 
"double messages" that actually promote greater use while 
ostensibly encouraging conservation. Points one and three 
are discussed more fully below in the section on communi-
cation. 
Effectiveness 
The evaluation of program effectiveness requires a state-
ment of program goals or objectives, and comparisons to 
determine whether desired changes were obtained.4 For 
these water conservation efforts, program goals were 
expressed in percent reduction of water consumed resi-
dentially. (See Table 2.) The results of rigorous and 
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Mild 20 Prior use 
Mild 10 Prior use 
moderate programs were even better than those sought, 
while the mild programs did not quite reach their stated 
goals. In short, this ability of residential consumers to 
reduce daily water consumption exceeded stated conserva-
tion goals, and in fact caused the water districts financial 
problems when revenues declined more than anticipated.s 
Beliefs, Behavior and Use 
Beliefs measured in the survey included views of the 
seriousness of the drought crisis and the need for long-
term conservation. The analyses of self-reported conserva-
tion behavior produced an "overall weighted conservation 
behavior score," based upon number of conservation 
actions undertaken from the onset of the drought, e.g., 
installing a shower flow restrictor, use of "grey water," 
installing toilet tank dams. and so on. The actual number 
of gallons of water used per person per day during the 
summer of 1977 was figured directly from respondents' 
water bills. When measures of belief were correlated with 
the weighted conservation score, and then with water use, 
it was found that socio-demographic variables of income 
bracket and education level did not materially affect the 
correlations. Further, beliefs about the seriousness of the 
crisis correlated with the weighted conservation behavior 
score, but not with per capita daily use. Beliefs about the 
need for long-term (non<risis) conservation correlated with 
Table 2 
Effectiveness of Water Conservation Programs 
























per capita daily use, but not with the overall weighted 
conservation behavior score noted above.6 
These results are quite provocative and do not fit in a 
simple way with the notion that response to a crisis situa-
tion produced the low consumption figures of the summer 
of 1977. The people who believed in a continuing long-
term need to conserve water actually used less water per 
person per day than the others. Those who believed the 
drought to be only a serious short-term crisis, even though 
they changed many behaviors after the drought began and 
did conserve, nevertheless used as much water as those who 
doubted that the drought was a crisis. 
Regionalism 
Regional organization for a variety of purposes in the 
San Francisco Bay Area is a persistent issue that was raised 
again by the 1977 drought.7 Wide differences in con-
servation programs mounted by the many water districts 
around the Bay raised questions of inter-district fairness. 
Would it be better to share water among districts and adopt 
one overall rationing and conservation plan? The worsening 
drought made the conflicts apparent during preliminary 
interviewing in the spring of 1977. 
Accordingly a question on regionalization of the Bay 
Area water supply and related rationing programs was 
included in the major survey during the summer of 1977. 
The data in Table 3 show that all areas surveyed, except 
one of those with a rigorous conservation program (San 
Leandro), favored local rather than regional water supply 
systems and conservation plans. Respondents from the 
other two districts with rigorous conservation plans, while 
giving a modest edge to local plans, nevertheless also voted 
for regional approaches in higher percents than in districts 
with moderate or mild programs. Apparently the respon-
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Summer 1977 Sought Obtained 
35 57 59 
61 37 60 
100 30 55 
112 25 47 
59 25 46 
92 25 41 
144 25 16 
129 20 19 
120 10 6 
dents residing in the districts having more stringent ration-
ing programs, even though they judged their own programs 
to be fair, may have desired greater equity between districts 
in rationing programs, since they were under the most 
pressure to conserve. 
Recommendation: Policy for Acute 
Drought Rationing Programs 
The major fmding on equity provides the first policy 
recommendation for rationing programs in acute droughts: 
Water allotments should be based upon number of people 
served, not last year's use, size of lot, square feet in the 
house, or any other similar criteria. 
It would be administratively easier for water districts to 
ask for a percentage reduction based on prior use, but as 
many respondents pointed out, this penalizes prior con-
servation and rewards prior excessive use. Also, it causes 
other problems because all consumers must know their 
prior use level in order to comply with such a program.8 
Additionally, both consumer comments and our evaluation 
of program effectiveness strongly support a per capita 
allotment. In an acute drought, priority must be given to 
people and their ingestive, culinary, sanitary and cleaning 
needs. During a real emergency all other uses of water, 
e.g., agricultural or industrial, become secondary compared 
to the health and safety of individuals. 
Recommendation: Mandatory Rationing 
A second important policy recommendation: Ration-
ing programs for acute droughts should be mandatory, 
even if restrictions and penalties are not severe. Major 
support for this assertion comes from the consumer ratings 
Table 3 
Attitudes Toward Regionalization of the San Francisco 
Bay Area Water Supply System by Percentage 
Percent Clearly favors 
regional plan 
Leans toward 




local plan No data Total 
Rigorous Program 
San Rafael 38 6 
San Leandro 52 5 
Concord 46 0 
Jfoderare Program 
Palo . ..\lto 25 14 
San Francisco 36 3 
San .\1ateo . 29 4 
Mild Program 
San Jose 27 2 
Napa 26 1 
Vallejo 21 9 
and comments upon effectiveness. People living under the 
voluntary programs were particularly vocal. fmding it 
incongruous to hear continually :J.bout the seriousness of 
the acute drought :J.tTlicting the San Francisco Bay Area. 
while only being :J.Sked to try to reduce their own use. in 
effect. "if this were not too much of a personal hardship .. , 
. ..\lso. the data on amounts actually conserved shown in 
Table :::. demonSLr:ne the mandatory programs· much 
g:re:ner ef:e:::::ver:ess. .'>1anC.:uory rationing by the stringent 
and moderate programs seemed to reinforce media informa-
tion that the drought was indeed serious, and that people 
must cut back water use in order to avoid potentially severe 
future problems and shortages. 
Further. if rationing programs employ rules and pro-
hibitions, these should be enforceable, and in fact enforced. 
When flagrant rule breakers are not punished, this lowers 
the morale of consumers who carefully follow the rules 
and abide by the prohibitions. Water district staff may find 
the idea of enforcement repugnant, since they see their 
mission as providing services. Nevertheless, if rules and 
prohibitions are needed to deal with acute drought, these 
should be vigorously and widely enforced. 
If, however, a water district does not wish to become 
involved in policing door-to-door to ensure compliance, it 
should adopt rationing rules and regulations that do not 
require close surveillance. Perhaps pricing penalties or 
fines, along with a clearly stated quota for each residence, 
followed by regular feedback to customers on consump-
tion, will suffice in all but the most extreme drought con-
ditions. Even though an individualized system of feedback 
and penalty for each residence would be difficult to imole-
ment, it might nevertheless involve less effort than wide-










7 47 1 100 
2 38 1 100 
4 45 2 100 
5 51 100 
6 42 4 100 
2 55 2 100 
4 65 0 100 
5 62 ., 100 .) 
13 54 0 100 
Recommendation: Communication 
A third poiicy recommendation for rationing programs 
in acute droughts: Gear and consistent communication 
between a water district :md irs residential consumers is 
essennal. ~any comments urged that the communication 
process be improved. and the survey results suggested that 
districts were not accustomed :o communicating with their 
customers on an individualized. ::asis. Also. some con-
sumers did not understand their diSLrict's overall program. 
partly because it was put together quickly, and was subject 
to change as the drought worsened. 
In short, information on the water situation and on 
rationing programs needs to be communicated as clearly, 
simply, accurately and consistently as possible, with in-
dividual feedback to customers on amounts used compared 
to allotments. Of course, it helps if the rationing plans are 
as simple as possible-consistent with equity and effec-
tiveness-and it should again be noted that water districts' 
informational feedback on use may be more acceptable as 
an aid to "self-enforcement" than vigorous door-to-door 
enforcement programs, which would cast water district 
personnel in the role of special police. 
"Double messages" should be avoided. The data show 
that many residential consumers used less than their stated 
allotments, especially in the three moderate rationing 
program districts, thus causing !1nancial problems for the 
water districts when revenues began to decline sharply. 9 
Presumably the unanticipated success of conservation 
presented the districts with an unexpected fmancial prob-
lem, causing some of them to issue messages that seemed to 
imply that conservation, while desirable, "could be carried 
too far." 
These double messages and lack of vigorous enforce-
ment apparently disturbed respondents who were con· 
vinced that the drought was acutely serious, and were 
trying to follow conservation measures at considerable 
personal expense and inconvenience. Following are some 
suggested ways for water districts to avoid the unantici· 
pated double bind that prompted the double messages. 
Principles and Policies for 
Long· Term Conservation 
Four major principles should be kept in mind when 
considering policies for long-term conservation. First, 
residential water conservation will probably have to be 
stepped up rather than decreased in California and the 
western United States over the coming decades. No longer 
does it seem sufficient to plan in terms of 200 to 300 
gallons usage pe.r person per day. Rather, as this research 
shows, the figures could drop to 100 gallons per person 
per day or even less. (See Table 2 for per capita water use 
in the summers of 1976 and 1977.) 
There is plenty of evidence of the need to conserve 
water .10 California's population continues to increase 
(though more slowly than many had projected earlier); 
energy costs for treating and transporting water are rising; 
the new large-scale inter-basin water transfers are becoming 
less desirable or feasible; and there is strong support for 
conserving environmental quality by maintaining wild rivers 
rather than damming them. Moreover both Californians 
and immigrants from wetter regions need to be made to 
recognize the impact of heavy water use in semiarid regions 
like California. 
Second, under the typical district fiscal fotrnula, with 
most funds coming from water sales, we have seen how 
conservation places districts in a double bind. Thus conser· 
vation reduces water district revenues, and when people 
conserve dramatically, revenues also fall dramatically .11 
Something must be done to deal with this problem equi· 
tably, if necessary conservation measures are not to cause 
water districts severe fmancial distress. 
Third, residential consumers can and will conserve water. 
The many individual conservation efforts, going beyond the 
goals set by the districts, were unanticipated. The results 
suggest a different basis for future planning of residential 
water use. Many people found that living on 100 gallons 
per person per day was not too difficuJt.l2 Changes 
required in watering outside plants, as well as in use of 
indoor plumbing, and in related conservation behavior. were 
usually not unduly vexing or expensive. In fact, despite the 
emergency's end when heavy precipitation came in the 
winter of 1977-78, conservation practices developed 
during the summer of 1977 appear to have been carried 
over into the summer of 1978. In· any event daily per 
capita use has remained lower than it was during the 
summer of 1976.13 
Fourth, the people with the lowest per capita daily use 
of water were those who saw the drought as a harbinger of 
a longer-term need to live with less water in the future. 
People who believed only in a serious shon·term crisis 
reported adopting many new conservation behaviors but, 
surprisingly, their belief in the seriousness of the crisis did 
not correlate with per capita daily use figures. This implies 
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that the best and most effective approach to reduced resi-
dential use may come from steady, long-range, methodical 
programs carried out in a non-emergency atmosphere. 
This idea augurs well for long-term residential conservation 
of water. Probably a crisis is not needed to get people to 
follow substantial conservation practices. In fact, an 
approach that focuses on a short-term crisis may not be as 
effective as preparing for long-run reductions. 
Recommendations: Specific Steps 
What are the implications of these fmdings for long-
range residential water conservation programs? What 
specific steps should be taken? First, a water meter of 
some sort should eventually be provided for every separate 
dwelling unit. A responsible person in each unit should be 
informed regularly on actual consumption in relation to 
targeted allotments based on the number of people per 
dwelling unit. Thus, each responsible person for each 
residential meter ought to know his or her targeted allot· 
ment in understandable terms, and get monthly informa· 
tion on how well he or she has performed in relation to 
that allotment. A landlord or apartment manager could 
act as the responsible person for multiple-family dwellings. 
Admittedly such a program would require changes and 
additional operating expenses, as well as costs for installing 
and monitoring more meters. There is also the problem of 
determining the number of people served by each meter. 
One simple way would be to assume that the number of 
people per meter is three, unless demonstrated otherwise, 
and using standard procedures for adjusting this number 
when necessary. Once additional meters have been installed 
and the basic allotments established, modern computer 
technology could ease the burden of issuing individualized 
reports regularly with the water bill. In fact, such re-
porting might not cost much more than the modern com· 
puterized billing procedures already established. 
With respect to enforcement, pricing should be the 
major regulatory mechanism employed to encourage con-
servation, penalize over-allotment use, and provide the 
water utility with a reliable income. A good method would 
be a flat rate or minimum monthly service fee for con· 
sumption below and up to the basic allotment. Ideally 
the minimum charge would provide a reasonable income for 
the water district without imposing a burden on any con· 
sumer, for example $10 per month for water use up to but 
not exceeding 10,000 gallons for the "standard" family of 
three. While a minimum monthly service charge for con-
sumption that is less than the basic allotment probably 
would not encourage extremely low levels of conservation, 
it would promote reasonably frugal use while guaranteeing 
fmancial support for the water district. 
A steeply inclining block rate structure would apply to 
amounts used above the basic allotment, to discourage 
such consumption.I4 For the "standard" family example, 
the second-block rate ($5 .00/1,000 gal.) for use over the 
basic allotment, up to double the allotment, might be five 
times the rate for the first or basic allotment block ($1.00/ 
1,000 gal.). The third block rate ($10.00/1 ,000 gal.) might 
be ten times the rate for the basic allotment (for use from 
two to three times the allotment) and so on. Excess use 
would thus automatically be penalized regularly, without 
involving water district personnel in door-to-door enforce-
ment. 
Admittedly, many details of a conservation plan would 
need to be worked out, such as: (1) the number of gallons 
in the first block basic allotment and the flat rate associated 
with it, (2) providing for reasonable exceptions and appeal 
procedures, and (3) the steepness of the inclining rate 
structure. Also, people should be instructed on types of 
landscaping suitable to California's semiarid Mediterranean 
climate. Fortunately, the drought of 1977 may already 
have demonstrated to many residents the need for less 
exotic and more water-conserving landscaping. 
In any event, the inclining block-rate structure has the 
following merits: 
1. recognizes the need for long-term residential conser-
vation of water; 
2. can provide a fair fmancial return to water districts, 
even when people conscientiously conserve and reduce 
use substantially; 
3. considers the number of people within each dwelling 
unit when establishing basic allotments; 
4. provides for water districts' communication with each 
residential consuming unit on a regular basis; 
5. involves no restrictive regulations or direct enforce-
ment, thus taking advantage of the users' willingness and 
ability to conserve: and 
6. emphasizes the more effective, long-run planning 
approaches to conservation. 
Other advantages include ease of adjustment: The 
rate structure could be tightened for drier periods and 
relaxed for wet cycles, simply by modifying the basic 
allotment. For example, during extended dry periods, 
the basic allotment of 100 gallons per person per day for 
the "standard" three-person family could be lowered to 
75 gallons per person per day. During extended wet 
periods, it could be raised to perhaps 125 gallons per person 
per day. Adjustments could also be made for climatic 
differences in sub-areas like those around San Francisco 
Bay. Allowing for such differences could help make 
regional planning for water conservation more acceptable 
to the public, while still maintaining a single basic type of 
conservation program. 
Implications for Long-Term 
Energy Conservation 
Now that the drought has abated, contemporary events 
place residential energy conservation in the forefront of 
our thinking, even more than residential water conserva-
tion. Some of the ideas developed here for the long-term 
residential conservation of water appear to be adaptable to 
other scarce resources, e.g., electricity, natural gas, and 
other energy sources. The goal of a meter for every dwell-
ing unit and basic allotments on the monthly gas and 
electricity bills, indicating each consumer's use over or 
under a basic allotment, appear quite feasible. An inclining 
block rate could be instituted, and already has some 
precedent in the so-called "lifeline" rates for certain utility 
customers. High penalty costs for heating in the winter and 
for cooling in the summer might convince energy bill payers 
of the value of insulation. Also, penalty costs for electri-
city usage could help persuade consumers of the value of 
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efficient appliances, and also make solar heating of water 
and rooms more attractive fmancially. 
As with water conservation, such programs would 
require a change in the utilities' marketing approaches. 
Instead of trying to sell more services, they would have to 
promote conservation. In fact, electricity and natural gas 
suppliers may already be closer to accepting this idea than 
are the water utilities. There is much to recommend the 
concept of allotment quotas noted on bills, along with 
information on amounts used during the previous month or 
billing period, with penalty costs clearly stipulated. iS The 
initial costs for beginning such programs could be lower for 
electricity and natural gas suppliers than for the water 
utilities, as many dwelling units already have gas and 
electricity meters and monthly billing is computerized on a 
regional basis. Highlighting information on amounts of 
energy used, in the context of a clearly stated conservation 
goal, and using an inclining block pricing structure, with 
penalty costs for uses over the allotments, might be more 
effective than rolling black- or brown- outs. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, research on v.:ater conservation in the 
recent California drought demonstrates that people can and 
will save a scarce resource-water-a good deal more effec-
tively than may have previously been believed. These 
encouraging results suggest that conservation of water and 
other scarce resources, such as electricity, natural gas, 
gasoline, heating oil, and coal, will be enhanced if con-
sumers receive convincing evidence of the need for conser-
vation over the long run. Further. the study indicates that 
conservation programs will be more effective if (1) they are 
viewed as equitable by those so governed, (2) the need for 
the programs, including their details, are clearly and consis-
tently communicated, (3) individuals receive regular, 
periodic information regarding their consumption in rela-
tion to their allotments, and ( 4) there are economic 
penalties for amounts used over the allotment. 
Finally, the research indicates that conservation would 
be encouraged if current marketing practices were restruc-
tured to reward-or at least not penalize-efforts by the 
consuming public to use less. The "lifeline-inclining block" 
structure suggested here might also work well for other 
resources such as electricity, natural gas, heating oil and 
coal. In any case, economic penalties for excessive use, and 
rewards for conservation (or at least non-punishment), 
should apply to the suppliers and consumers of our scarce 
natural resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After two years of bitter wrangling, the California Legis-
lature adjourned in September 1978 without authorizing 
"Phase II" of the State Water Project.! This monumental 
$7 billion undertaking2 would almost double the size of 
the present California water storage and transportation 
system, already the largest in the world. Its central and 
most controversial feature is a Peripheral Canal, which 
would cross the Delta formed by the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin rivers at the head of San Francisco Bay. Although 
strongly backed by the Brown administration, which tried 
to satisfy project opponents by including certain environ-
mental safeguards and water conservation measures, the 
project bill (SB 346) died when it returned to the Senate 
in August, 1978, for concurrence with Assembly amend-
ments. But the idea of expanding the state water system is 
far from dead. Pressure for a cross-Delta transfer facility 
and increased movement of water to the south has been 
building for over a decade, and proponents of Phase II 
believe its time is overdue. A new project authorization 
bill (SB 200) was submitted to the Legislature this year, 
and complex political maneuvering is now taking place) 
Since Phase II would be perhaps the largest new capital 
commitment by state government at a time when the need 
for fiscal austerity is being widely proclaimed, it is impor· 
tant for the people of California to be apprised of the issues 
surrounding the proposal.4 To this end, this report will 
The writers wish to acknowledge the help of several readers, 
p~icularly that of Ronald B. Robie, Director of California's 
Dep~ment of Water Resources. While we are not in agreement on 
a number of points, his knowledgeable comments and queries 
helped clarify a number of questions, and are appreciated. We, of 
course, are solely responstble for the information, interpretations 
and conclusions presented in this paper. 
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provide an intro'duction to: (1) the political alignments 
and arguments pro and con regarding expansion of the 
California Water System; (2) the principal features of 
Phase II; (3) the central issue dividing opinion, i.e., whether 
water quality in the San Francisco Bay and Delta can be 
safeguarded; (4) the more basic question whether additional 
water transfers are needed, or economically rational; and 
(5) suggested policy alternatives to Phase II, which follow 
from our conclusion as to the economic and environmental 
unsoundness of further water supply expansion at this time. 
ISSUES AND ALIGNMENTS 
The main support for Phase II of the State Water Proj-
ect (SWP) comes from the water-short areas of Southern 
California: urban users represented chiefly by the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California (MWD) and 
San Joaquin Valley growers and their local irrigation 
districts. These areas receive massive transfers of water from 
Northern California's Sacramento River system by means 
of the SWP, Phase I, operated by the Department of Water 
Resources (DWR), and the Central Valley Project (CVP), 
operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). 
Over the years the water users to the south have been per· 
sistent and successful in securing new supplies. They won 
authorization of the CVP in the mid-1930s, the SWP in 
the late 1950s, and are now fighting for the third genera· 
tion expansion of the state water system. 
Supporters of Phase II make four basic arguments. 
First, they claim that the SWP was never compieted as 
authorized, since a cross-Delta transfer facility was included 
in the California Water Plan (1957). Second, the MWD 
fears that Arizona will begin to divert its full legal entitle· 
ment from the Colorado River in 1985, cutting into MWD's 
draft.S Third, many growers in the Valley are faced with a 
falling water table, which makes drilling and pumping in· 
creasingly expensive and causes ground subsidence in some 
places. Finally, both MWD and Valley irrigation districts 
point to contractual obligations incurred by the state and 
USBR that cannot be met with existing storage and delivery 
capabilities. Behind all these arguments, of course, lies a 
claim of "need" for more water, which rests on an assump· 
tion of the invariability of present day use and pricing 
practices. 
Arrayed against the water industry is a loose coalition in 
Northern California opposed to further water development. 
The principa1 opponents are the farmers of the rich agri· 
cultural Delh region. They presently draw water directly 
from the Delta channels to irrigate their crops, and fear 
that further diversions south will jeopardize water quality' 
when salt water from the Bay penetrates the Delta in the 
summer because of low runoff from the Sacramento and 
San Joaquin rivers.6 
Additional opposition comes from Bay Area munici· 
palities concerned about the detrimental effects on the Bay 
of reduced freshwater outflow from the Delta. They 
worry about the loss of Bay "flushing" and possible neu-
tralization of gains in water quality achieved through large 
investments in pollution control. 
Environmentalists echo the fears of others regarding Bay 
and Delta water quality, more from an ecological point 
of view than a fmancial one. Particular concern attends 
the possible degradation of Suisun Marsh, with its con· 
siderable birdlife, and reduction of large migratory and 
in-Delta flsh populations. In addition, environmentalists 
question the long-range plans of the water industry to 
develop the last remaining wild rivers in California, North 
Coast rivers such as the Eel, Trinity and Klamath.? En-
vironmental arguments in this case coincide with the 
regional interests of the northern third of the state, for 
which the rivers are the main natural amenity and basis 
for any further local development. 
The environmentalist camp has developed an important 
schism. In 1978 the Sierra Club supported the Brown 
administration strategy of incorporating legal protections 
for Delta water quality within the Phase II package. The 
club's leadership argued that unless the compromise legis· 
lation were accepted, a worse bill with no environmental 
safeguards whatsoever might be enacted in years to come. 
On the other hand, Delta farmers and other environ· 
mental groups, such as Friends of the Earth, put little 
faith in government promises about water quality pro-
tection after the Peripheral Canal is completed, removing 
the principal obstacle to greater water withdrawal. Indeed, 
opposition within the ranks of the Sierra Club itself has 
subsequently forced the leadership to retreat to a neutral 
position.& 
At the same time a split also emerged among forces 
normally pro-development. Many Valley water districts, 
the California Farm Bureau Federation, and several Repub-
lican Senators representing Southern California, refused to 
support the Phase II package in 1978 because they felt that 
Delta environmental protections were too strong and could 
prevent delivery of water. Thus, the governor's attempt 
to satisfy interests on both sides of the controversy -by 
enlarging the California network while providing legal 
safeguards for Delta water quality-was not successful. 
The interests in conflict were not resolved. 
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF PHASE II 
The Peripheral Canal 
Some kind of facility to transfer water across the Delta 
has been envisioned since the drawing up of the California 
Water Plan in 1957.9 In 1966 DWR officially designated 
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the Peripheral Canal as the desired transfer mechanism, an.d 
it· has been embroiled in controversy ever since. Reaction 
was so strong against the Environmental Impact Report 
issued in 1974 by the Reagan administration that the in-
coming Brown administration undertook a new "Delta 
Alternatives" study, which went through several drafts 
between 1975 and 1977. In the end, the Peripheral Canal 
emerged once more as the official favorite.lO 
Water planners face a basic geographic discrepancy in 
water supply and demand: the area of greatest rainfall 
and the largest rivers is the northern third of California, 
where the main storage dams of the State Water Project 
and Central Valley Project are located-CVP's Shasta, 
Trinity and Folsom, and SWP's Oroville.ll To the south 
lie the arid regions, with much of the state's arable land and 
the majority of its population. In the middle of the state, 
however, lies a major obstacle to water transport: 1,100 
miles of meandering channels and 738,000 acres of islands, 
comprising the largest inland delta in the United States, 
outside Alaska. Some 5·6 million acre-feet (MAF)l2 
of water per year are pumped out of SWP's Clifton Court 
Forebay and the nearby CVP Tracy pumping station 
(both on the south edge of the Delta) into two man-made 
rivers, the California Aqueduct (SWP) and the Delta-
Mendota Canal (CVP), for delivery to 76 contracting 
agencies. The purpose of the Peripheral Canal, then, is 
to span the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta with an effi· 
cient, large-scale conduit to move more water from the 
northern part of the state to the south. 
When the giant project pumps are operating at capa-
city, water does not so much move across the Delta as 
around it, traveling down the main channel of the Sacra· 
mento River and then being pulled back around the west· 
emmost island. This "reverse flow" drags salt water back 
with it from the tidal zone where the Delta's fresh water 
mixes with the San Francisco Bay's salt water. In summer, 
lower river flow and maximum water demands coincide to 
make the problem worse. 
Saline intrusion into the Delta has four major impacts: 
(1) Water users to the south do not want salty water, 
so the agencies are limited in the amount of water they 
can pump.13 
(2) Delta farmers are directly affected by saline con-
ditions. Very low water during extremely dry years such as 
1976-77 already seriously jeopardizes agriculture in the 
western and southern Delta.l4 
(3) Homes and industries in northern Contra Costa 
County are serviced with water drawn from the Delta via 
the Contra Costa Canal. In the spring of 1977, during 
the drought, water quality was seriously lowered. With 
the exception of only four days, intake water at Rock 
Slough daily exceeded health standards of not more than 
25 milligrams of chlorides per liter. Thereafter, the state 
built emergency rock barriers across several channels to 
keep back the salt water.15 
(4) The Delta and adjoining Suisun Marsh are, variously, 
home, breeding ground, and migratory way station for 
many waterfowl and fish, including King Salmon and 
Striped Bass. High salt levels affect the success of these 
species in ways not well understood, but very likely detri· 
mental. In addition, the "reverse flow" confuses migrating 
fish and the project pumps ingest millions of fry and eggs. 
Together, these effects have had a negative impact on fish 
populations. 
The water agencies hope that the Peripheral Canal will 
solve all the above difficulties, as well as fulfilling their 
primary purpose of moving the water south. The Canal 
would be an unlined ditch, 43 miles long, 400 feet wide 
and 30 feet deep, with a capacity of 16.3 MAF per year-
enough to carry over 70 percent of the average flow of the 
Sacramento River. It would skirt the east side of the 
Delta, pumping water directly from the Sacramento near 
Hood and delivering it to Clifton Court Forebay. Along 
the way it would have 12 gates from which water could be 
released into the channels of the Delta to create a west-
ward flow. 
Remainder of the Phase II Package 
By itself the Peripheral Canal cannot solve the problems 
of the Delta, let alone meet the goals of the water industry 
for supply expansion to meet an estimated export demand 
of 7.5 MAF by the year 2000. As a result, a complemen-
tary system of storage and conveyance facilities has been 
proposed by DWR to go along with the Canal. These are: 
1. Storage components north of the Delta: Cottonwood 
Creek project (2 reservoirs) and Glenn Reservoir and 
diversion complex (or, alternatively, the Colusa Reservoir 
complex). All three are off-stream storage located on the 
west side of the Sacramento Valley. Glenn would be the 
state's largest reservoir at 8.7 MAF (cf. Shasta's 4.5 MAF 
capacity). 
2. Facilities in the Delta: the Peripheral Canal; reloca-
tion of the Contra Costa Canal intake to Oifton Court; 
southern and western Delta water quality improvement 
structures; and Suisun Marsh protective structures. 
3. Components south of the Delta: the Mid-Valley 
Canal to offset groundwater overdraft in a federal service 
area; Los Vaqueros unit (2 reservoirs west of Clifton 
Court); if needed, Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, near 
San Luis Reservoir; unspecified additional service to the 
Bay Area; and groundwater storage works and wastewater 
reclamation projects. 
In all, Phase II would cost over $7 billion, of which 
approximately $1 billion would go to the Peripheral Canal. 
The federal government would pay for half the Peripheral 
Canal and provide water for the Mid-Valley area.l6 
The system would augment the delivery and storage 
capability of the CVP and SWP by about 3 MAF and make 
it easier to meet commitments during water-short years. 
Phase II also contains certain innovations its proponents 
herald as differentiating it from all previous water projects. 
Most crucial here is the stipulation that, for Phase II to 
proceed, Congress must order the USBR to operate in 
accordance with California state Delta water quality 
standards-although exact standards are not specified by 
statute. In addition, water conservation and wastewater 
reclamation are declared to be goals of state water policy 
and some money has been targeted for agricultural con-
servation loans and reclamation facilities. Finally, the 
package includes as goals groundwater restoration and 
storage, and the state government is pushing for reform 
of water rights laws to achieve conjunctive use manage-
ment.l7 
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PROTECfiNG THE BAY-DELTA ENVIRONMENT 
The debate over Phase II centers on the ability of 
certain water management measures and legal safeguards 
to offset the effects of increased withdrawals from the 
Sacramento-Bay Delta system. Many backers of the proj-
ect, including administration officials, see it as an en-
vironmentally sound alternative to the present degradation 
of the Delta.18 Project opponents claim that these mea-
sures are insufficient to protect the Bay and Delta, arguing 
(1) that the environmental impacts of Phase II are poorly 
understood and (2) that the formal protections to be 
erected would be unable to withstand future political 
pressure for their relaxation or elimination. 
Unresolved Environmental Problems 
The Peripheral Canal would probably solve the problem 
of "reverse flow" in the Delta, as planned,19 but it leaves 
unanswered questions regarding performance of flsh 
screens, sufficient water releases to protect water quality 
in the Delta and Bay, and increased agricultural runoff. 
The Peripheral Canal will shift the point of intake 40 
miles north to the Sacramento River, but will not eliminate 
one basic problem. As noted, millions of fish eggs and fry 
are now sucked into the Delta pumps every year, despite 
attempts to devise a preventive system of screens. In 
recognition of this, DWR proposes that a secure screen 
be installed at the head of the canal. Furthermore, the 
DWR proposes that the canal be constructed in three 
segments that could not be connected until effective 
screens were developed and demonstrated. The state 
Department of Fish and Game, which supported SB 346, 
claims that development of an effective fish screen is close 
at hand but the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service disagrees.20 
Project opponents ask why it is assumed that such screens 
can be invented if specialists have thus far found it an 
impossible task. In addition, they point out that it is 
unlikely that the absence of a suitable fish screen would 
realistically be expected to hold up a $7 billion project 
once it is nearly complete. 
A second difficulty arises concerning the requirements 
of the Delta for freshwater flows from the Sacramento. 
Satisfactory scientific knowledge is lacking as to the long-
term impacts on the wildlife and soils of the area of greater 
saline penetration. Researchers are gradually discovering 
the serious implications for the Delta environment of 
progressively larger water diversions. In the last 12 years, 
estimates of the amount of riverine inflow required to 
maintain minimum summer water quality in the Delta 
have risen significantly from 1800 to 4000 cubic feet 
per second. Further research could raise these estimates-
the 4000 cfs figure is currently under challenge by Delta 
farmers and municipalities unhappy with· the latest water 
quality standards.21 
The water circulation patterns and flow requirements 
of San Francisco Bay are even more poorly understood. 
It is not known how much Sacramento River flows can 
be diminished and at what times of the year, without 
degrading Bay water quality. This question is particularly 
important for the portion of the Bay south of the San 
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, an area with little natural 
runoff and one that experiences only weak tidal action. 
The South Bay receives significant amounts of fresh water 
"flushing" only when there are relatively large volume, 
rapid outflows from the Sacramento River. Otherwise, a 
threshold apparently exists under which almost all river 
water bypasses the South Bay and goes directly out the 
Golden Gate.22 South Bay water has been seriously 
polluted by urban wastes and has only begun to improve 
as the result of large expenditures for municipal sewage 
treatment systems; but the margin of safety for dissolved 
oxygen levels in summertime remains narrow. At the same 
time, the North Bay relies on steady freshwater outflows 
to clear its heavy load of industrial and municipal wastes, 
so even the reduction of average flows could lower overall 
Bay water quality. 
The Bay and Delta are further jeopardized by Phase II 
because as more water goes south to irrigate farmland, more 
runoff laden with salts and chemical pollutants is generated. 
A growing dilemma for San Joaquin Valley farmers is what 
to do with their wastes. The proposed solution is called 
the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Drain, already partially 
completed. The State-Federal Interagency Drainage Pro-
gram recently recommended that the drain be continued 
to the Delta, where its load of pollutants would be dis-
charged.23 
Thus, in spite of the long effort to market Phase II as 
an environmentally sound alternative to the present situa-
tion, serious questions about its ultimate impact upon 
the unique Bay-Delta environment remain unanswered. 
Legal Safeguards 
The crux of the Brown administration plan for Phase II 
is a set of legal safeguards designed to govern operation of 
the expanded State Water Project and to force the USBR 
to tailor management of the Central Valley Project to meet 
state Delta water quality standards. By physically by-
passing the Delta, the Peripheral Canal would preserve the 
quality of water going south, regardless of possible deteri-
oration of Delta water quality. Therefore the Delta is 
especially vulnerable and needs firm guarantees as part 
of any compromise package. Project supporters believe 
in the efficacy and permanence of legal regulations, while 
opponents hold that-in the words of former California 
Senator Peter Behr-"A thirsty beast cannot be contained 
in a paper cage." 
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) 
presently sets standards for the Delta. These emerged, 
after years of intense conflict, in the form of Decision 
1379 in 1971.24 The State Water Project attempts to 
meet SWRCB standards, but the U.S. Bureau of Reclama-
tion does not. The Bureau's Regional Director set CVP 
policy in 1957 when he informed the state: "I consider 
that the obligations of the Central Valley Project are 
satisfied when a satisfactory quality of water is provided 
at the intakes to the Contra Costa and Tracy pumping 
plants. "25 
The controversy recently came to a head in the Supreme 
Court decision in California v. United States.26 The 
court, however, begged the question by ruling that the 
state could impose conditions of operation on the CVP 
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when they were not inconsistent with "clear Congressional 
directive" for operation of the Project. Secretary of 
the Interior Cecil Andrus recently announced that the 
Bureau would voluntarily comply with the state Delta 
standards in years of sufficient water supply, but here 
again the federal government gave away nothing: the 
Secretary reserved the right to challenge the consistency 
of state standards. In any event his decision could be 
reversed by a subsequent administration.27 
The SWRCB is also empowered to undertake basin 
planning for pollution control.28 Objectives for the Delta 
are contained in a Water Quality Control Plan for the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Basin. In August 1978 SWRCB 
released a new Basin Plan that replaces Decision 137929 
and continues the historic trend with upward revision of 
minimum standards for Delta protection. At the same 
time, the board now believes that with fme tuning of 
fresh water releases from upstream dams a higher level of 
protection can be achieved while another million acre-
feet of water are exported. This finding appears to be an 
attempt to please all concerned, but its feasibility is ques-
tionable.30 
The Basin Plan is supposed to guide operation of the 
CVP under sections 502 and 313 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which say 
that all federal facilities must comply with state plans. 
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Reclamation claims that be-
cause the CVP has prior water commitments authorized 
by Congress, it is exempt.31 Because of the Bureau's 
intransigence, the Phase II package includes a provision 
that Congress require the CVP to be operated in accor-
dance with state regulations before Phase II can begin 
service. 
Will this assure compliance? Several unfortunate scenar-
ios can be foreseen, such as: Congress does not agree but 
state legislation is amended to eliminate this provision; 
Congress agrees, but fails to provide airtight requirements, 
so that a court challenge overturns the agreement; Congress 
agrees and all political pressures are focused on the SWRCB 
standard-setting process. 
What is the security of state standards? We already have 
evidence of how poorly they hold up under pressure. 
Twice during the drought year of 1977 Decision 13 79 was 
amended to lower Delta water quality standards on an 
"emergency" basis in the face of inadequate upstream 
storage (owing to normal drawdown in 1976 which was 
not replenished when the drought continued into 1977, 
the driest year on record).32 But if standards can be set 
aside precisely when they come into play-during periods 
of lowest flow-then their protective powers are an illusion. 
If we are to believe proponents of Phase II, laws govern-
ing operation of the CVP and establishing Delta water 
quality minima are expected to work in the future when 
they have not worked in the past. Unfortunately, power-
ful political forces, armed with actual dams and canals, 
can often find ways around seemingly airtight agree-
ments.33 
WATER NEEDS AND SUPPLY ALTERNATIVES 
The debate over expanding the State Water Project has 
centered on considerations of environmental and regional 
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interests. Yet the need for additional surface water supplies 
has never been clearly demonstrated. In this section we an-
swer the major arguments proponents use to justify Phase II, 
and question the rationality of present water use and 
pricing practices. By thus showing that water use does 
not expand inexorably, we point the way to alternatives 
to Phase II. 
Contractual Obligations 
DWR claims that it requires Phase II in order to meet 
the contractual obligations incurred as part of the SWP 
-4.23 MAF vs. 2.5 MAF now being delivered. This 
discrepancy says less about the need for water than about 
the overly optimistic predictions of DWR planners, who 
promised more than they could feasibly deliver with the 
system built under the original SWP authorization. In 
fact, current DWR contracts have clauses that limit deliv-
ery and construction obligations to cases where they are 
"physically and tlnancially feasible," and it can be argued 
that the contracts are not binding if adequate facilities 
for delivery do not exist.34 We consider it to be self-
fulfilling prophecy for the state to promise more than it 
can deliver and then to use those promises to justify further 
supply expansion.35 
At the same time, USBR wants the Peripheral Canal 
so that it can incur new contractual obligations.36 Here 
again agency optimism overrides wise planning, so that 
contractual commitments are made and expectations of 
water supply created, which cannot be met.37 On one 
hand, the bureau makes promises of "tlrm" water, based 
on predictions of supply that underestimate climatic 
variability and overestimate the ability of its storage dams 
to serve as a hedge against drought. On the other hand, 
the bureau delivers "interim" water, which cannot be 
assured in dry years, yet which the bureau always hopes 
to convert to tlrm contracts, and which creates economic 
dependence on outside water in the contracting areas. 
So long as these practices continue, there can neJ,-:er be a 
water supply system big enough to meet demand, and 
there will always be a built-in lever for supply expansion 
in the form of unfulfilled contractual "obligations." 
Groundwater Overdraft 
Presently over half of water withdrawals in California 
come from the ground. Supporters of Phase II argue that 
groundwater overdrafts threaten the future of irrigated 
agriculture in portions of the San Joaquin Valley unless 
the project is undertaken.38 The problem is undoubtedly 
serious, but the question is whether further water imports 
will actually solve the problem. History suggests they 
will not. 
When the Central Valley Project was proposed in the 
1930s, one major rationale was to replace the use of 
groundwater in the San Joaquin. Nonetheless, after the 
CVP was constructed, the groundwater problem remained 
because excessive pumping now extended to the West and 
South Valley, as irrigated agriculture expanded into these 
areas. The State Water Project was then promoted to 
help alleviate this overdraft; but it was not intended for 
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the promotion of further irrigated agriculture. In develop-
ing the SWP, however, DWR contracted more than I MAF 
to the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA). Unfortu-
nately, groundwater proved cheaper for Kern County 
farmers than project water, despite falling water tables, 
so KCWA had to seek out buyers in previously unirrigated 
areas. As a result, much of the agricultural supply of the 
SWP went to expand irrigated agriculture.39 
We conclude that such divergences between intent and 
result are likely to be repeated as long as groundwater 
pumping remains unregulated. Nor will the demand for 
genuine water-table rescue operations end as long as the 
future implications of competitive pumping are ignored 
in favor of short-run gain. 
Despite extensive evidence of the need for and pos-
sibility of successful groundwater management,40 the 
agricultural lobby remains officially opposed to even the 
moderate program proposed by the recent governor's 
commission to review water rights law. One of the prin-
cipal water industry lobbyists argued before a recent 
hearing of the Senate Agriculture and Water Resources 
Committee that: "there is no groundwater overdraft ... 
[but] simply a shortage of imported surface water." In 
short, the water users have not been interested in con-
serving and managing California's water resources rationally 
because so far it has been more protltable for them to 
secure imported water41 (see below, regarding subsidies). 
Colorado River Water 
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
(MWD) currently draws much of its water from the Colo-
rado River aqueduct.42 But MWD could lose several hun-
dred thousand acre feet per year, because Arizona won a 
Supreme Court decision in 1963 entitling it to a larger 
share of the Colorado River. and the USBR is now con-
structing the Central Arizona Project (CAP). MWD has 
a projected demand of 2.1 11AF for the year 2000, and a 
minimum supply of 1.2 MAF at that time. Present use is 
about L3 MAF per year. Does this mean, as the district 
argues, that additional Northern California water must be 
imported? 
Perhaps not. First, MWD has consistently overestimated 
water demands.43 In fact, MWD has- never yet taken its 
full tlrm entitlement from the SWP. As a consequence, 
large quantities of water earmarked for the Los Angeles 
basin have actually been sold as "surplus," at bargain 
prices, to landowners in the San Joaquin Valley. Now it 
looks as if the same mistake will be made again. If we 
look at MWD's predicted demand and supply for the 
year 2000, it appears that additional SWP water will not 
be needed. MWD predicts a demand of 2.1 MAF per year. 
On the supply side it will have a guaranteed 1.0 MAF 
from the SWP, even in dry years; between 0.4 and 0.55 
MAF from the Colorado River, even after CAP diversions; 
and 0.3 MAF from wastewater reclamation. This means 
a tlrm supply of 1.7 to 1.85 MAF per year. With 15 
percent conservation-a tlgure DWR itself thinks reasonable 
(see below)-MWD will be able to eliminate the difference 
between demand and supply.44 
In addition, the SWP is an expensive source, because 
the water must be pumped over 3,000-foot-plus elevations 
through the Tehachapi range. MWD must therefore pay a 
power cost of over $60 per acre-foot. As economists 
Bain, Caves and Margolis45 suggested more than ten years 
ago, a cheaper alternative supply lies near at hand: Colo-
rado River water currently allocated to irrigators in the 
Imperial-Palo Verde-Coachella valleys. Since the latter 
pay the federal government only $7.50 per acre-foot, 
MWD could compensate the farmers handsomely and 
still come out ahead. Less than a 20 percent diversion of 
their roughly 4.4 MAF entitlement would make up the 
shortfall in water rights lost to Arizona. as estimated by 
MWD. 
A further consideration of cost that weighs against 
~ expanding water imports from the north is the demand for 
energy. The SWP is the largest single user of electrical 
power in California, owing to the tremendous pump-lift 
over the mountains. The planned increase in water ship-
ments to the southern coastal basin will very likely double 
present energy consumption, which already equals the 
electricity used by the entire City of Los Angeles in 1965. 
DWR will have to construct several new power plants 
to provide this power. Where will these be sited?46 
Pricing and Subsidies 
Must all new demands for water be met? Water demands 
are not water requirements dictated by nature.47 Nor 
are all demands economically rational, since water is 
costly to supply and is no more to be dispensed carelessly 
than any other economic commodity. This is particularly 
true where water is used in an industrial process, as it is 
in California agriculture, the state's biggest business. Agri-
cultural water demands derive from the demand for food, 
fibre and forage crops. and the potential for growth in 
such markets. 
Yet agricultural water is heavily subsidized in California, 
making it appear very cheap to growers. The low price 
of water artificially inflates demand and offers little in-
centive to make wise use of existing water supplies.48 
Among other things. water subsidy promotes the irrigation 
of low-value crops: e.g., forage crops such as alfalfa 
account for fully 63 percent of all agricultural water used 
in the state. Far from being naturally given, water demand 
is flexible and responds to price changes: Economic 
studies have repeatedly shown acreages of low-value, 
water-intensive crops being reduced as water prices rise.49 
In granting subsidies, the federal reclamation program 
is the worst offender. Average prices to irrigators are 
$3.50 to $8 per acre-foot for USBR water, compared with 
$18.50 to $30 for SWP water; prices to cities are con-
siderably higher. Actually, the state system only nomi-
nally charges its posted prices. "Surplus" water is priced 
with capital costs removed; and since up to 50 percent 
of this "surplus" water is mixed in, the average cost paid 
by agricultural customers drops much closer to USBR 
rates. SO 
The pricing and repayment policies of the USBR are 
so generous that irrigators pay less than 5 percent of total 
costs of supplying the water they use.Sl They pay so 
little, in fact, that the CVP could not even cover its oper-
ating costs recently. In comparison, the state's water 
program is a model of fiScal responsibility, and at least 
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is fmancially solvent, but it also gives subsidies. The 
principal sources of subsidy are: local water district prop-
erty taxes on urban nonusers; hydro-power revenues; 
revenues transferred from Tidelands oil leases; and capital 
provided at below market rate.52 In short, despite 
apparent fiscal soundness, Bain, Caves and Margolis judged 
the benefit-cost ratio of the SWP to be below 1:1.53 At 
the same time, as noted above, water demand is artificially 
inflated because the amount users pay does not reflect 
the costs of the water they use.54 
Water Use Efficiency and the Potential 
for Conservation 
There is an alternative "source" of water-other than 
supply augmentation- Le., conservation through reduced 
and rationalized use.55 But given current policies and 
practices-such as excess contractual obligations, ground-
water mismanagement, and government willingness to 
supply low cost water to meet all demands-users have 
little incentive to conserve. Under these circumstances, 
substantial water conservation without significant dis-
location would be made possible by: (1) cutting un-
necessary losses in storage and transfer, (2) investing in 
improved equipment, and (3) paYing closer attention to 
efficiency of use, not to mention eliminating low-value 
uses. 
The potential for urban residential water conservation 
was demonstrated in the great drought of 1976-77, where 
unprecedented cutbacks of 50-75 percent were achieved 
with water rationing, and 10-25 percent on a voluntary 
basis in less hard-hit communities.S6 While one need not 
advocate such extreme reductions, 25-33 percent no longer 
seems unrealistic, and can be secured by a few basic tech-
nical modifications, without significant changes in habits. 
Indeed, the permanent efficiencies in urban water use 
realized as a result of efforts during the drought have put 
demand well below previous estimates of growth, forcing 
local water agencies to raise prices to meet their fixed 
costs. A Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory study has con-
cluded that 1.8 MAF per year could be obtained from 
urban conservation, while DWR itself sees 1.2-2.4 MAF 
of potential urban water savings statewide. 57 
The potential importance of agricultural water saving 
is much greater, of course, since 85 percent of California's 
water withdrawals go to irrigation. Although blanket 
condemnation of agricultural practices is not justified, 
there is considerable room for improvement by cutting 
delivery and application losses (through seepage and evap-
oration) and reducing excessive consumption by the crops 
themselves (plants can actually consume more water than 
needed for optimum growth). For example, many canals 
are unlined and uncovered; the Coachella Canal alone 
loses some 300,000 acre-feet of the 1.2 MAF sent down 
it each year. (Ironically, the Peripheral Canal would 
also be unlined.) Some 82 percent of California's irri-
gation is by gravity methods, chiefly open-ditch, which 
use much more water than other techniques. For example, 
sprinkler irrigation uses only 18 percent as much water 
as open-ditch (gravity) and drip irrigation only one percent 
as much.58 Although the latter are not applicable to 
all situations, no one-including DWR-believes that their 
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potential has been fully tapped. Similarly, possibilities 
have scarcely been touched with respect to scientific 
management of irrigation, especially careful scheduling 
related to soil moisture and crop growth patterns. The 
USBR began an advisory irrigation management service 
for this purpose within the last t1ve years, and it has shown 
good results.59 
DWR's rather conservative estimate of potential water 
saving in agriculture is 1.2 MAF.60 Of course, water 
conservation measures are not without cost, but they 
may cost society less than massive water supply projects. 
The problem is that under current arrangements-particu-
larly government subsidies for water supply but not for 
water conservation-the rational solution for the whole 
populace is not presently rational for the fanners.61 
SUGGElJnONSFORREFORM 
Proponents of Phase II have promised conservation, 
water quality agreements for the Delta, and now a series 
of expensive water conservation policy studies originally 
proposed by the environmentalist opposition. Neverthe-
less, the preceding discussion should make it clear that a 
high priority for conservation is not part of the California 
water industry's prevailing philosophy. We believe basic 
reforms are needed in the state's water law, policies and 
practices before further authorizations for expansion 
of supply. Otherwise, the process of building more water 
transfer systems to slake the thirst of the agricultural and 
urban water industries seems likely to continue. 
Reforms should include: (1) a t1rm acre-foot limit on 
Delta exports; (2) congressional reauthorization of the 
Central Valley Project to make it conform to state water 
quality objectives in the Delta; (3) further research on the 
Bay-Delta system's water requirements before building 
the Peripheral Canal; ( 4) federal Wild and Scenic River 
protection for the North Coast rivers; (5) reform of state 
and federal repayment practices so that water users con-
tribute their fair share of project costs; (6) following the 
SU&,aestion of the General Accounting Office, authorizing 
no further projects in areas with groundwater overdrafts, 
unless management programs are in force; (7) well-fmanced 
research and funding programs for diffusion of water 
conserving techniques; (8) changes in agency contracting 
practices to eliminate overcornmitment of supplies; and 
(9) making all water use rights contingent on demonstra-
tion of good management practices. 
The real answer to the need for environmental pro-
tection, economic eft1ciency, and safeguards for water 
supply lies in wise use of the water resources already 
at hand. But forceful and effective conservation policies 
will not be adopted and implemented as long as the alterna-
tive of government subsidies and rescue operations are 
available. If Phase II of the State Water Project is approved 
without the reforms we have suggested, the water industry 
will continue to operate in the future as it has in the past. 
Demand will once again outrun supply, and even larger 
projects will be proposed to meet the inevitable "need" 
for more water. We argue that Phase II will not solve Cali-
fornia's water problems, but will simply recreate them 
again on a larger scale; 
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NOTES 
1 We choose to call the proposals "Phase II" rather than merely 
.. completion of the State Water Project," as proponents of the 
proposals would have it, for several reasons, amplified in the rest 
of the paper. For example, (1) the cost is over three times the 
original SWP bond issue; (2) the authorization of the Peripheral 
Canal in the Bums-Porter Act is questionable; (3) the addition of 
many new features besides the Canal would double or triple SWP 
storage capacity; and (4) much time has lapsed since the SWP was 
authorized. Perhaps a better name for the project would be "Stage 
ill of the California Water System." 
2 $3.4 billion in capital costs plus $3.8 billion in interest charges, 
with a 5.84 percent weighted average interest rate over a 30-year 
repayment period. Sources of capital are: California Water Fund, 
60 percent; Tidelands oil reserves, 5 percent; State Central Valley 
Project Construction Fund, revenue bonds, 20 percent; miscel-
laneous receipts, 10 percent; unexpended Bums-Porter bonds 
(general obligation), 5 percent. 
3 As of this writing (5/7/79) several bills are under considera-
tion: 
-SB 200 (Ayala). Introduced as a duplicate of Brown's SB 
346 (77-78), it is now significantly amended and allows the state 
to construct the Peripheral Canal without federal participation; 
it has also removed appropriations, enabling the bill to pass with 
only a majority vote, rather than the normal 2/3 required for 
appropriation acts. Presumably, DWR will issue revenue bonds, 
thereby avoiding the need for a 2/3 vote in the Legislature or the 
need to consult the electorate. 
DWR Director Ron Robie has pledged DWR's support for the 
bill, so long as it requires state protection of, and a federal com-
mitment to, Delta water quality before any federal water is allowed 
through the state-constructed Peripheral Canal If the federal 
government refuses to meet Delta standards, Section 11460 of SB 
200 (as amended in Senate, 4/30/79) allows the state to meet 
standards alone, but requires the standards to be reconsidered 
when appropriate permits for the Peripheral Canal have been issued 
by the SWRCB. 
The push for a state-only canal co= primarily from the Metro-
politan Water Dist:rict:. which had earlier proposed its own legis-
lation (Resolution 7768 and accompanying dia.ft legislation, MWD, 
2/13/79). MWD accurately perceived that federal approval of 
a facility would take years, if it occurred at aJ.J. given Washing-
ton's current untavorable view of expensive water projects. Sena-
tor Ayala apparently acceded to MWD's strategy in amending 
his bilL 
-AB 442 (Kapiloff). Introduced by the Chair of the Assembly 
Committee on Water, Parks and Wildlife, AB 442 is a general policy 
bill Kapiloff held a series of hearings to reexamine the basic 
questions of California water management, including subsidi!l.$ 
and groundwater management. The committee staff is preparing 
an extensive bill to include both management reforms and con-
struction of Phase II. This language will be amended into AB 442. 
-Several minor bills to authorize the Peripheral Canal have also 
been introduced, e.g., AB 303 (Lehman). 
-Several water management bills, including: SB 47 (Nejedly) 
to establish a groundwater management procedure, following the 
recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Review Cali-
fornia Water Rights Law. AB 1147 (Filante) would authorize water 
transfers and establish tighter fiscal controls. AB 1209 (Gage) 
would set up a task force to establish the potential for agricultural 
water conservation in the state. 
Politically, the battle will be between the Senate-sponsored 
bill, which most closely reflects the priorities of the water industry, 
and the more reform-minded Assembly bill(s). 
4 Under SB 346, the capital costs of the project would have 
been borne by the State Water Project and the Federal Central 
Valley Project, but may be carried by the state alone under current 
legislative proposals (see note 3, above). 
5 MWD's contract was amended in 1964 to add .5 MAF from 
the SWP to substitute for losses anticipated from CAP diversions. 
6 It should be noted that the Delta experienced very high 
saline penetration prior to the construction of the water projects. 
The upstream storage reservoirs of the SWP and CVP allow releases 
of fresh water in summertime that keep salt water at bay. This is 
necessary both for Delta agriculture, which has been established 
since the Delta islands were reclaimed by levees around the turn 
of the century, and because the water quality at the SWP and CVP 
pumping stations in the south Delta must be maintained. 
7 Plans for North Coast development have long been on the 
books of the water agencies (see Sidney Twichell Harding, Water 
in California, Palo Alto: N-P Publications, 1960; and Johannes 
Humlum, Water Development and Water Planning in the Southwest 
United States, [Denmark], Aarhus Universitet, Kulturgeografisk 
Institut, 1969). The state Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1972 
currently restricts development in the Eel, Trinity and Klamath 
watersheds. But it should be noted that Sen. Ayala introduced a 
companion bill to SB 346 in 1977-78 which would have repealed 
the Scenic Rivers law. Ayala dropped the bill to push SB 346. 
Nonetheless, many water agency officials are frank about their 
eventual plans to repeal the protection law and dam the Eel In 
any case, the status of the Eel River must be reconsidered in 1983. 
The storage and conveyance facilities of Phase II, it should be said, 
only make the next step of tapping the North Coast much easier, 
physically and !mancially. 
8 A similar reversal occurred within the Planning and Conser-
vation League, another Sacramento environmental lobby. The PCL 
Board of Directors narrowly voted to endorse SB 346 in 1977, at 
the urging of their executive director, who had helped to draft the 
bill In 1979, PCL reversed its position, with the appointment 
of a new executive director and shifting sentiments on the part of 
board members. 
9 California, DWR, Div. of Resources Planning, Bulletin No. 3, 
The California Water Plan, May 1957. The Burns-Porter Act of 
1959, submitting the bond authorization for the SWP to state 
voters, is the key legal document. It mentioned "channel improve-
ments and appurtenant facilities in the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta for water conservation, water supply in the Delta, transfer of 
water across the Delta. . .and related functions." (Chapter 17 62, 
Cal Statutes, 1959). During the 20 years since, three major ques-
tions of interpretation have arisen: (1) does Burns-Porter specifi-
cally indicate the Peripheral Canal as the Delta Facility? (2) does 
Burns-Porter constitute an authorization for the whole Phase II 
project? (3) Is any action required by the Legislature to construct 
Phase II? Whatever the legality, however, it would be politically 
impossible to proceed without legislative approval. 
10 The EIR drew 836 negative public comments. When Gov. 
Brown was elected, he promised to reconsider the whole proposal, 
in order better to include environmental considerations. He ap-
pointed two strongly pro-environmental protection people to be 
Director and Deputy Director of DWR. Nonetheless, the only 
"Delta Alternative" ever seriously considered in the DWR study 
was the Peripheral Canal. See Kelly Robinson, "Project Report: 
Delta Alternatives Study," Department of Geography, U.C. Berke-
ley, June 10, 1977. The main change produced by the study was 
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to include, along with the canal, the whole package of storage, 
transfer and mitigation features that comprises Phase II. 
11 The Sacramento River carries an average flow of 23 million 
acre-feet per year, but the San Joaquin only 6.3 million acre-feet. 
Together they carry roughly 40 percent of total runoff in the state. 
The North Coast rivers, on which only one major dam (Trinity) 
has been constructed, carry another 40 percent of the runoff. 
Less than 15 percent of California's river outflow occurs south of 
San Francisco. 
12 An acre-foot is the amount of water necessary to cover one 
acre of land one foot deep, or about 325,000 gallons. The average 
water used in irrigated agriculture in California is three acre-feet 
per year, though the amount varies widely according to crop, 
climate, soil and method of irrigation. 
13 The USBR's operating standard is 750 parts per million 
dissolved solids. 
14 Another threat to Delta agriculture is the scouring of pro-
tective levees by project-induced currents. This would very likely 
not be solved, but merely shifted to a new location by the Periph-
eral Canal. 
15 In 1977 water quality at Emmaton, near the middle of 
Sherman Island in the west Delta, regularly exceeded the 10-day 
mean salinity standards of 1000 milligrams per litre chlorides. 
16 There is maneuvering underway to have the state assume the 
entire cost of the Canal, so that federal approval would no longer 
be required. See note 3, above. 
17 See California, Governor's Commission to Review California 
Water Rights Law, Final Report issued in December 1978. 
18 The ostensible purpose of the Peripheral Canal has been 
changed over the years from merely a water conduit to an environ-
mental protection measure. We believe that the basic impetus for 
the Canal is the same as ever, but that backers have been forced into 
trying to mollify opponents on environmental grounds. 
19sB 346 required federal participation in the construction and 
operation of the Peripheral Canal. This year's bill, SB 200, author-
izes the state to construct the Peripheral Canal without federal 
participation in !mancing or use of the CanaL It would allow the 
federal government to wheel water through the Canal under speci-
fied conditions. This is important because under the SB 346 plan, 
the federal government and the state would have drawn all their 
water from the lower end of the Canal, at Clifton Court Forebay. 
However, should the federal government not use the state-only 
Canal, a situation could conceivably develop where the state is 
pumping its water from the Canal at Clifton Court Forebay, and the 
CVP is pumping its water directly out of the Delta through its 
Tracy Pumping Plant. With this even more complex pumping 
situation, it is not known whether the Canal would correct the 
existing reverse flow patterns in the Delta. Thus, a state-only canal 
might not satisfy even the most obvious environmental require-
ments. 
20· William D. Sweeney, Area Manager, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service in a statement to Assembly Committee on Water, Parks and 
Wildlife, 4/4/79: "the present state of the art in flsh screening does 
not allow us to endorse the project as being of overall benefit to a 
total fish management program for the Delta. ... " 
I 
21 On the historical evolution of standards, see John MacLeod 
MacDiarmid, "The California State Water Project: Development, 
Description, Current Conflicts," speech presented to the 62nd 
Annual Conference of the National Council for Geographic Educa-
tion, San Francisco, November 27, 1976. DWR maintains that 
up to 5,000 cfs are built into its current plans. Our point here is 
that this is an area where knowledge is not sufficient and thus 
estimates are subject to significant change. ln light of water com· 
rnitments now being planned, there is serious risk to the Delta. 
As we have attempted to illustrate, we believe it unlikely that, 
once these commitments have been made, new scientific knowledge 
of outflow requirements would be reason enough to curtail use of 
the expensive new facilities. 
22 Hugo B. Fisher Associates, "A Preliminary Report on the 
Effects of Density Stratification in San Francisco Bay," Report to 
the Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, California, 
June 1977. See also D.S. McCulloch et aL, "A Preliminary Study 
of the Effects of Water Circulation in the San Francisco Bay Es-
tuary-Some Effects of Freshwater lnflow in the Flushing of South 
San Francisco Bay." U.S. Geological Survey Circular No. 637A 
(Washington, D.C.: 1970). 
23 San Joaquin Valley Interagency Drainage Program. "Agri-
cultu.ral Drainage and Salt Management in the San Joaquin Valley," 
January 1979. 
This has given rise to several criticisms and concerns: (1) Some 
observers question whether it is possible to meet salt standards 
safely while discharging 300 cfs of drain water into Suisun Bay, 
when total Delta outflows are sometimes less than 10 times that 
amount. (2) Discharges of chemicals such as DDT, dieldrin and 
toxaphene are predicted, but no specific mitigation or control 
measures are suggested, and no discussion is offered as to whether 
federal and state water quality standards would be violated. (3) 
The Environmental Impact Report on the drain makes assumptions 
of adequate knowledge about the impacts of wastewater discharge 
on the stimulation in growth of algae and other organisms {owing 
to high nutrient levels). But as the EPA pointed out, there is a 
"paucity" of information on the subject. 
24 N . . b . egot:Janons etween proJect sponsors and Delta growers 
produced the first water quality standards for the Delta in 1965. 
These standards called for a Delta outflow of 1,800 cfs. This meant 
that at least pan of the Delta would have had to find an alternative 
water supply, due to salt incursion. But Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act in the same year, instructing the state 
to establish water quality standards. The standards proposed by 
the state in 1967 (Res. 68-17 of the SWRCB) were rejected by the 
Secretary of the Interior. The SWRCB then held hearings and 
eventually produced the ftrst comprehensive water quality standards 
for the Delta, embodied in Decision 1379. The water quality under 
this decision would be maintained at roughly twice the level of 
the 1965 standards. 
25 There is a long history of conflicting purposes for Delta 
salinity controL The CVP was originally a state project that in-
cluded salt water repulsion as a function, but it could not be ft. 
nanced on account of the Great Depression. When the federal 
government assumed respollSI.bility for the project, salinity control 
did not appear in the congressional authorization. Nonetheless, 
the building of Shasta Darn markedly improved conditions in the 
Delta, so the Bureau of Reclamation continued to publicize its 
success in this regard, especially in its annual appropriations hear-
ings before Congress. Over 125 references to Delta salinity control 
by the USBR have been documented, despite their official refusal 
to meet standards. See MacDiarmid, note 21 above. 
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26 California v. United States, 46 LW 4997, July 3, 1978 (Dock-
et No. 77-285). 
27 Andrus' decision memo, dated December 29, 1978, reads 
in part: 
•.. Interior would reserve, and the state would recognize, our 
right to challenge the consistency of the state standards, when-
ever meeting those standards impairs Interior's ability to fulfill 
other project purposes. 
Andrus also proposed to have legislation introduced in Congress 
amending CVP authorization to include Delta protection as a proj-
ect purpose, but the fate of such legislation and its ulthnate impact 
remain to be seen. Hearings are now underway to determine the 
new scope of CVP authorizations. 
28 Under Section 303 of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972 and the state Porter-Cologne Water 
Quality Control Act of 1969. 
29 When combined with Decision 1485 (1978) to coordinate 
the plan with water rights. 
3° Criticisms of the SWRCB Basin Plan and Decision 1485 are 
too numerous and complex to be explained here. A number of 
water districts in the Delta. environmental groups, and the EPA 
have all raised serious questions about the board's plan. The EPA 
has not yet approved the SVlRCB plan and has asked for several 
revisions. One important area of dispute is the "relaxation pro-
vision," which operates as follows: the Plan sets water quality 
standards for the Delta. The standards vary according to the hydro-
logical year, Le., in a wet year, water quality is maintained at a 
standard higher than in a dry year. The quantity of project def".l-
ciencies in firm water supplies is used to determine the quality of 
water that will remain to protect Delta water quality. As C:urrent 
USBR surplus water is convened into firm supplies, once the 
Peripheral Canal is built, and as DWR contract entitlements increase, 
potential project deficiencies in firm supplies will be larger for the 
same water year type. This means lowered water quality. For 
instance, if a drought in 1979 had caused 2 MAF in firm water 
deficiencies to project users, sufficient water would have had 
to be released between April 1 and May 5 to meet an electrical 
conductivity standard of 4.4 millirnhos at Antioch, in the Delta. 
Based on the board's proposed relaxation provision, if the exact 
sr:rme conditions occurred in 1988, when commitments may be 
2 MAF higher than 1979, there would be a 4 MAF deficiency, but 
only the Delta would suffer. See "Petition of Friends of the Earth 
appealing SWRCB's approval of Water Quality Control Plan and EIR 
and Decision 1483," September 11, 1978. 
31 Section 502 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
identiftes those pollutants subject to cleanup. Salinity incursions 
were included in discussions on the Senate floor-particularly those 
between Sen. Muskie, author of the act, and Sen. Bayh. Section 
313 requires federal facilities to meet the effluent limitations. 
ln addition, Pres. Carter has issued an executive order (No. 12088, 
10/18/1978) that requires all federal facilities to comply with 
section 313. 
32 But the recent drought years of 1976 and 1977 were not the 
driest years in the long-run record taken from tree-ring data. In 
fact, the 1976-77 drought was by no means extraordinazy eli· 
matologically. Such periods in the future must be anticipated and 
planned for-not, however, by expanding supplies under present 
institutional arrangements, which assure that climatic variability 
will not be sufficiently taken into account (see notes 34-35 below). 
33 Phase ll also calls for a Four-Agency Fish and Wildlife Ad-
ministrative agreement. This rompact between USBR, DWR, 
California Department of Fish and Game and the U.S. Fish and 
WJldlife Service, would specify that fish and wildlife populations 
be maintained at .. average historical levels" in the Delta. Quite 
apart from the impossibility of objectively determining the meaning 
of .. average historical levels" in an erosystem that has been drasti-
cally altered by hwnan beings (including the introduction of the 
Striped Bass from the East Coast), the same basic argwnent about 
the inherent malleability of such standards under political pressure 
holds here as well 
34 It has been argued that constructing Phase II rould create 
the obligations to deliver all 4.23 MAF of contracted water, but 
that, in the absence 1lf faeilities, the contracts are not binding. 
The contracts have not been tested in the rourts, however-so 
the argument at this point is one lawyer's opinion against another's. 
SWP contracts are made in accordance with the "Governor's Con-
tracting Principles," which are guidelines only, not statutory re-
quirements. 
35 In the October 1972 update of its Delta Alternatives study, 
DWR even proposed expanding its contractual obligations further, 
but this has been dropped from current plans. 
36 USBR currently delivers 0.9 MAF on an "interim" basis 
which it proposes to ronvert into a permanent or "ftml" commit-
ment. At the same time, it proposes firm new rontractual rommit-
ments of 0.25 MAF to the Westlands Water District, and 0.115 MAF 
to the Tehama-Colusa service area. The bureau may be unable to 
make these commitments and ronform to Delta water quality 
standards, without new facilities. But there is more. If USBR 
makes commitments to the Delta, as proposed by Secretary Andrus, 
and the Westlands and Tehama-Colusa rontracts are executed, 
it will not have sufficient water to supply the proposed West Sacra-
mento Valley Canal (0.148 MAF), the Folsom South service area 
(0.7 MAF), and the Mid-Valley Canal (0.550 MAF). New storage 
and conveyance facilities would have to be constructed to meet 
this significant new build-up in commitments. 
37 Even with existing rommitments, USBR had to make de-
livery cutbacks of up to 75 percent of rontract entitlements in 
1977. California, Resources Agency, DWR, The Continuing Cali-
fomi.a Drought (August 1977) p. 24. 
38 The Mid-Valley portion is openly acknowledged to be a 
"rescue" operation. California, Resources Agency, DWR, Phase II: 
Alternative Courus of Action, to Provide Delta Protection and 
Adequate Water Supplies for California (March 1976) p. 14. DWR 
admits, moreover, that groundwater levels will still fall an average 
of 140 feet with the project. Ronald B. Robie, Director of DWR, 
letter to Assemblyman Gualro, dated August 11, 1977. 
39 MacDiarmid, note 21 above. 
40 The big success story in this regard is in Orange County, 
where conjunctive use management has been in effect since 1933, 
and a previously declining water table has stabilized. See Stephen 
C. Birdlebough and Alfred Wilkins, "Legal Aspects of Conjunctive 
Use in California," in David Seckler (ed.), California Water: A 
Study in Resource Management (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1971), pp. 263-270. 
41 For example, the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Water 
Committee, an organization of valley water districts, recently 
issued a formal report saYing that the best solution to ground-
water depletion is surface imports, not rontrolling groundwater 
use. "Report Urges Importing Water .•. " San Francisco Chronicle, 
March 14, 1979, p. 5, coL 1. 
42 The MWD includes the City of Los Angeles, but the latter 
does not use its share of Colorado River water because it has a 
better source in Owens Valley. MWD serves the suburban areas. 
43 The original Colorado Aqueduct was built at least 10 years 
too soon. See Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven and Jerome W. 
Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
44 Sources: 1.3 MAF (memo from MWD General Manager to 
Board of Directors, 4/4/79); year 2000 demand (same memo); 
supply, year 2000 (letter from DWR Director Robie to Planning 
and Conservation League, 4/3/79); conservation, 15 percent (same 
letter); reclamation (Orange and Los Angeles Counties Water Reuse 
Study, October 17, 1978); Colorado River supply (memo, MWD 
General Manager to Board, 4/4/79). 
45 Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves and Julius Margolis, Northern 
California's Water Industry: The CorrrparatiJJe Efficimcy of Public 
Enterprise in Developing a Scarce Natural Resource (Baltitnore: 
Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1966), p. 721. 
Cf. Hirshleifer et aL (note 43) who originally suggested the idea. 
46 As the recent ronflicts over power plant siting in California-
e.g., Sun Valley and P. G. & E.'s plans for a roal-fued plant in the 
Central Valley-attest, finding sites will not be easy. Nuclear 
plants are opposed by the Brown administration, while roal plants 
almost invariably violate air quality standards. 
47 See Steve H. Hanke and John J. Boland, "Water Require-
ments or Water Demands?" Journal of the American Water Works 
Association (November 1971), 677-681. 
48 This holds for groundwater, too, since it is replenished by 
surface imports-which are regularly brought in to "rescue" irri-
gators from their own poor groundwater management practices. 
See above, note 38. 
49 See e.g., Siegfried Berle, Irrigation Agriculture in the South-
west United States, Marburg University Geographic Institute, 1976, 
Figure 5, p. 68. 1n fact, a 1978 DWR report indicated a rapidly 
falling demand for water used to irrigate forage land in California. 
See Kenneth Turner, "Feed and Forage Crop Projections: Review 
and Analysis," California, Resources Agency, DWR, Office Re-
port, May 19, 1977, revised October 1977. 
SO Many users even have built into their contracts a commit· 
ment for continued surplus water at low prices. 
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"Surplus" water is so designated because each year the total 
yield of the SWP is allotted to the various contractors in accordance 
with a formula contained in the rontracts. When a contractor does 
not take the entire share of that year's fmn yield, that water 
becomes part of the surplus. The contractor, however, still pays 
the capital costs on the water, as set forth in the contract. Hence 
MWD actually subsidizes San Joaquin Valley growers, primarily 
in the Kern County Water Agency service area, where many of the 
largest agricultural corporations have their holdings. 
We believe this indicates that the SWP already has built-in 
overcapacity. 
• 
51 E. Phillip LeVeen, "Reclamation Policy at a Crossroads," 
Public Affairs Repon, 19:5, October 1978, p. 3. 
5Z See the essentially correct, but now outdated, treatment of 
the problem in Robert C. Fellmeth et al, Politics of Land: Ralph 
Nader's Study Group Repon on Land Use in California (Grossman: 
New York, 1973). 
Property taxes are levied on all land in a water district, regard-
less of whether the owner actually purchases water. Urban land 
has a disproportionately high value, but accounts for relatively 
little water use, so "captive" cities pay more than their share of the 
costs, e.g., Bakersr1eld in the Kern County Water Agency service 
area. A similar situation obtains in Los Angeles, where the city of 
L.A. uses only 2 percent of MWD's water but pays 21 percent 
(1978) of the total taxes; hence the city subsidizes the suburban 
purchasers of MWD water. 
53 Bain, Caves and Margolis, note 45 above, p. 570. 
54 Cf. Willey, "Financial Impacts on the State Water Project of 
New Supply Projects Compared to Water Conservation, Reclama-
tion, and Management." Testimony before the California Assembly 
Committee on Water, Parks, and Wildlife, ~arch 28, 1979. 
55 DWR recognizes this and maintains that conservation is an 
important part of Phase II. But we do not believe this can be 
sustained. No conservation is actually required in DWR's plan and 
the comparatively small $50 million loan fund for water conserva-
tion equipment contained in SB 346 has been eliminated in the new 
bill, SB 200. In any case, if one contrasts a proposed $50 million 
for conservation with $7 billion for supply expansion, with subsidies 
intact, Phase II seems to embody major disincentives to water 
conservation. 
56 See William H. Bruvold, "Residential Water Conservation: 
Policy Lessons from the California Drought, n PublicA[fain Repon, 
19:6, December 1978. Of course. where water restrictions were 
severe, some real hardship resulted but the achievements were far 
greater than anyone had previously predicted.. EconomisU advo-
ca:ting as little as 10 percent demand redllct:ions through metered 
pricing had previously been viewed as unrealistic dreamers. 
57 California. Resources Agency, DWR, Water Conservation in 
California, Bulletin 198, May 1976, p. 38, Table 8; see also Peter 
Benenson, A Water Conservation Scenario [or the Residential 
and Indusrriai Seeton in Caii[omia: Potenrial SavtnK$ of Water 
and Related Energy, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Report No. 
6817,August 1977. 
58 DWR Bulletin 198, pp. 42-45. 
59 Ronald L. Ritschard and Karen Tsao, Energy and Water Use 
in Irrigated Agriculture During Drought Conditions, Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory Report No. 7866, June 1978, Appendix A, 
pp. 57-59. 
60 DWR Bulletin 198, p. 3. 
61 Willey, note 54 above, argues that conservation options 
are economically viable, but that evaluations of "conservation 
hardware" as an alternative to water supply projects are distorted 
by using current market costs for the one but undervalued, histori-
cal costs for the other. He points out that water could be conserved 
at a cost of $23-43 per acre-foot (using a discount rate varying 
from 5-10 percent) while on Phase U yield, customers would pay 
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an average capital cost of $89.11 per acre-foot plus a $74.55 electric 
power cost. Adding about 10 percent operations and maintenance 
costs, this totals about $180 per acre-foot. Thus, if conservation 
options are compared to the costs of new water development-
which is the relevant comparison-conservation would be more 
attractive. 
Subsidies in the SWP distort this choice. For example, artif'I-
cially low interest rates undervalue the total cost of borrowing. 
Capital costs at 5.84 percent interest, as in SB 346, make water 
worth $90 per acre-foot. At a market rate of interest, say 10 
percent, water would cost $132/AF. Second, financing of electric 
generation for the SWP is done at low interest rates (approximately 
6 percent), which Willey estimates to add another $7.50 subsidy 
per acre-foot. The two subsidies together amount to nearly $50/ 
acte-foot. 
Readers' Window 
A copy error on p. 6 of the April 1979 PAR produced an er-
roneous statement suggesting that sprinkler and drip irrigation 
methods are much more efficient in using water when compared 
with gravity methods, than is actually the case. The authors had 
intended to compare the numbers of each system in use, not their 
relative efficiency in conserving water. 
The error was called to the attention of authors Richard Walker 
and Michael Storper by Ray Coppock. Communications Specialist, 
Agricultural Information, Cooperative Extension, U.C. Davis. 
They responded by submitting the following correct version of the 
statement: ~Gravity methods make up some 82 percent of Califor-
nia's irrigation systems, sprinklers 18 percent, and drip 1 percent." 
Walker also commemed: "Although sprinkler and drip methods 
are more efficient than gravity methods (chiefly open ditch and 
flooding), their efficiency and appropriateness vary by crop, so 
general averages are not very helpfuL The more water-saving meth-
ods could be more widely adopted, but they are expensive and the 
incentive is lacking where water is cheap." 
The authors and editors regret this error. 
A Reader's Response 
... I wish to thank you for publishing a most interesting and 
informarive article on the California Water System and situation. 
the April !979 Report on "The California Water System: Another 
Round of Expansion?" by R. Walker and M. Storper. It is the 
clearest and most to the point article I have read in many years on 
this problem. The authors are to be commended highly for so clear 
and understandable a presentation. 
Future subjects in the PAR could include (1) the actual value 
of busing and its influence on the quality of education and (2) 
the question or problem of voter turnout, reasons for the low 
response, relation to age, economic status, and influence of any of 
the multilingual ballots, etc., in California. 
-Lionel Farber, Mill Valley, California: 

• CALIFORNIA'S EARTHQUAKE HAZARD: A REASSESSMENT 
Bruce A. Bolt 
Director, Seismogxaphic Station 
University of California, Berkeley 
Richard a Jahns 
Professor of Geology and Applied Earth Sciences 
Stanford Uruversity 
Introduction 
In trying to reduce seismic hazard in vulnerable regions 
like California, it is essential to understand the kinds of 
damage and other consequences that earthquakes can 
produce. Of course, detailed projections of future casualties 
and allied losses cannot be made without accurate, reliable, 
and rather specific forecasts of the size, location, and tim-
ing of major earthquakes. At present we lack the capability 
for such forecasting, even though a few successful predic-
tions have been made in recent years. Moreover we must 
expect that specific predictions of very large earthquakes 
will be especially difficult to achieve. For now, therefore, 
we must continue to judge future earthquakes on the basis 
of the historic earthquake record, geodetic measurement of 
crustal strain, and evidences of geologic activity along 
earthquake-generating faults during the past few thousands 
of years. 
As might be expected, smaller earthquakes are much 
more frequent than the larger events: 
Editors' Note: Seismologist Bruce A. Bolt and geologist Richard 
H. Jahns, recogrtized authorities in their respective fields, and both 
members of the Califorrtia Seismic Safety Commission, have long 
been active in advising on public policy needs for earthquake safety. 
We. are gratified that they have collaborated in this essay, pooling 
then resources to make up-to-date estimates of the seismic hazard 
in Califorrtia, and to reassess the implications of future earthquakes. 
Their conclusions are based on interpretations of present knowledge 
and recent fmdings about fault displacement, seismicity and earth· 
quake phenomena, as well as judgments on the significance of avail-
able information about past casualties and earthquake damage. 
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California has small earthquakes every day. These minor 
events are recorded, located and cataloged by seismographic 
stations, but are rarely felt and cause little or no damage. 
Every two or three years, however, California has a magni-
tude 5 or 6 earthquake that can cause appreciable local 
damage, especially if its epicenter is in or very near an 
urbanized area, with poor construction or with soil condi-
tions or underlying geologic formations that make it un-
usually susceptible to strong shaking. In the San Francisco 
Bay region, for example, the most recent earthquakes in 
the 5 to 6 range were the magnitude 5.3 Daly City earth-
quake in 1957, the 5.6 and 5.7 magnitude Santa Rosa 
earthquake in 1969 (two jolts close together), and the 5.9 
magnitude Coyote Lake earthquake in the vicinity of 
Hollister in August 1979. 
All these shocks were widely felt and resulted in damage .. 
The smaller Daly City and Santa Rosa quakes, however, 
caused a good deal more damage than the higher-magnitude 
Hollister event, principally because the epicenters were 
more centrally located within urbanized territory. Partly 
because the affected area's underlying formations tend to 
magnify shaking, the Santa Rosa eanhquake caused by far 
the greatest amount of destruction (estimated at $10 
million). 
Magnitude 6 to 7 earthquakes are much less frequent 
but much more damaging than the 5 to 6 events. Indeed, 
earthquakes of 6 to 7 magnitude can be about as damaging 
locally, in the affected areas, as the really big ones-i.e., 
large or "great" earthquakes of 7.0 magnitude and higher-
that are the central focus of this article. The principal 
difference lies in the total amounts of energy released and 
hence the size of the areas affected by severe or violent 
shaking. 
Thus earthquakes of 7 to 8 and greater magnitudes may 
seriously affect regions 50 to 100 .kilometers long (roughly 
30 to 60 miles) and many kilometers wide. If their epi· 
centers are anywhere near urbanized territory they can 
cause significant casualties and economic losses, and when 
they occur in or near large metropolitan areas, damage and 
casualties can be greatly increased. 
When Can We Expect a Large Earthquake? 
In anticipating the next big California earthquake of 
magnitude 7 or higher, we must conclude that time is 
running out. The evidence strongly suggests that such an 
event must now be considered imminent. Until recently 
there has been a tendency to think of such an occurrence 
in terms of "the next 10 or 20 years." But now, for several 
reasons, we can no longer keep pushing this .. time window" 
into the future. In short, present evidence that a large 
earthquake is imminent in California is much stronger now 
than 30 years ago-or even 10 years ago. 
Historical Events 
What is the basis for this conclusion? Tne first line of 
evidence comes from the historical record that, for Cali-
fornia, goes back to about 1800. In the period since 1800 
there have been ten very large earthquakes in this state of 
magnitude 7 or greater (see Table, .. Large Historic Earth-
quakes ... "). Looking first at northern California, the record 
shows a major earthquake in 1836; it was centered on the 
Hayward fault, which extends along the foothills east of 
San Francisco Bay. From what we know now, the 1836 
event probably should be classed as "great," with an 
estimated magnitude of 7+. Two years later, in 1838, 
another large earthquake also with a magnitude estimated 
at 7+ was felt strongly in San Francisco and was accom-
panied by rupturing along many kilometers of the San 
Andreas fault. 
In 1868 another big (7+) earthquake occurred on -the 
Hayward fault with surface ruprure reaching at least from 
Berkeley to San Jose. This earthquake caused destruction 
in San Jose, Hayward, and downtown San Francisco, 
and until 1906 was referred to locally as "the great earth-
quake." A group of laymen wrote a report on the 1868 
event, but this report seems to have been suppressed; no 
copy of it has been seen in the present century. In 1906, 
however, some people who had experienced the 1868 
earthquake were asked to give their recollections (these 
will be referred to later). 
In the great 8.3 magnitude San Francisco earthquake 
of 1906 the San Andreas fault broke from San Juan Bau-
tista to Humboldt County, a distance of 450 kilometers 
(280 miles). The attendant life loss and damage (estimated 
at $1 billion) in the San Francisco Bay region are matters 
of record for this catastrophic event, which still ranks as 
the only great earthquake to occur in a thickly settled part 
of the United States.z Since then, no major land-based 
earthquake of magnitude 7 or greater has occurred in north-
em California, although several smaller ones. have caused 
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considerable damage, and an earthquake estimated at 7.5 
magnitude occurred offshore about 80 miles west of 
Eureka in 1922. 
In southern California, the great Ft. Tejon earthquake 
(estimated magnitude 8.3+) occurred in 1857 on the San 
Andreas fault, which appears to have ruptured from points 
north of the Carrizo Plain to San Bernardino, a distance of 
at least 400 kilometers (250 miles).3 Extensive surface 
displacements near the easterly base of the Sierra Nevada, 
along a quite different zone of faults, attended the 1872 
Owens Valley earthquake. Although judged by some 
investigators to have been the greatest among all recorded 
shocks in the state's history (estimated magnitude 8.3+), 
this earthquake was in a remote region and hence did not 
affect urbanized areas significantly .4 In 1940 a 7 .I magni-
tude earthquake in the Imperial Valley caused $8 million 
in damage. The shaking in this earthquake was long used as 
the basis for seismically resistant design standards, until 
later evidence proved the standards to be inadequate. In 
1952 the severe 7.2 magnitude earthquake in Kern County, 
on still another fault system, caused major damage in 
Bakersfield. At this writing, the 1952 Kern County earth· 
quake is the most recent one in southern California of 
magnitude 7 or greater. 
It may also be appropriate to note such smaller dam-
aging southern California events as the 1925 offshore 
earthquake of 6.3 magnitude that caused S8 million loss 
mostly in the Santa Barbara business district, and the 1933 
earthquake of 6.3 magnitude that caused $60 million loss 
in the Long Beach area and severely damaged or destroyed 
many public school buildings. The 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake, with a magnitude of 6.5 or less, was accom-
panied by fault rupture approximately 15 kilometers long 
(about nine miles) and was destructive in relatively small 
parts of the San Fernando Valley and Los Angeles. 5 
Despite these and other damaging shocks, no major (7+ 
magnitude) southern California earthquake has occurred 
in or near present metropolitan areas for more than a 
century, i.e., since the Ft. Tejon earthquake of 1857. 
In fact, because southern California was then only sparsely 
settled, it is justifiable to say there has never been a major 
earthquake (magnitude 7 or greater) in or near heavily 
urbanized territory in the southern California region. 
This fortunate accident of fate does not, however, mean 
that there is no serious threat in that region. To the con-
trary, the evidence shows that major earthquakes have 
severely shaken parts of southern California that have 
subsequently become heavily settled. In time, this kind of 
earthquake activity is sure to recur. 
Historic Record Too Short 
Historic records like those just summarized provide some 
of the most helpful data we have for judging the seismicity 
of California. But the historic record is all too short -for 
fme-grained estimates of when and where the next major 
earthquakes are likely to occur, especially when some 
recurrence intervals are as long as or longer than the entire 
historic record itself. For example, knowing that a single 
great earthquake occurred along a portion of the San An-
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dreas fault, if it is the only big one historic records show for 
that area, tells us little about when the next great earth-
quake will occur there. For some large active faults, like 
the Garlock in southern California, the entire historic 
record is no more than a portion of the gap between the 
most recent earthquake, which presumably happened in 
very young prehistoric times, and the next event that has 
not taken place yet. Small wonder that scientists are 
actively seeking evidence of datable prehistoric earthquakes, 
to round out the past record and help us understand better 
what to expect in the future. 
Going Back in Geologic Time 
One method of extending our information back into 
prehistoric time is to make highly detailed geological 
studies of earthquake-related features along individual 
faults. In the past two decades, such work has led to im-
portant breakthroughs. Thus in some parts of California 
the studies have revealed and dated features ascribable to 
specific large earthquakes that appear to have occurred 
during past millenia. Interpretation of the findings indicates 
that, for the San Andreas and some other large faults, the 
average recurrence intervals of major earthquakes are mea-
sured in hundreds rather than thousands of years. 
Trenches recently excavated across the San Andreas 
fault in southern California have extended the historical 
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record back significantly to include an impressive series of 
past great earthquakes. Displacement and liquefaction 
effects of such paleoearthquakes have been preserved in 
beds of sand and peat. Important measurements of this 
kind recently were made by Kerry Sieh of Stanford Univer-
sity (now a professor at the California Institute of Tech-
nology).6 One site was at Pallett Creek, which crosses the 
San Andreas fault 50 kilometers northeast of Los Angeles. 
Sieh found evidence of at least nine paleoearthquakes 
extending back more than 1400 years to A.D. 545. The 
dates, all but one of them approximate, are as follows: 
1857 1745 1470 1245 1190 965 860 665 545 
(1857 is the date of the historically documented Ft. 
Tejon earthquake noted earlier; the 1745 event was prob-
ably from a rupture of the San Andreas fault southeast-
ward from Sar1 Bernardino.) 
Two conclusions follow from this work. First, large 
earthquakes along the southern reach of the San Andreas 
may break different segments of the fault at different 
times. Second, the average recurrence interval for these 
past earthquakes is approximately 165 years, but there is 
a good deal of variation from one pair of events to another. 
The greatest interval was nearly 300 years and the smallest 
perhaps as short as 55 years. (It should be noted that the 
Pallett Creek site gives information on earthquakes caused 
by rupture along only one large segment of the San Andreas 
fault in southern California-and not its whole extent even 
there.) 
Geodetic Measurements and the Buildup 
of Crustal Strain 
In addition to historic and prehistoric earthquake 
information, there is an important third source of data. 
Successive surveys measure horizontal and vertical dis-
placements between points on the earth's surface, and those 
made in California since the middle of the 19th Century 
give us important clues as to what is happening under-
ground and what to expect in the future. 
In the San Francisco Bay region, for example, the 
surveys show a northwestward movement of the Farallon 
Islands, about 30 kilometers (20 miles) offshore, with 
respect to «fixed" points on the mainland, i.e., Mt. Diablo, 
Mt. Sonoma and Mt. Ross. 7 This movement was going on 
before the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, and has con-
tinued since, at an estimated average annual rate of between 
2 and 3 inches per year, leaving no doubt that strain is 
building up in the intervening crustal rocks, somewhat like 
the tightening of a watch spring when a watch is wound. 
The level of strain that had been reached prior to the 1906 
San Andreas fault rupture is known from geodetic mea-
surements made in the 19th Century. A comparison sug-
gests that a sudden slip will again have to occur along one 
of the main faults in the Bay region in order to relieve the 
growing strain. 
One or More Major California Earthquakes Due 
In California, more than a dozen faults are known to 
be capable of generating major earthquakes. Recurrence 
intervals for such events probably range from about a cen-
tury to many centuries, depending upon the fault in ques-
tion. But an estimated or calculated average interval has 
limited meaning in terms of the probable elapsed time 
between two successive events on a given fault, which can 
be considerably shorter than the long-term average. Geo-
logic studies provide a reasonable basis for suggesting that 
some of California's faults are "due" or "nearly due" for 
major earthquake ruptures, although this must be expressed 
as a probability rather than a certainty. Several of these 
faults traverse areas of dense urban populations, or are 
within moderate distances of such areas. In fact, uf Cali-
fornia's principal urban concentrations, all except the 
Sacramento and San Diego areas appear to be exposed to 
fairly high levels of seismic risk. 
For further illustration, let us consider four parts of the 
San Andreas fault system that could produce great earth-
quakes: (1) central California, (2) the Hayward fault, (3) 
Ft. Tejon-Palmdale, and (4) San Bernardino and south-
eastward. On the latter two sections, the average time 
between great earthquakes may well be about 160 years. 
In central California, the geodetic surveys show that it took 
about 100 years for the rocks to strain enough to produce 
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fault displacement, 
and there is no reason to suppose that this rate of strain ac· 
cumulation is not about the same in the other sections. It 
has been 122 years since the last great earthquake on the 
San Andreas fault in southern California, and 73 years in 
central and northern California. Moreover it has been 27 
years since the last major earthquake on any fault in the 
state. 
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Probability and Timing 
What does this evidence tell us about the imminence of 
damaging earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater? When all 
sections of major earthquake-producing faults are consider-
ed jointly, a rough estimate of the odds fmds them now 
about even-50-50-that an earthquake with a magnitude 
greater than 7 will occur in California during the next 
decade. With every passing year, these odds will steadily 
increase. In any event, present knowledge supports as a 
reasonable working hypothesis that we should anticipate 
a great earthquake somewhere in California during the 
next ten years. (See "Explanatory Note .... " at the end 
of this article.) 
Earthquake Prediction? 
What about more precise earthquake forecasts? Obvious-
ly more specific earthquake predictions would help prevent 
loss of life from collapsing structures, but seismology has 
not yet advanced to the stage of practical and precise 
earthquake prediction. In some countries that experience 
earthquakes, among them Japan, China, the United States, 
New Zealand, the USSR, and Italy, effons have been made 
to forecast precisely the time and place of damaging shocks. 
No more than limited and partial success thus far has at-
tended these efforts. The Chinese, for example, did not 
predict the devastating 1976 Tangshan earthquake, near 
Beijing (Peking) that is estimated to have caused 650,000 
deaths. In short, earthquake prediction may have a long 
way to go before it becomes a practical means for trying 
to deal with many large earthquakes. Moreover, we should 
not forget that even if valid and relatively precise earth-
quake prediction were feasible, making it possible to get 
people into positions of relative safety prior to an event, 
the hazard to unsafe srructures would continue and there-
fore the threat of physical damage and economic loss would 
not be mitigated. 
Earthquake Casualties and Damage: Worldwide 
What is known about earthquake losses? It is believed 
that there have been approximately 13 million deaths from 
earthquakes, worldwide, during the past 4,000 years. 
Some 3.5 million of these deaths occurred in the past 
400 years, and nearly 2 million of them in the last 100 
years. s The sharp increase observed in the rate of earth-
quake-related life loss is due partly to world population 
growth per se, and partly to increasing concentrations of 
people in some of the world's vulnerable seismic areas. It 
should be recognized, however, that there have been many 
departures from the broad trend, and that the occurrence 
of a single great earthquake in or near a metropolitan area 
can cause the statistics on casualties and economic losses to 
change dramatically. 
The recent year 1976, with less than the average annual 
number of large earthquakes worldwide, nevertheless 
saw about 700,000 people killed, most of them in China's 
Tangshan event. In fact the heavy losses from the Tangshan 
earthquake, which drastically affected the globai statistics 
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for the present century, provide a special Jesson for resi-
dents of the United States and other urbanized nations 
that may experience major earthquakes. This lesson is that 
statistical data on earthquake losses are themselves vulner-
able and can undergo drastic upward revision after a single 
great earthquake in a heavily populated area. 
Earthquake Casualties and Damage: 
California and the U.S. 
Since the beginning of the 19th Century, only about 
1,700 lives have been lost in the United States because of 
earthquakes. But let us look closer at the distribution of 
casualties in space and time. Approximately two-thirds of 
the total can be assigned to California, and nearly one-half 
is attributed to a single California event, the San Francisco 
earthquake of 1906. 9 
Although more than 100 damaging events have occurred 
in California since 1800, essentially all of the related death 
toll has derived from only 17 of these earthquakes, with an 
average life loss of about 65 persons per event, and with 
the events occurring at an average rate of once every ten 
years. 10 
Admittedly these averages are of limited meaning, 
partly because the life loss has been unevenly distributed 
among the earthquakes, and also because the earthquakes 
have been unevenly spaced in time. For example, if the 
San Francisco earthquake is excluded from the reckoning, 
the average death rate from the other pertinent California 
earthquakes drops from 65 per event to Jess than 20. The 
skev.'i.ng effects related to concentrations of people are 
further emphasized by a drop to 4 deaths per event by the 
exclusion of only four additional earthquakes: 1812 
Capistrano, 1868 Hayward, 1933 Long Beach, and 1971 
San Fernando. 
Looking at more recent times, we see that in the United 
States during the period 1925-1975,590 deaths were attrib-
uted to earthquakes.ll This is only about 3 percent of the 
combined life Joss from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and 
earthquakes during that half-century period,t" and little 
more than 1 percent of the loss from all natural hazards in 
that same period. The corresponding worldwide percentage 
for earthquake deaths is four times as high as that of the 
U.S., 13 owing to differences in seismicity, topographic 
and climatic conditions, concentrations of population, 
styles of living, construction practices, and other factors. 
Earthquake-related deaths in the United States have 
amounted to about 15 percent of the death toll from 
hurricanes, and to less than 10 percent of that from floods 
and tornadoes. 14 They have been at about the same level 
as losses of life from snow avalanches, but only 7 percent 
of those from lightning strikes. As a sobering comparison, 
it can also be pointed out that life loss from all natural 
hazards in the United States during recent decades has 
amounted to only about 2 percent of the deaths from 
vehicular traffic. 
Cumulative physical damage from United States earth· 
quakes has been reckoned at approximately $2 billion since 
1800.15 This total seems small when compared with the 
$4 billion price tag for a single recent non-seismic event, 
Hurricane Agnes in 1972. The average cost of 10 cents per 
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person for earthquake damage during the past century 
(or less than 55 cents per person as reckoned in 1971 
dollars) also seems small when compared with the average 
of nearly $25 per person for all damage from natural haz-
ards in the United. States during the same period. 16 But, 
as we shall see, these data are not satisfactory for long-
term predictions of future costs. 
The Future: Higher Losses Must Be Anticipated 
It should be emphasized that four-fifths of the U.S. 
earthquake costs noted above were associated with only 
three events: San Francisco (1906), Alaska (1964), and 
San Fernando (1971). As a hint for the future, we should 
heed the significance of the $1 billion in direct damage and 
indirect costs resulting from the San Fernando event, a 
moderate earthquake located in a metropolitan area. Both 
physical and demographic factors were considered by the 
California Division of Mines and Geology in projecting 
for this state a startling $21 billion in earthquake shaking 
damage during the period 1970-2000, assuming a con-
tinuation of present kinds of responses to earthquake 
hazards. 1' 
The record of earthquakes and their effects in the 
United States leads thoughtful, responsible people to 
conflicting views. Some, using the comparative data noted 
above, regard seismic hazards as relatively modest threats 
when contrasted with other physical hazards. To be sure, 
major earthquakes in this country are infrequent, and the 
costs associated with historic events have been relatively 
low. Reasoning from past history, some have argued that 
earthquake risks should have relatively low priority in the 
allocation of our attention and resources. 
Admittedly the historical statistics, taken alone, can be 
interpreted to support this notion. But the data also con· 
tain another and quite different message. Life loss and 
property damage are influenced not only by the magnitude 
and duration of a strong earthquake, but also by the 
numbers of people involved and the nature of the build-
ings and other structures affected. The only major earth-
quake in the United States to occur in a heavily populated 
region with modern structures was the San Francisco event 
of 1906. Consequently this single earthquake has domi-
nated the nation's statistical record of seismic losses. But 
substantially higher losses must be anticipated when an· 
other great earthquake occurs in a U.S. metropolitan 
area. Is Moreover, there is a high probability of just such 
an occurrence. Indeed, metropolitan areas in both northern 
and southern California are certain to be hit by major 
earthquakes in the future. 
How Well Prepared ... ? 
To sum up, future earthquakes are inevitable in Cali-
fornia, and the damage potential is high in the likely event 
that a big one strikes an urban region fairly soon. Earth-
quake preparedness therefore should be prominent on the 
public agenda for attention. So what is the present state 
of earthquake preparedness? 
Until recently at least, California has not been very 
consistent or methodical in its approach to seismic safety. 
The style has been one of reaction rather than action, with 
responses that have tended to focus on single specific 
problems highlighted by the results of actual earthquakes. 
Perhaps the best example of such ad hoc response was 
enactment of the Field Act in 1933, immediately after the 
Long Beach earthquake heavily damaged or destroyed 
many public schools, in order to enforce safety standards 
for all public schools built thereafter. Over time this ad hoc 
process has brought some important improvements in 
earthquake safety, but it has left other significant hazards 
relatively unattended. 
Earthquake safety began to get appreciably more atten-
tion after the great Alaskan earthquake in 1964. This 
prompted renewed interest in California. and led in 1969 
to creation of a joint legislative committee on seismic 
safety, headed by State Senator Alfred E. Alquist, and in 
1972 to establishment by Governor Ronald Reagan of the 
Governor's Earthquake Council. The 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake provided further strong stimulus that eventuat-
ed in several elements of earthquake-related legislation and, 
perhaps even more important, establishment of the Cali-
fornia Seismic Safety Commission in 1975. 
The commission has brought together different kinds of 
interests and expertise, and has stimulated more effective 
efforts toward seismic hazard mitigation. It has broad 
independent advisory powers to formulate earthquake 
safety policy, including proposals for needed legislation. 
In our view, establishment of the commission represents 
the greatest single public accomplishment on earthquake 
hazard mitigation in California since the landmark study of 
the 1906 earthquake by the State Earthquake Investigation 
Commission, a temporary body set up specifically to study 
that one event. 
Meanwhile some help is also coming from the federal 
government, stimulated in part by the 1964 and 1971 
earthquakes, and also due to the efforts of key individuals 
such as California's U.S. Senator Alan Cranston. This re-
sulted in the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977, a 
law designed to encourage efforts to reduce risk to life and 
property in future earthquakes. 
Progress ... But We Are Still Vulnerable 
Despite advances in seismic studies, earthquake policy 
formulation, and pertinent legislation, California continues 
to be seismically vulnerable in many ways. Even in the 
absence of great recent earthquakes, this vulnerability has 
been periodically reemphasized by relatively modest but 
damaging earthquakes. An excellent example is the Santa 
Barbara shock of August 1978, which was comparatively 
small, with a magnitude of only 5.6. The strong ground 
motion in this earthquake lasted 2 to 3 seconds and shook 
only a limited area, yet it caused approximately $9 million 
in public property damage, and another $2.3 million to 
the private sector. 19 By comparison, the strong ground 
motion in the great 1906 San Francisco earthquake lasted 
about 40 seconds. The released energy, spread over most 
of central and northern California, was perhaps 10,000 
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times greater than that released in the Santa Barbara shock. 
Sixty-five people were injured by falling objects and 
glass in the Santa Barbara earthquake. The most serious 
residential damage occurred in mobile home parks, with 
263 units affected.2o The earthquake also damaged anum-
ber of buildings built after 1952, thus refuting any idea 
that only old buildings from another era should be con-
sidered in assessing earthquake dangers in California. 
Reports from the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
note evidence that the building code and building designs 
were not invariably followed, and that errors seemed to 
have been made in construction. These findings raise 
questions about the need for improved inspection, during 
construction, of both publicly and privately owned build-
ings in California. 
Preparing for a Great Earthquake 
in California 
If a magnitude 5.6 earthquake is able to produce signifi-
cant destruction in a limited area, what is the likely damage 
from a great earthquake and what preparations are needed? 
First, we need a careful reexamination of earthquake 
hazards and risks in California. We need a broader frame-
work than in the past, a framework that considers earth-
quakes in relation to the whole economic system. We 
should find out how building codes are being applied, how 
communities are responding to suggestions that they 
prepare for earthquakes, and how we can best assess the 
costs and benefits from properly carrying out earthquake 
mitigation plans. 
While elements of a comprehensive hazard mitigation 
program already exist at the state and local levels and in the 
private sector, little has yet been done to link them in 
mutually supportive ways or to insure comprehensive 
attention to seismic hazard. Increasing efforts should be 
made to involve and activate the private sector more 
effectively. 
Because the private sector owns most of our buildings 
and other structures where future damage and casualties 
will occur, and because the economy may be drastically 
affected by a great earthquake, this sector cannot escape 
the social and economic consequences of a great earth-
quake. Thus it is good policy as well as practical self-
interest for the private sector to be concerned. 
We obviously must become more deeply involved with 
earthquake preparation and emergency preparedness in the 
future than we have been in the past. Although the fear 
of added expense is often an excuse for inaction, much can 
be done at a very reasonable cost if proper forethought is 
given to the problem. 
Today more people in California are concerned about 
earthquakes than ever before. Local community groups 
are beginning to ask: What can we do in this particular 
neighborhood if a big earthquake occurs? What can we 
do to see that hazards are reduced before the next earth-
quake strikes? Will adequate fire-fighting facilities be 
available? What other responses should we consider? What 
is government doing? 
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What is Ukely to Happen? 
The Seismic Safety Commission and other groups should 
encourage this grassroots activity throughout the state. 
On April 18, 1979, the University of California, Berkeley, 
observed an "Earthquake Awareness Day." Planning for 
this program involved many meetings of administrative 
officers, clerical staff, laboratory managers, officials and 
representatives from student groups, all concerned with 
environment, health, and safety. The organizing committee 
met frequently with no lag in interest. In short there is 
clear evidence of a desire for concrete, reliable information 
about just what is likely to happen during and after another 
earthquake. 
California has extensive experience with earthquake 
effects, including eyewitness accounts and reports based on 
direct observation. Reviewing some of this past experience 
can give a feel for "what it is like to be there," and may 
. help prepare people on what to expect in the future. The 
following accounts, for example, are based on experience 
with two large earthquakes, the 7+ earthquake on the 
Hayward fault in 1868, and the 83 earthquake on the 
San Andreas fault in 1906: 
1868, near San Leandro. 
I managed to get out of the building ... when the 
shaking started. The house was thrown from its 
foundation, the chimney was torn from the roof, 
and the porch was wrenched away, dishes were 
broken and everything was in confuswn. I found that 
most of the houses were in the same condition as 
my own-thrown from their foundations, with 
chimneys down, porches knocked sideways, etc. 
All the while the ground was shaking and continued 
to shake for days, even weeks.2l 
1868, near Irvington. 
I was then about 15 years of age and my home was 
near Irvington. When the shock came I was alone 
in the house with my baby brother and my mother 
called to me to get the baby. I managed to get the 
child over my arm, face down with a pillow on top, 
then falling and crawling I worked my way to the 
kitchen door. My mother was on the ground, and 
every time she tried to get up she was thrown again. 
As I sat there I could see the ground in waves like 
the ocean. After the main shock I think we had a 
hundred shocks during the first 24 hours, not a house 
was left with a chimney on it.22 
1906, San Francisco. 
To some extent the earthquake caused damage to 
buildings and other structures in all pans of the city 
and county of San Francisco .... Almost everywhere 
chimneys were thrown down or badly broken, but 
in a few small localities most of the chimneys with-
stood the shock .... Plaster on walls and ceilings 
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was very generally damaged. So, probably, were 
frail partition walls and chandeliers, crockery and 
fragile household furnishings. Such effects were 
typical of large sections of the city. There were 
relatively small districts, however, in which brick 
and frame buildings of ordinary construction were 
badly wrecked or quite destroyed. Pavements were 
fissured, buckled, and arched. Sewers and water-
mains were broken. In places, portions of streets 
were moved laterally several feet out of place. Well-
ballasted street-car tracks, equipped with 8, 10, or 
11 inch rails, were arched and flexed or thrown into 
shallow wave forms .... Effects of this degree of 
violence were pretty closely confmed ... to areas of 
"fllled" or "made" land.23 
About the Ferry Building, at the foot of the Market 
Street, is a district of "made" land . . . in which 
high intensity was manifested .... Wooden build-
ings, 1 story to 3 stories high, with brick or stone-
work fronts, were interspersed among ordinary brick 
buildings from 2 to 6 or 8 stories in height. Mingled 
with these was a considerable number of modem, 
class A, office buildings. Here the fire burned fiercely 
and caused great havoc .... After the fire had past, 
standing walls revealed ugly, sinuous cracks, in rudely 
parallel systems, which were not due to fire nor to 
dynamite. Masonry blocks in the walls of excellent 
modern buildings were broken as by a blow. Rivets 
were sheared off in parts of the framework of steel 
structures, and tension rods in such frames were 
badly stretched. Tubular cast-iron columns, support· 
ing floor girders, were broken off near their bases 
in cellars where they rested upon piling. The concrete 
casing [s] of piles were frequently broken. Wherever the 
intensity was high, the tendency to crack or crush 
near the base, as tho a sharp blow had been struck 
there, [was] notably conspicuous. In spots the streets 
sank bodily, certainly as much as 2 feet, probably 
more .... The surface of the ground was deformed 
into waves and small open fissures were formed, 
especially close to the wharves. Buildings on the 
water side, along East Street, generally slumped 
seaward in some cases as much as 2 feet. The damage 
was greatest close to the water's edge .... 24 
In the neighborhood of the crossing of Steiner and 
Sutter Streets, there is an irregularly bounded district 
a little larger than a city block in which several 
buildings not conspicuously weak were totally 
destroyed. St. Dominic's Church, at the corner of 
Steiner and Bush streets, was a complete ruin .... 
Its steeple towers were ruined, its roof fell in, and all 
its walls were so badly cracked that it became a 
menace to the neighborhood. If the shock had 
occurred during the hours of religious service, few 
would have escaped from the building alive. Prob-
ably it was not a building of the most excellent 
construction; but, on the other hand, it did not 
appear to be built flimsily. It certainly suffered a 
most violent shaking.2s 
1906, Stanford University. 
I came suddenly awake, as if someone had given me 
a very strong shove. Nothing happened for a moment, 
and then I found myself clutching at the blankets 
to keep from being tossed out of my wildly shaking 
bed. Between the big pulses of movement, I struggled 
upright and into my slippers, and then groped my 
way to the door in the faint morning light. The build-
ing was rocking in a most violent way, and I fell more 
than once as I moved down the hallways. What I 
remember best, though, was the frightful noise-an 
overall dull roar, with the groaning of timbers and 
the cracking and falling of masonry. I made it to the 
end of the hall in spite of the pulsating motions, 
and looked out the window to see other buildings 
swaying like so many trees in a high wind. Then the 
big stone chimney of the power plant collapsed with 
an awful roar. 26 
Need for Earthquake Education 
Such first-hand accounts give people a chance to reassess 
their thinking about what to do when the next great 
earthquake occurs. Some now make highly unrealistic 
assumptions that they can put through emergency calls 
on the telephone, or, if at work, get in their cars and go 
home to join their families! 
In short, there is a wide gap between what many people 
think they are going to do, and what will actually be 
possible during and immediately after heavy earthquake 
shaking. Such unrealistic perceptions are one of the un-
certainties involved in reassessing the possible consequences 
of the next great earthquake. 
Obviously more effective earthquake education will be 
very important in trying to achieve an adequate defense. 
We must get the attention of a large portion of the popu-
lation in describing the kinds of earthquake experiences to 
be expected, so that individuals are prepared to respond in 
sensible ways. While the public appears presently to lack 
knowledge about earthquake safety measures, a recent 
survey of public attitudes toward earthquake prediction in 
southern California, as made by Professor Ralph Turner of 
UCLA, found that people would like to know more about 
earthquake preparedness. 
It seems extremely unfortunate that most California 
public schools no longer provide disaster education pro-
grams for students, because over the years imaginative 
programs could contribute significantly and improve basic 
public awareness of the nature of earthquake disasters and 
what to do about them. The Department of Education did 
conduct a federally funded disaster program a few years 
ago, but it was discontinued when the federal funding 
ceased. 
No Cause for Complacency 
Clearly there is no cause for complacency about earth-
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quake risk in California. Many widespread dangers persist. 
Many old hazardous buildings, for example, should be 
strengthened or removed, even though such actions will 
take major commitments of time and effort to achieve 
long-term solutions. Meanwhile, short-term efforts must 
be increased, because present state and local ability to 
respond to major disasters appears highly questionable 
compared with the magnitude of resources that a large 
earthquake will call for. In weighing both short- and long-
term needs, a Seismic Safety Commission report comments 
on existing hazards and disaster preparedness: 
Given the great number of hazardous structures in 
use today . . . built prior to any consideration of 
lateral force requirements [to resist sideways shak-
ing] , any program of rehabilitation and strengthening 
... must be directed toward ... long-term solu-
tion[s]. There is a general consensus, however, that 
in the short term (within the next ten or fifteen 
years), disaster preparedness can provide the greatest 
degree of hazard mitigation in terms of lives saved 
•••• 27 
Despite this, less than 2.0 percent of the state's expen-
diture for seismic safety is going into disaster preparedness. 
In short, we clearly need to be thinking and doing more to 
understand and prepare for what will happen in another 
great earthquake. During the next few years we should try 
to reduce the hazard to an acceptable or minimal level of 
risk statewide, for time is no longer on our side. 
Conclusion 
In assessing preparedness, we have argued that in the 
not-distant future California must expect major earth-
quakes in thickly settled areas, causing large losses. More-
over, without being over-pessimistic, it seems sensible that 
our precautions should anticipate what has not yet hap-
pened in California: (1) highly unfavorable timing of earth-
quake occurrence with respect to the activities of people, 
(2) periods of heavy rainfall prior to an earthquake in the 
affected area, and (3) other factors known to increase 
losses. With a combination of adverse circumstances, the 
death toll could become heavy, and in a single earthquake 
property damage caused by ground shaking, landslides, 
soil liquefaction, and other kinds of ground failure could 
exceed by an order of magnitude the total of all earth-
quake damage recorded in the United States so far. 
In sum, we cannot simply extrapolate the historic 
earthquake record into the future if we wish to make 
realistic estimates of future losses. Instead we must take 
into account the several unfavorable physical and demo-
graphic factors of the present social and economic situa-
tion, i.e., we must plan for events that will drastically 
change the actuarial base for appraising seismic hazard and 
risk. This is a crucial justification for devoting special, 
wide-ranging efforts to the reduction of seismic hazards. 
The situation causes increasing concern to scientists and 
engineers, and fortunately also to key prime-movers of 
seismic legislation such as the Alfred Alquists in Sacra-
mento and the Alan Cranstons in Washington. All these 
efforts are helping to raise seismic safety issues to the 
level of attention they deserve in the eyes of California's 
citizenry. 
Explanatory Note on Probability Estimates 
for a Major Earthquake in California 
The record of recurrence for major quakes in California 
is too short for any detailed or defmitive analysis of prob-
ability. So let us look at the record of earthquakes of 
Richter magnitude 7 or greater (M 7+) in a simple way. 
As shown in the Table, "Large Historic Earthquakes ... ," 
ten M 7+ events have occurred in California during the past 
150 years (in 1836, 1838, 1857, 1868, 1872, 1906, 1922, 
1927, 1940 and 1952). This means that the average recur-
rence interval from 1820 to 1979 has been 15 years-if 
we include the time since the latest event, in 1952, plus 
adding an arbitrary seven years prior to the 1836 event to 
make a 150-year period. (The average recurrence interval 
would drop to less than 13 years if we considered all ten 
earthquakes and used the shorter 116-year period, 1836-
1952, between the earliest and latest events.) 
Let us now tum to recurrence intervals between succes-
sive M 7+ earthquakes. Since 1836 these have been 2, 19, 
11, 4, 34, 16, 5, 13, 12 years-a minimum of2 years and a 
maximum of 34 years. It has been 27 years since the latest 
big one (1952 in Kern County), a length of time exceeded 
only once since 1836. And 27 years is almost twice as long 
as the estimated average of 15 years (or less than 13 years). 
We conclude that California is "due" or even "overdue," 
unless we assume some sort of long-term fluctuation in the 
intervals between California earthquakes. But there is little 
or no justification for assuming such fluctuation: the 
crustal plates that meet in California are moving steadily 
\\ith respect to each other, and most of the large earth· 
quakes discussed here are associated with major rupturing 
along the boundary zone between the plates (i.e., the 
San Andreas fault system). 
In any event, data available from the historic record 
suggest that odds of 50-50 for a major earthquake in the 
next 10 years are by no means too great. One might argue 
that the likelihood is even greater. If by 1989 no M 7+ 
quake has occurred in California, it would then have been 
37 years since the 1952 event-and that would be an 
historic record-breaker for length of a quiet intervaL Such 
a continuation of the current quiet period for another 10 
years is possible, of course, but unlikely. 
Now let us go back in time beyond the historic record 
for evidence from a longer-term period, and use that to 
extrapolate. We can examine a single reach of the San 
Andreas fault-from Paso Robles to the Coachella Valley-
and consider Kerry Sieh's fmdings, which go back nearly 
1500 years.28 As noted earlier, there have been at least 
nine major earthquakes from about 545 A.D. to 1859. 
The average recurrence interval has thus been approximate-
ly 165 years, with intervals between successive events of 
about 120, 195, 105,225,55,225,275, and 110 years. 29 It 
has been 122 years since the most recent event, in 1857. 
. These time intervals estimated by Sieh apply to only 
one reach of one quake fault. Naturally they are consider-
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ably longer than would be the case for California as a 
whole, with a record involving major events on several 
faults. Accordingly let us now begin extrapolating by 
adding the more northerly section of the San Andreas 
fault-while still leaving out other segments in the Im-
perial Valley-Gulf of California region. Inclusion of the 
northerly San Andreas roughly cuts the estimated time 
interval in half, and doubles the estimate of earthquake 
frequency for the San Andreas fault. On this basis the 
estimated average recurrence interval since 545 A.D. 
drops to about 80 years. 
In addition, other faults of the San Andreas system 
(Hayward, Calaveras, San Jacinto, Elsinore, Imperial) 
also must be reckoned with, as some of them have con-
tributed to the record of M 7+ historic earthquakes (see 
Table). So we can argue that extending Sieh's findings to 
the other parts of the San Andreas system justifies further 
reducing our estimate of the average recurrence interval 
to the order of 70 years, and to even less if we include two 
major events that have occurred in the Colorado River 
delta region of Mexico. 
The estimate is reduced still further, to about 25 years, 
by including the faults of the Transverse Ranges, the 
Sierra Nevada, and adjacent Basin Ranges, along with 
other faults that have shown a capability for M 7+ earth· 
quakes. Moreover, this does not exhaust the list of major 
faults that are likely to produce M 7+ earthquakes felt in 
populated areas (e.g., the Garlock fault). 
In short, the historic record with its 15-year average 
interval is in fairly good agreement with the probable 
longer-term record, with an average interval of 25 years 
or less, as extrapolated from information about one reach 
of the San Andreas fault. In this light, 50-50 odds can be 
viewed as a modest, perhaps even conservative appraisal of 
the likelihood that California will experience an earthquake 
of magnitude 7 or greater during the next 10 years. 
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS: WATER REUSE 
Introduction 
William H. Bruvold 
School of Public Health 
University of California. Berkeley 
Water reclaimed from municipal wastewater can be a 
significant source of supply in California and elsewhere in 
the semiarid western United States. I But public opinion 
about such uses is, of course, a controlling determinant, 
as was recognized several years ago in a number of studies 
that attempted to assess attitudes.2 
Unfortunately all of the previous research on waste-
water reclamation dealt with hypothetical uses of re-
claimed water that might occur at some unspecified time 
in the future. There is a lack of studies assessing attitudes 
toward specified uses of reclaimed water proposed for the 
actual communities under investigation. Such research is 
needed to give policymakers more reliable guides to 
public responses; it is based on citizens' personal attitudes 
to concrete proposals, rather than only impersonal pro-
jections or speculations. 
The major purpose of the work discussed here was to 
study voters' evaluations of several wastewater reclama-
tion and reuse options that were actually proposed for 
selected California communities. Uses assessed ranged all 
the way from {I) minimal treatment followed by ocean 
disposal, to (2) advanced treatment and subsequent reuse 
for drinking, and were evaluated by people immediately 
affected by the options under consideration. The rather 
surprising results found that respondents did not favor 
either (I) minimal treatment followed by discharge, or (2) 
very high levels of treatment followed by domestic use. 
Instead they preferred relatively high levels of treatment, 
followed by a "middle" level of use, e.g., for park and 
greenspace irrigation. The research findings also further 
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suggest ways to involve the public more fully in waste-
water reuse and related environmental decisions . 
The Study 
The study used face-to-face interviews, including full 
presentations of real wastewater treatment and reuse 
options for the community under study, intended to ob-
tain thoughtful evaluations of these options by the 
respondents. This approach-presenting specific options 
to residents of communities in which such options had 
actually been proposed-changed the frame of reference 
of "somewhere" to one's own community, and from 
"sometime" to one's own immediate future. 
The interview schedule was deliberately made different 
from those employed in most survey research, each respon-
dent receiving an individualized educational presentation 
describing and comparing three wastewater treatment 
and reuse options tailor-made to the community under 
study. At the end of the presentation, respondents were 
asked to rate each treatment option with respect to 
environmental impact, health impact and economic im-
pact. Respondents were also asked for statements of the 
option liked best and why. Perhaps most important, 
respondents were asked if they would vote for each option 
if it were later offered to the local community in the form 
of a bond issue. The option statements in the educational 
presentation were carefully developed for each of the ten 
communities surveyed. The cities and towns were chosen 
to cover as wide a range as possible. A complete and 
detailed description of all research procedures used is 
available in a technical report. 3 
Principal Findings: Water Use-
Contact Combination Preferred 
The major findings are summarized in Table I. 
None of the ocean discharge options received a favor-
able vote, nor did any of the proposals for using reclaimed 
water for drinking. Each of the options proposing conven-




Voter Preferences for Reuse Options Analyzed by Ltvel of Treatment, Type of Reuse and Decree of Human Contact 
lcvd of Treatmcnl: CWT cwr AWT AWl AWT AWT 
Type of use: Discharge Reuse Discharae Reuse Reuse Reuse 
Dcarce of Contact: None Low lligh l.ow Moderate Hiah 
Community 
Livermore Bay ourfall lrriaation reservoir 
No contact Food crops 
(21-77) (71-24} 
Watsonville Bay our fall lrriaation Recreational lake 
No coni act Food crops Swimmina 
(J(l-67) (84-13) (3(1.66) 
San Luis Obispo Bay ourfall Irrigation Recreational lake 
No contact Food crops Swimmina 
(14-81) (76-17) (62-31) 
San Dicao lrriaation Aqua culture 
Urban arcenbeltt Food production 
(65-27) (41-49) 
Santa Rosa Irrigation Stream discharae Irrigation 
Fodder crops Swimmina Food crops 
(4H6) (S6-J6) (49-40} 
Oxnard Ocean outfall lrriJIIion Groundwater rccharae 
No contact Food crops Food crop irriaation 
()6-59) (46-H) (Sl>-41) 
Modeato Irrigation River discharae Irrigation 
Fodder crops Swimmina Food crops 
(61-JJ) (41-55} (JJ-61) 
Fairfield lrriaation lrri1a1ion lrriaation 
Turf nunery Turf nursery f:ood crops 
(4(1.55) (H-40) (SI-41} 
Pomona Strum discharee Industrial use lrriaation 
Swimmine raper milia l'ood crops 
(J6-S•} (S9-J4) (27-66} 
Fountain Valley Ocean outfall Irrigation 
No contact Oolf courael 
(7J-21) 
Overall Succeu Ratio 0/S Ill 1/3 4/4 4/9 2{3 
Overall Suueu Percentaae .00 .JJ .Jl 1.00 .44 .67 
Sourct: William H. Bruvold, Public Auitudts toward Community Wa.sltwoltr Rtdamation ond Rtuu Options (Davis: University of California, Water Reaourcea Center, Auauat, 1979), Contribution no. 19. 
No us: 
C WT =conventional waste treatment (secondary treatment concluded by disinfection). 
AWT = advanced waste treatment (lecondary treatment followed by tome form of advanced waste treatment and concluded by disinfection). 















R~uu =some planned beneficial reuse for reclaimed water. 
D~t"tofhumon contoctcateaoriea are defined a a followa: very hixh for inae~~tivc use such as drinkina and cookina; hith for body contact utca auch asawlmmina and laundry; moduattforaecondarycontact uaea auchaa food crop production and dairy 
patturc irriaation; low for usea where human contact is incidental or remote, such as fodder crop production or aolf course hazard lakes; and nont where the pouibilily of human contact ia extremely remote •• in a deep bay or ouan ou1fal1. 
FirurtJ in partnthtuJ under each option are re1ulta from the straw vote on that option. The percentaae of favorable rrspona.ct iJ aiven firu and undecided rtsponses are omitted. 
Ov~rtl/1 sucuJJ rt~lio.r aiven at the bottom of the table repruent the number of auccessful uraw vole. obtained for uch of the aeven aeneral opliona reJHettnled by the columns of Table I. 
outfall was voted down decisively. Equally significant was 
the negative response to the three options proposing reuse 
for drinking, each also being voted down decisively. In 
short, the respondents strongly opposed conventional 
treatment with disposal by discharge, and also strongly 
opposed advanced treatment with reuse for drinking. 
The most favored option involved advanced waste treat-
ment and beneficial reuse for low-contact purposes, such 
as golf course and greenbelt irrigation. Respondents con-
sistently favored advanced waste treatment when coupled 
with beneficial reuse for purposes involving a low degree 
of human contact. Approval ratios also generally de-
clined as proposed treatment and use levels decreased 
from the most favored option. 
Why did the results turn out this way? Earlier findings 
had suggested only a simple linear relation between the 
degree of proposed contact and extent of opposition, and 
had not forecast the U-shaped opposition pattern re-
ported here. The reasons for preferences (see Table 2) 
provide useful insights into respondents' motivation. 
Respondents were asked to give reasons for liking and 
not liking the 20 options given, ten of which were liked 
best and ten liked least. The reasons given most often 
concerned the extent to which the option provided envi-
ronmental protection, public health protection, and 
water resource conservation. Together these three con-
siderations comprise respondents' principal explanation 
for both their positive and negative preferences. Level of 
treatment, cost of treatment and control of development 
were cited infrequently. 
Apparently respondents favor wastewater treatment 
and reuse options that (I) safeguard public health, (2) 
protect the environment, and (3) conserve water. Con-
ventional treatment followed by disposal met the public 
health requirement, but failed the environmental pro-
tection and conservation requirements, and thus were 
consistently voted down. Advanced waste treatment 
followed by ingestive use met the conservation and 
environmental protection requirements, but failed the 
public health requirement, and thus were also consis-
tently voted down. The option that seemed to meet an· 
three requirements best-public health, environmental 
protection, and conservation-involved advanced waste 
treatment followed by beneficial reuse, but only for 
purposes that entail low levels of human contact. 
Facilitating Community Approval of Reuse Projects 
What are the implications of these findings for ways of 
facilitating actual community adoption of water reuse 
projects? A major impact of the present research may lie 
in what it suggests about community adoption proce-
dures, in addition to the light it sheds on community 
preferences for reuse options. 
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) 
distributes federal and state funds to California commun-
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ities for construction of wastewater treatment facilities, 
and has produced a large, detailed compendium of 
guidelines for communities applying for grants to con-
struct wastewater systems.4 Table 3 outlines the three 
principal steps in the process of planning and con-
structing such a system as (I) option development and 
selection; (2) development and approval of construction 
plans; and (3) actual construction and operational testing 
of the wastewater treatment facility. The following dis-
cussion focuses on step one, option development and 
selection. 
In a useful monograph on a community adoption of 
water reuse systems, Kasperson, McCauley, and others5 
report that step one is usually divided into three sequen-
tial phases. In the first phase, the technical planning 
sector, comprised of city employees and consulting 
engineers, selects a single wastewater treatment option 
they consider best to meet the perceived goals and 
preferences of significant components of the community 
decisionmaking structure. 
The option selected is then submitted to the local polit-
ical decisionmakers, who test it against their understand-
ing of the local water resources situation, public opinion 
goals, local political goals, and the views of the state 
agency. If the option survives this local political review, it 
is then ready for presentation to the local voting public, 
through public hearings, city council votes, and most 
important, local bond issue elections. 
Kasperson and McCauley said little about the public 
ratification phase, because their report was prepared 
before many major reclamation and reuse projects had 
actually been adopted in the United States. This prompts 
several questions about the ratification phase. How can 
the public best be included in the adoption process? What 
can be learned from theopresent study that would extend 
the Kasperson and McCauley model of the adoption 
process, and its facilitation? 
Public Involvement 
in Wastewater Reclamation Planning 
Three principal approaches to public involvement in 
wastewater reclamation planning are considered here: (I) 
involve the public heavily from the earliest stages of 
planning all the way through to adoption; (2) seek public 
involvement, but only after planning has been completed, 
and at the point when approval of a bond issue is needed 
to fund the project; and (3) a "middle ground"that would 
involve the public after initial planning has identified the 
major options, but well before the time to ratify funding 
by a public vote. The pros and cons of each approach are 
reviewed below. 
l. On behalf of the first approach it can be argued that 
the best time for public contribution to decisionmaking is 
early in the process (stage one of the Kasperson and 
McCauley model) to help ensure that planning proceeds 
TABLE 2 









Source: Bruvold, Public Atlitudes .... 
Most Cited Reason 
for Preferring 
the Best-Liked Option 
Adequate 
treatment ............. 0 
Protects the 
environment ........... 2 
Protects 
public health .......... 3 
Economic 
advantage ............. 2 
Conserves 
water ................. 2 
Controls 
development .......... . 
10 
Most Cited Reason 
for Opposing 
the Least-Liked Option 
Inadequate 
treatment ............. 0 
Does not protect 
the environment ....... 2 
Does not protect 
public health .......... 3 
Economic 
disadvantage .......... 0 
Does not 
conserve water ......... 5 
Stimulates 
development ........... 0 
10 
Overall 







Note: Numbers in the body of the table referto the reasons most often cited by respondents for preferring the best-liked option and for opposing the 
least-liked. For example, in Livermore. the local irrigation option was best liked because it controlled urban development and the discharge option 











Schematic Outline Showing Community Adoption 
of Wastewater Treatment and Reuse Projects 
Major steps formally required in 
California (SWRCB, 1976) 
1. Technical Component Planning 
2. Political Component Planning 
3. Public Sector Ratification 
Blow up of Step I option 
development and selection 
( Kasperson et a!., 1974) 
Source: Bruvold, Public Altitudes . ... 
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on a course that is acceptable to a majority. Democracy is 
based in part on an assumption that governance is better 
when there is active involvement of an informed popu-
lace. If this is true in principle, it would be improper to put 
off or delay the community's participation. 
The opposing argument is that the ordinary voter lacks 
the technical expertise necessary to formulate options for 
wastewater management or to judge which is best. In this 
view, lack of technological expertise on the part of the 
voting population poses very serious impediments to the 
early involvement of voters in the planning process. Fur-
ther, it may be argued that most people, even if capable of 
understanding the basics of the technology, are neither 
interested in nor have the time for systematic analysis and 
assessment of options. 
2. On behalf of the second approach-public involve-
ment after planning is complete-such participation can 
best come much later in the decisionmaking process, 
when the option selected by technological experts is to be 
ratified (e.g., a vote on a local bond issue). This allows 
technological and professional experts to do the kinds of 
planning and analysis that require their expertise. These 
individuals select and develop options, decide which of 
several possibilities is best, and then present the one 
selected to the voting public for ratification. With only 
one choice, the voters must simply approve or reject the 
single option the technological experts and politicians 
have selected. It may be argued that this approach 
preserves democratic principles, while allowing techno-
logical personnel to do technological work. 
One major problem with this approach, however, is 
that it frequently results in conflict and failure. Most local 
bond issues are at best hard to pass in an era of fiscal stress 
and double-digit inflation. Moreover local bond elections 
and attempts to finance advanced wastewater treatment 
by other means can also lead to serious difficulties.6 Thus 
when the technical experts and professional planners 
choose wastewater treatment and reuse projects they 
must be extremely careful to select those that have 
substantial public approval. Otherwise the support 
needed to finance construction and operation may not be 
forthcoming. It can also be argued that a yes-or-no vote 
on a single option chosen by experts weighs too heavily in 
favor of technocratic expertise, and gives too limited a 
role to democratic processes and participation. While 
most voters admittedly are not expert enough to analyze 
options, they may be quite able to understand the options 
and the option analyses developed by the technical 
experts, when this information is presented using clear, 
non-jargon language. 
3. A number of arguments can be advanced to support 
the third approach, which attempts to balance technical 
and democratic imperatives, while also helping ensure 
greater success in the polling booths. Under this approach 
the technical and political participants are to select a 
small number of options for wastewater treatment and 
reuse that (I) seem feasible for the area, and (2) deliber-
86 
ately represent divergent or different combinations of 
reclamation and reuse. Careful comparative analyses of 
the options by the technical experts and planning profes-
sionals would be translated into lay language, and 
presented to voters for their reaction and input, before 
either deciding on the chosen option or going on to a 
formal public ratification. While this procedure would 
not require each voter to become expert in wastewater 
reclamation and reuse, it would also not postpone public 
involvement until the very last. 
Arguments against this approach center on its practi-
cality. Can it actually be done, and if so, how? Will it be 
successful? The present study suggests two ways of 
implementing this approach, permitting the technology 
sector to assess risks and efficiency, while the public 
sector evaluates safety and community benefits, as 
recommended by Lowrance.7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The methodology underlying the present study is a 
workable procedure for obtaining public reaction to 
several options developed by technical experts. Thus a 
carefully drawn sample of respondents can test the 
opinion of the affected voting population, and can give 
results that are reasonably accurate. The brief educa-
tional effort required by such a survey would not be 
extensive, and care can be taken to make it factual, fair, 
complete and systematic. The results of carefully done 
.polls would be useful to the political decisionmakers 
(shown on the right of Table 3) and could surely reach 
more of the public than the present minimal involvement 
in reviewing environmental impact reports.8 
Another way of using this methodology would involve 
all voters in the decisionmaking process, after they had 
been exposed to an informational campaign and debate 
covering the several options developed by the profes-
sionals. Information on several wastewater treatment and 
reuse options would be widely disseminated, followed by 
an advisory referendum, perhaps conducted in connec-
tion with a local or county election. Each voter could be 
sent information that carefully and systematically de-
scribes the treatment and use for three or four viable 
options. Informed comments on environmental, health, 
and economic impacts associated with each option would 
be included. All of this would be done in lay language, 
supported by simple maps and charts as needed. Position 
statements on various options by interested groups could 
also be included. The mailing could be followed by public 
meetings, TV and radio coverage of debates;newspaper 
articles, and the like, to arouse interest and supplement 
the written information. 
The advisory referendum could appear, possibly at the 
end of the regular election ballot, asking each voter to 
indicate "yes" or "no" to each option. The results should 
be highly indicative of voter sentiment, being an ex pres-
sion of voters actually participating in local elections. 
This could then be considered by the local political 
leadership in choosing the option to be presented for~ 
formal ratification. While either the poll or the advisory 
referendum would cost money and complicate the plan-
ning process, they could be much less costly in money and 
confidence than failed bond elections, or recall campaigns 
brought against elected public officials by disgruntled 
citizens. 
The present study indicated that a majority of respon-
dents would like to be involved in water-reuse option 
selection in meaningful ways. Public participation 
through public hearings is limited, because such hearings 
are usually not well attended by citizens, and may be 
dominated by various interest groups that do not neces-
sarily represent the voting public. In short, public hear-
ings, while essential, do not seem to provide an effective 
vehicle for public participation in choosing options. 
Accordingly either the special poll or the advisory 
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referendum are recommended as better ways of imple-
menting the recommended planning approach. 
Results of these participatory procedures should be: ( 1) 
marked increase of chances of success in local bond elec-
tions; (2) increased confidence in public officials and their 
technical planning consultants; and (3) increased citizen 
participation in local political decisions. The processes 
could possibly serve as models for citizen participation in 
school bond issues, planning and zoning decisions, public 
works improvements, and other similar matters requiring 
voter ratification at a local or county election. 
In summary, a two-step political review and ratifica-
tion process is recommended. The first would assess 
public opinion regarding several viable options, either by 
a special poll or an advisory referendum. The second step 
would involve final formal public ratification of the single 
plan selected as best for the community by a decision 
process that has already involved the technical and plan-
ning sectors, local political leaders and the voting public. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article is intended to give readers perspective on 
Proposition 9 - the June 1982 referendum on the Peri-
pheral Canal and associated facilities - and help place the 
discussion in the broader context of the Delta and the 
state's water system. Most of California's high-quality 
water that is available for shipment flows into the Delta 
through the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and their 
tributaries, and the amounts of water exported are inex-
tricably linked to Delta water quality. That is, water 
quality (salinity) in the Delta and southward depends on 
the quantity of freshwater in the Delta. The interdepen-
dence of the two prompts public concern about both. 
There are no panaceas, no simple solutions to the com-
plex problems involving water quantity and quality. 
Satisfactory management of the ~tate's water depends on 
the outcome of a series of policy decisions reached over 
time, each influenced by considerations of politics, tech-
nology, and economics. The vote on Proposition 9 will 
be a crucial decision in the series. 
The following discussion first presents necessary 
background on the Delta and its role in the state's water 
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system. The article then considers the effect of three sets 
of state policy options on Delta water quality and quan-
tity: (1) the first set of options involves flood protection 
and levee enhancement in the Delta~ (2) the second, 
ways of moving water through or around the Delta; and 
(3) the third, legal and institutional changes affecting 
water management and distribution. 
THE DELTA: CHARACTER AND USES 
Geography 
As defined by statute, the Delta comprises almost 
740,000 acres, and includes parts of Contra Costa, San 
Joaquin, Sacramento, Solano, and Yolo counties. 1 The 
natural flow of freshwater is from Central Valley rivers 
through Delta channels and canals into San Francisco 
Bay. At high tide, however, the incoming saltwater holds 
the freshwater in the Delta. Moreover, if the flow of 
fresh river water into the Delta is low, saltwater enters 
the Delta, reducing its water quality. 
The Delta occupies a crucial site: 70 percent of the 
state's water originates to its north, while 80 percent of 
the demand is from south of the Delta. 2 The situation is 
further complicated because water supply and demand 
are seasonally out of phase, and even more severely 
mismatched in dry years. Supply is greatest in winter, 
when demand is lowest, and may fluctuate substantially 
from year to year. When free-flowing supplies are 
lowest, demand is highest for summer irrigation, 
although this seasonal need is reasonably constant from 
year to year. 
The California Policy Seminar, administered by the Institute of Governmental Studies on the Berkeley campus, is a 
Universitywide program that supports research on future policy problems the state may face. The Seminar is chaired by the 
University PresidenL Its members include the Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the 
Assembly, plus appointees from the faculty, the associated students, and the Assembly, Senate, and executive branches of 
governmenL The commissioned research represents the latest in academic thought about major state policy questions. This 
CAI.JR>RHIA POLICY SEMINAR issue of the Public Affairs Repon summarizes and interprets other work by the authors. 
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PROPOSITION 9 
California's June 1982 ballot will include Proposition 
9, entitled "Water Facilities Including the Peripheral 
Canal, • asking voters to approve or reject Senate Bill 200 
(SB 200). SB 200 was passed in the summer of 1980, 
and would have taken effect on January 1, 1981, had it 
not been delayed by a voters' petition requiring it to be 
placed on the ballot. Proposition 8 (ACA 90), approved 
by voters in November 1980, will have no force or effect 
unless the voters approve SB 200 in the forthcoming 
referendum. 
SB 200 would authorize (1) construction of the Peri-
pheral Canal around the Delta, (2) relocation of the Con-
tra Costa Canal, (3) construction of the Glenn or Colusa 
Reservoir, and the Los Vaqueros Reservoir, for off-
stream storage, and (4) enlargement of the East Branch 
Aqueduct in southern California (see Figure 1 and Fig-
ure 2). 
In addition to these authorizations, SB 200 also: 
requires agreements to ensure protection of 
Delta water quality and fish and wildlife 
within the Delta; agreements to ensure 
implementation of additional surface and 
ground water storage (San Joaquin Valley 
and Los Angeles Basin); and water conserva-
tion and reclamation programs to meet the 
water needs of the SWP through year 2000. 
It also authorizes, separate from the SWP: 
(1) the Mid-Valley Canal to help stop falling 
ground water levels on the east side of the 
San Joaquin Valley, and (2) undefined facili-
ties to transport water to Alameda, Contra 
Costa, San Joaquin, San Francisco, and San 
Mateo counties. (California, Department of 
Water Resources, The California Scare Water 
Project - Current Activities and Future 
Management Plans. Bulletin 132-81, 
November 1981, p. 4.) 
Agriculture 
Two-thirds of the statutory Delta, known as the 
"Delta lowlands," is at elevations from five feet above sea 
level to 20 feet below. Eighty percent of this reclaimed 
marsh is in agriculture, 9 percent is in open waterways, 
10 percent is in native vegetation, and 1 percent is 
residential. It includes 61 islands currently surrounded 
by 1, 100 miles of flood protection levees. The lowlands 
have been zoned for agriculture by the five counties hav-
ing jurisdiction, with minimum parcel size varying from 
five acres in Contra Costa County to 80 acres in 
Sacramento and Solano counties. Agriculture is the only 
industry in the Delta lowlands, agricultural produce being 
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If ACA 90 takes effect, it will place into the State 
Constitution procedural barriers designed to forestall any 
legislative efforts to reduce the Delta water quality or fish 
and wildlife protections set forth in SB 200. Specifically, 
the article requires: 
(1) that the State Water Project (SWP) must 
meet State Water Resources Control Board 
water quality standards to protect the 
beneficial uses of water in the Delta, Suisun 
Marsh, and San Francisco Bay; (2) that the 
SWP must provide water releases in case the 
Federal Government fails to operate the 
Central Valley Project in compliance with 
such standards; (3) that the Department of 
Water Resources, before constructing the 
··Peripheral Canal, must enter into a per-
manent agreement with the Department of 
Fish and Game to restore and maintain Delta 
fish and wildlife resources to their historic 
levels (1922-1967). (California, Department 
of Water Resources, The California State 
Water Project - Current Activities and Future 
Management Plans, Bulletin 132-80, October 
1980, p. 10.) 
Thus, if and when it becomes effective, ACA 90 is 
designed to preserve water quality rights of users within 
the Delta from legislative intervention. The article does 
not affect administrative modifications - e.g., the 
definition of "historic fish levels" - already allowed under 
SB 200. However, it does give protection to the wild and 
scenic rivers of northern California. A later vote of the 
people could change any of these stipulations, and pro-
tection of North Coast rivers could also be changed by a 
two-thirds vote of the Legislature. 
packed in small sheds scattered throughout the Delta and 
then shipped out by truck. 
Population and Recreational Use 
There are four incorporated cities (total population 
98,560 in 1980) in the "Delta uplands": Antioch, 
Pittsburg, Brentwood, and Tracy. The lowlands have 
only one incorporated town (Isleton, population 930) and 
about 10 villages. A 1975 Department of Commerce 
special census reported about 11,000 people living in the 
lowlands. 3 
The Delta has more than 700 miles of navigable 
waterways, with small resorts on 24 of the islands, and 
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two islands have recreational housing (Bethel Island and 
Discovery Bay). A 1978 survey by the California Depart-
ment of Water Resources (DWR) estimated that over 7 
million people use the Delta area, boating and fishing 
being the prime attractions for two-thirds of them. In 
1978 approximately $70 million was spent in the area for 
recreation. 4 That same year the five Delta counties had 
82,282 registered pleasure boats served by 150 marinas 
inside the Delta, and additional pleasure craft also used 
the Delta waterways. 5 
Transportation and Utilities 
While parts of the Delta seem remote, it has vital 
transportation and utility uses. A 1975 inventory of 56 
islands protected by "non-project levees," i.e., levees 
maintained by local interests only, found 37 to have pub-
lic roads, including major state highways (routes 4, 12, 
and 160). Sixteen islands are crossed by aqueducts or 
pipelines, 18 by power transmission lines, and 11 by rail-
roads. Fifteen islands have gas wells, and McDonald 
Tract provides underground storage for both domestic 
and Canadian gas. 6 
Fish and Wildlife 
The Department of Water Resources characterizes 
the Delta as a unique and varied environment that is 
important to the survival of a large segment of 
California's fishery. Migratory fish, including salmon, 
steelhead, shad, sturgeon, and striped bass, move 
through the Delta on their upstream spawning runs. 
About half of the striped bass spawn in the Delta itself, 
and young fish of all species use Delta channels as a nur-
sery before moving through San Francisco Bay to the 
ocean. 7 In the process, the Delta's small young fish suffer 
high mortality from pumping at water intakes used by 
water agencies, utilities, and industries. Pumping also 
kills some larger fish and causes "normal" water flows to 
reverse, confusing fish that are trying to reach the ocean. 
Fish that survive the pumps now provide significant 
opportunities for sports fishing in canals and reservoirs 
south of the Delta. 
The Delta also provides an ideal environment for 
over 200 species of birds, including five major species 
(ducks, geese, and pheasants, which are hunted as game, 
as well as sandhill cranes and swans, which are pro-
tected). There are 39 species of mammals, 19 of reptiles, 
and 8 of amphibians 8 Preservation of this habitat for fish 
and wildlife depends on adequate water quality and con-
tinued plant growth on the Delta's levees and farmlands. 
Agencies Involved 
Numerous governmental agencies make decisions 
affecting the Delta, including 6 local water districts, 50 
levee districts, 5 county governments, the DWR, the 
State Water Project (SWP), the State Water Resources 
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Control Board (SWRCB), the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (Central Valley Project - CVP), the US 
Army Corps of Engineers, the State Reclamation Board, 
and the Sacramento-Central Valley Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board. 9 The Contra Costa County Water Dis-
trict currently uses Delta water from the Contra Costa 
Canal, whose intake is in the western Delta at Rock 
Slough. 
SWAMPLAND RECLAMATION 
AND THE LEVEES 
History of Delta Development 
Before 1850, the swampy Delta islands were mostly 
used to graze cattle. Swampland reclamation was legal-
ized and encouraged by the federal ·Arkansas Act" of 
1850, granting title of swamp and overflow lands to cer-
tain states, on condition that proceeds from their sale 
would be used to assist in reclamation. California's 1861 
"Swampland Act" allowed the state to offer patents to 
those who would drain and reclaim river-bottom lands. 10 
By 1930 the Delta had been fully reclaimed for intensive 
agriculture, the shallow natural channels having been 
dredged to build levees on the natural ridges and create 
new islands. 
Many of today's levee problems are a result of this 
early construction by private initiative, about half of the 
old levees being built on peat soils, and most without 
adequate stable foundations. While they hold, these 
levees protect the islands and low-lying tracts from flood-
ing caused by heavy river runoff, high tides from the 
ocean, and waves driven by strong winds. In the 1920s, 
federal flood control projects rehabilitated levees (known 
as "project levees") along the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin rivers, using appropriate engineering design stan-
dards. 
The Delta Levees 
The levees were originally constructed for flood pro-
tection only, whereas today they are necessary not only 
to protect reclaimed agricultural land, and transportation 
and utility facilities, but also to maintain high water qual-
ity, provide a desirable fish habitat, offer recreational 
amenities, and serve as channels for water transfer. 
Levees are necessary for high-quality water because each 
additional flooded island means that the SWP must 
release more freshwater from northern reservoirs to keep 
saltwater out of the Delta and compensate for increased 
evaporation. When Andrus-Brannan islands flooded in 
1972, 300,000 acre feet of water was released from 
Shasta and Oroville reservoirs to compensate for the 
freshwater covering the island. This release was neces-
sary to maintain the water quality for export 11 
Levee maintenance is in a variety of hands. Mainte-
nance for the Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel and 
certain river levees is a federal responsibility. The Port 
of Stockton has an agreement with the federal govern-
ment for the latter to repair and restore levees along the 
Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel and San Joaquin 
River - this represents about 10 percent of Delta levees. 
In addition, districts controlling 15 percent of the private 
levees have agreements with the federal government to 
maintain their levees to US specifications. These are 
called "project levees." 
The remaining 75 percent of the Delta island levees 
are called "non-project levees, • which are maintained by 
the landowners or by special districts created for that pur-
pose. The utilities and railroads that cross the Delta pay 
a local district tax for levee maintenance, and in addition 
the three railroad companies maintain their own rights· 
of-way. The state has no jurisdiction or responsibility for 
these non-project levees, although the districts can ask 
for state assistance during emergencies, and in case of a 
disaster they are usually eligible for state and federal 
financial assistance. 12 
In 1980, the estimated value of land and improve-
ments within these districts was over $1 billion. The dis-
tricts could levy "approximately $4 million per year for 
levee maintenance... we believe that in many years, 
expenditures have been substantially less... [and] there 
appears to be an inadequate level of local commitment 
for (non-project) levee maintenance." 13 A 1980 inspec· 
tion of non-project levees by the DWR rated levees of 4 
islands very poor, 28 as poor, and 20 as fair. 14 
Delta Island Flooding 
Flooding of Delta islands is mainly attributable to 
increased hydrostatic pressure on already weak levees. 
Many of the islands' interiors are below water level, as a 
result of land subsidence due to soil erosion and compac-
tion. In order for crops to grow, the islands' ground-
water levels must be lowered further. Ditches are dug to 
collect the ground water, and pumps lift the drainage 
water up into the canals, causing an increase in water 
pressure on the canal side of the levees. The levees are 
also undermined and punctured by burrowing rodents, 
wave action in the wake of boats, and, in certain chan-
nels, scouring caused by the increased water velocities 
due to the SWP and CVP pumping. 
All six islands and tracts that flooded in 1980 had 
non-project levees. These six total 30,956 acres of land, 
valued at $45,849,000. 15 Four of the islands flooded dur-
ing winter high-water stages, and two flooded under nor-
mal summer cunditions. State and federal aid of over 
$40 million has been spent repairing the levees, pumping 
out the water, and repairing the flood damage. 16 This 
work is expensive; pumping costs on one island alone 
were three times the land's appraised value. 17 On the 
other hand, a failure to reclaim flooded islands could also 
be costly, us many engineers fear that if one island is left 
flooded, the resulting wind and wave action could hasten 
the flooding of neighboring islands with poor levees. 
93 
Since Delta levees are necessary to the continued 
availability of high-quality water, levee protection 
becomes a crucial issue. In 1969, the Legislature asked 
the DWR to formulate a plan for improved Delta flood 
protection. The May 1975 DWR report proposed specific 
levee improvements to provide 100-year flood protection 
(i.e., a flood recurrence interval on the average of about 
once in 100 years) for 8 islands with urban development, 
and 50-year flood protection elsewhere. 18 A 1976 act 
(Chapter 1302, Statutes of 1976) directed the DWR to 
review and complete feasibility plans for the improve-
ments, including recommendations on: construction, 
cost-sharing, land use, zoning, flood control, recreation, 
fish and wildlife habitat, and aesthetic values. The DWR 
final report is expected in the summer of 1982. The US 
Army Corps of Engineers joined the DWR in this study. 
In 1980 the DWR estimated the cost of complete rehabil-
itation of the Delta levees on 55 islands at between $800 
million and $1 billion. 19 
THE STATEWIDE WATER EXCHANGE 
AND DELTA WATER QUALITY 
The Water Exchange 
Whereas the Delta was once only a drainage estuary 
and a natural conduit to the sea for California's two 
major rivers, increased statewide demand for water has 
converted the Delta from a largely seasonal freshwater 
source for local use, into the center of an immense water 
exchange. In other words, the Delta currently operates 
as a year-round "river" for water being shipped from 
northern to southern California. 
The SWP and federal CVP currently use the existing 
channels and rivers to transport water through the Delta 
to facilities near Tracy, where it is pumped into the two 
canals that take it to the San Joaquin, Livermore, and 
Santa Clara valleys, southern Alameda County, and 
southern California. The SWP moves about two-fifths -
2.2 million acre feet (MAF) per year - and the CVP 
moves about three-fifths - 3.1 MAF - of the water 
exported from the Delta. 20 
When the CVP was built, a short "Delta 
Cross Channel" was installed to connect the 
Sacramento River to the Mokelumne River 
delta channels. (This allows a certain 
amount of Sacramento River water to flow 
into the central Delta.) The CVP export 
pumps (near Tracy) then sucked down 
southern Delta water levels and thereby pro-
vided a gradient to draw water through that 
channel and across the central Delta to the 
pumps. When the SWP added its pumps it 
further reduced southern Delta water levels, 
but the capacity of the Cross Channel was 
not augmented, so water is now sucked down 
the Sacramento River around Sherman 
Island bringing salt from the bay. 21 
Thus part of the water moving south toward the pumps. 
flows through the western Delta in a direction counter to 
normal flow. 
Withdrawals of Delta water by the CVP and SWP 
have tended to exceed the amounts originally planned for 
the state water facilities. 22 This is a source of serious con-
cern, because the quality of the water pumped depends 
entirely on the quality of the water in the Delta. 
Increased pumping has caused severe water-quality prob-
lems due to salinity intrusion from San Francisco Bay, as 
well as scouring of the channels, and reduced tidal flush-
ing of the· southern Delta. It has also contributed to 
drastic depletion of the estuary's fish resources. The 
problems caused by the recent three-year drought under-
scored the Delta ecosystem's fragility and the need for 
careful water quality management 
Delta Water Quality 
In August 1978, the SWRCB adopted (1) the Water 
Quality Control Plan for the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta and Suisun Marsh (called the Delta Plan), and (2) 
the Water Right Decision 1485 (D-1485). 23 In effect. 
decision D-1485 states that the criterion for Delta water 
quality should be "pre-project" conditions, i.e., as if nei-
ther the CVP nor SWP existed. The Delta Plan included 
water-quality control and use of water rights in a single 
set of water-quality standards to be reviewed in 1988. 
The plan is intended to protect beneficial uses of Delta 
and Suisun Marsh water, and deals primarily with water 
flows as they relate to salinity intrusion. 
The beneficial uses noted in the plan include: agri-
culture on both peat and mineral soils (recognizing 
differences between the Delta's northern interior and 
western and southern portions); municipal and industrial 
uses, including water exported to the San Francisco Bay 
Area, to the San Joaquin Valley, and to the Los Angeles 
basin; and fish and wildlife. The standards are set and 
can be changed by the SWRCB. As noted above,-SB 200 
also sets forth certain guarantees designed to protect 
Delta water quality, requirements which - resulting from 
the adoption of ACA 90 in 1980 - cannot be altered by 
the Legislature. These guarantees will come into force 
only if Proposition 9 is approved and SB 200 takes effect. 
The US Bureau of Reclamation, the SWRCB, and the 
DWR are now engaged in negotiation, discussion, and 
litigation over (1) the extent to which federal water proj-
ects are subject to state water-quality regulatio~ (2) 
how much levee work the Army Corps of Engineers is 
responsible for - this depends on whether Delta levees 
are primarily for flood protection or for reclamation; and 
(3) the proper allocation of levee and water-quality con-
trol costs among state and local Delta water agencies. 
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ISSUES AND CONCERNS: 
WATER QUALITY, QUANTITY, 
FISH PROTECTION, AND COST 
All the current water issues cannot be treated here, 
nor are all possible solutions presented. Furthermore, 
each suggested solution implies sets of trade-offs among 
agricultural, municipal, industrial, environmental, and 
wildlife water needs. Each solution also involves 
different combinations of physical and political risks, 
costs, financing methods, benefits, and beneficiaries. 
California's water concerns are much too diverse and its 
water industry too complex to deal with adequately in the 
space available here. Nevertheless, we believe that the 
discussion provides a way to analyze and compare solu-
tions proposed for some of the major water issues con-
fronting the state. 
The solutions discussed below deal with the main 
issues of water quality, water quantity, fish protection, 
and cost Currently, the SWP and CVP water contract 
deliveries for the year 2000 indicate a 50 percent increase 
in volume over 1980. 24 Delivery of this increased amount 
of water would reduce Delta water quality unless com-
pensating measures are initiated, e.g., developing addi-
tional water supplies or adopting selected institutional 
options. On the other hand, if additional water supplies 
are limited, some institutional and technological changes 
could encourage better use and stretch existing supplies. 
A reduction of water export would allow the maintenance 
of relatively high water quality in the Delta. 
Californians are concerned about how the vote on 
Proposition 9 will affect the future distribution of water, 
and what the implications will be for additional water 
development For example, agriculture now uses 85 per-
cent of the state's developed water, whereas municipal 
uses take only 9 percent, and industrial uses about 6 per-
cent Will it be possible for agriculture .to maintain or 
increase its already large share of the state's water, or 
will urban needs for more water cut into farm alloca-
tions? 
There is real concern about who will ultimately con-
trol California's water. Farmers north of the Delta 
speculate that their access to local surface water for irri-
gation may be curtailed as increasing amounts of water 
are shipped south, or are impounded in new reservoirs. 
Many Delta farmers fear that the demands of southern 
California users will control Delta water quality, espe-
cially in times when freshwater is in short supply. 
Further, since various state agencies have conflicting 
priorities, and the federal government also has its own 
criteria for the water it controls, many people believe 
legally established Delta water-quality standards are polit-
ically vulnerable to administrative changes. 
The need to protect the fish that use the Delta is a 
major influence on the quality and quantity of water 
shipped south. Many recreationists worry, however, that 
the present laws are not strict enough, and that under 
drought conditions fish protection and Delta water quality 
standards would get a low priority. On the other hand, 
agriculturalists fear that in water-short years environmen-
tal protection laws will give the maintenance of good 
water quality for fish a higher priority than supplying 
high-quality irrigation water for farmland. 
Increasing competition for public funds and growing 
resistance to tax-supported water development have 
raised equity questions about who pays for and who 
benefits from protecting water quality, and developing 
more water. The public pays a large portion of the cost, 
and we are all beneficiaries. Landowners protecting their 
levees in the Delta also provide some of the benefits we 
all share. In short, determining appropriate, equitable 
roles for public and private contributions to water-project 
financing is complex, and made even more so by the 
increasing number of interests that share in decision-
making about water development and use. 
The fiscal pressures and issue-conflicts are aggravated 
by the fact that future water development will be more 
and more expensive. The era of cheap water is over. 
Not only are construction and energy costs rising, but so 
are the costs of simply maintaining current Delta water-
quality standards. Deteriorating levees, increasing risk of 
flooding, and ineffective drainage add to the escalating 
costs. For instance, over $40 million in public funds was 
required to repair Delta flood damage in 1980, not count-
ing funds from individuals, utilities, and the railroad. 25 
The discussion now turns to several policy options 
that have been suggested to help California resolve some 
of these complicated and difficult water issues. 
THREE SETS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
Three sets of policy options are outlined, all relating 
to Delta water quality and use. The first set of options 
would protect the islands and levees from flooding. The 
second relates to the movement of water around and 
through the Delta en route to the San Francisco Bay 
Area, the San Joaquin Valley, and southern California. 
The third involves institutional and legal changes in the 
State Water Project. Some options are mutually 
exclusive, while others could be combined. 
First Set of Options: 
Alternatives for Flood Protection 
and Levee Maintenance 
These options concern decisions on Delta levee 
maintenance, and on who pays. Research indicates that 
the formation of lakes by flooding of Delta islands would 
call for larger freshwater releases than are now required 
to maintain the SWP and Delta water quality levels. 
Complying with these demands would reduce the sup-
plies of water available for the entire system, and 
increase the need for costly water releases to maintain 
quality standards. The following options contemplate 
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different levels of landowner responsibility for protecting 
their property from flooding, and corresponding roles in 
land protection for state and/or federal aid. 
(1) The status quo is one alternative. Delta landown-
ers would continue to bear most of the protection costs, 
with little state participation, no major new protection 
facilities built, and no changes in institutional rules. 
Local districts would continue the current low level of 
funding for levee maintenance and repair. Federal agen-
cies would deal mostly with navigation and channel 
maintenance, and provide monetary help only after catas-
trophic floods. The state would help coordinate emer-
gency relief. 26 Finally, rates of pumping by the CVP and 
the SWP would attempt to keep pace with the growing 
commitments to water contractors. 
While this option has worked in the past, its con-
tinuation in the face of limitations on future supplies 
means further degradation of levee structures and water 
quality. Certain kinds of fish will decrease and perhaps 
disappear, particularly the striped bass. Delta agriculture 
will either literally "farm itself into flooding" through 
further soil subsidence and levee erosion, convert to less 
remunerative crops (this has already happened on many 
islands), or shift from agriculture to other forms of busi-
ness, e.g., seasonal recreation. Recreational boating will 
increase, and boat wakes will hasten the breach of some 
weaker levees. Loss of some islands ... ill enlarge the 
open water areas, perhaps leading to further levee dam-
age from wind and waves. 
The status quo option will lead to increased public 
costs. Sooner or later urban users of Delta water - from 
Contra Costa County to the Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California - would have to install expensive 
new water treatment facilities to safeguard public health. 
Utility companies using the islands would have to shore 
up their structures, or develop alternative routes in which 
to relocate severely threatened facilities. Local govern-
ments would suffer tax-revenue declines if flood-
threatened property were reassessed downward or 
removed from the tax rolls. Further, costs to state and 
federal governments would rise if flooding forced releases 
of additional freshwater from limited upstream facilities 
to dilute the resulting intrusion of saltwater from the 
ocean. Finally, the status quo could also cost taxpayers 
more than $1 billion, if it were later decided to "save" the 
Delta by rehabilitating levees and pumping drowned 
islands dry. 27 
(2) This option differs from the previous one only in 
that the federal government would severely reduce the 
amount of aid provided for flood relief. Thus, relief 
would be available only if benefits greatly exceeded costs. 
Governmental responsibility for channel maintenance 
and navigation facilities would continue. Under this 
option, each landowner or district would be solely 
responsible for their own flood-prevention programs and 
protection standards. 
Most of the consequences noted for the first alterna-
tive would also apply to this one. In addition, the strict 
limitations on public relief funds would increase the 
probability of flooded islands being left as unreclaimed 
lakes. Clearly, if reclamation costs exceed the value of 
the flooded land, as has been the case recently, individual 
landowners would have little incentive to rehabilitate 
their flooded islands. 
Moreover, further water degradation could mean that 
society's loss would greatly exceed the sum of individual 
landowner's losses. Examples of such losses from pump-
ing low-quality water include increased repairs of water 
distribution facilities, reduced yields from irrigation, and 
greater expenditures required to protect pubhc health. 
Finally, as under the first alternative, a later decision to 
salvage the Delta could easily cost $1 billion or more. 28 
(3) The final alternative under this set of options 
would mandate public and private cost sharing of land pro-
tection, including levee operation, maintenance, and 
emergency relief. This would require agreement on levee 
protection standards, on who would do the work, and on 
how costs would be shared. Once an emergency was 
declared, flood recovery help would come from federal 
and state sources, without considering the program's 
costs and benefits. Maintenance of channel and naviga-
tion aids would continue as a federal responsibility. 
This alternative would minimize or eliminate most of 
the previously mentioned losses of freshwater, agricul-
tural land, and water quality. On the other hand, it could 
increase individual levee assessments, and even increase 
the Delta's share of funds taken from the state's general 
tax fund. Total federal Delta expenses could be reduced 
from what they are today, however, if improved levees 
reduced the incidence of flooding. 
With more public dollars invested in levee protection, 
increased access and augmented recreational facilities will 
be required throughout the Delta. 29 An improved levee 
system could have a positive influence on fish protection. 
Total costs of levee rehabilitation would remain the 
same, i.e., about $I billion. 30 
This alternative would do nothing to inhibit land sub-
sidence, nor would it guarantee minimum water quality 
levels, in the face of increased pumping by the CVP 
and/or SWP. Finally, it would not protect water quality 
from possible degradation during periods of low flow or 
drought. 
Second Set of Options: 
Ways of Transporting Water South 
The second set of policy options involves ways of 
moving CVP and SWP water around or through the 
Delta, including (1) the status quo, (2) a "non-isolated" 
Through-Delta facility, and (3) an "isolated" facility, e.g., 
the Peripheral Canal. These options involve differences 
in quantities of water moved, and the impacts on the 
96 
quality of both Delta water and transported water. But 
all of them would require upstream storage facilities to 
meet SWP and CVP projected demand. None of the 
options would deal with lana subsidence. 
(1) The status quo alternative has already been dis-
cussed, and the problems of continuing water transport 
considered. CVP and SWP pumping near Tracy moves 
almost 6 MAF of water out of the Delta annually, creat-
ing reverse flows and causing stagnation and high salinity 
in the South Delta, confusing many migratory fish, and 
threatening to force water systems drawing from the 
Delta to use more expensive purification methods. 31 
(2) The next alternative in this group is a • non-
isolated" Through-Delta facility, i.e., the one currently pro-
posed by the Central Delta Water Agency. 32 Water would 
be taken from the Sacramento River near Walnut Grove 
and transported into the Delta interior, through improved 
channels of the Mokelumne River system. A pump 
located near Clifton Court Forebay would draw the water 
south, through improved and widened channels in the 
Central Delta, and around Victoria Island. Pumps would 
send some of this water east into the southeastern Delta, 
and move some north toward the Contra Costa Canal 
intake. 
Fish screens would be needed at the intake from the 
Sacramento River, and before Clifton Court Forebay. 
Since this would be a non-isolated facility, fish and water 
could circulate into the branch canals, because the pumps 
would create a southward-flowing current. This option 
would require upgrading of some levees adjacent to 
selected channels. Total cost estimates for the facility 
range from $330 to $545 million in 1981 dollars. 33 (The 
cost of fish screens is difficult to predict because 
appropriate techniques and designs are still being 
developed, but cost estimates range from $100 to $150 
million.) 
Supporters claim this option would reduce flood 
potential (because some levees would be strengthened), 
while providing for water shipments south. It would also 
eliminate much political uncertainty about the availability 
of sufficient freshwater in the Delta because export water 
contractors are interested in high-quality water. Further-
more, they claim that costly relocation ($17 million in 
1979 dollars) of the Contra Costa Canal's present water 
intake would be unnecessary. J.4 On the other hand, 
opponents say the Through-Delta facility would cost 
more than the Peripheral Canal, continue degradation of 
the fisheries, jeopardize water exports, and harm the 
scenic qualities of the lower Mokelumne River. 35 They 
also suggest that operation and maintenance costs would 
be much higher than those for the Peripheral Canal. 
Finally, they argue that this type of option was fully 
reviewed and rejected in previous studies that led to the 
selection of the Peripheral Canal alternative .. 
The Delta's levees and islands comprise part of a 
large saltwater barrier that protects the quality of the 
exported water. Accordingly, the non-isolated canal 
would focus state attention on the levees, whose preser-
vation would be essential to the maintenance of high 
water quality. Fish losses due to stream-flow reversals 
around Sherman Island would decline. Recreationists 
would continue to enjoy a Delta with many channels and 
protected sloughs. 
This facility could be completed within four years of 
approval. Although the environmental safeguards of 
Proposition 8 would not apply, D-1485 water-quality 
standards would prevail, since they do not depend on any 
water transport alternative. 
(3) The final alternative under this set of options is 
an • isolated" water transfer facility, e.g., the Peripheral 
Canal, as provided for in SB 200. This option differs 
from the previous one in that the canal would bypass the 
Delta. Its key feature would be a large ditch through 
which up to 80 percent of the upstream storage released 
into the Sacramento River could be shunted around the 
Delta. for shipment south. This percentage would vary 
with actual stream-flow and time of year. 
The shunted water could be available for pumping by 
both the CVP and the SWP. The CVP would, however, 
be restricted from using the canal unless it agrees to 
Delta water-quality standards set by the SWRCB. Ot has 
also been suggested that the SWRCB might order the 
Department of Water Resources to permit federal use of 
the canal so as to protect fish in the Delta from the 
reverse-flow phenomenon discussed above.) The DWR 
states that the Peripheral Canal could provide between 
500,000 and 700,000 acre feet of extra water for trans-
portation south without degrading Delta water quality. 
This would really be "saved water," because the canal 
would render unnecessary releases into the Sacramento 
River to offset saltwater intrusion due to reverse stream 
flows in its western portion. To increase water delivery 
above these amounts - 500,000 to 700,000 acre feet -
additional upstream reservoirs would be needed (e.g., 
those authorized by SB 200), regardless of the alternative 
chosen to transport water in or around the Delta. 
Planning for the Peripheral Canal was based on the 
assumption that the SWP and the CVP would both use it, 
and would also coordinate their efforts to control Delta 
water quality. Currently, while there is no formal agree-
ment about water-quality standards, there is tacit coordi-
nation between the CVP and the SWP about pumping 
from the Delta. In the absence of a formal future agree-
ment, however, SB 200 would require the SWP water 
releases to compensate for any failure by the CVP to 
meet SWRCB standards for the Delta. 
The canal would be 42 miles long, approximately 10 
feet above ground, 400 to 500 feet wide, and 20 to 30 
feet deep. It would require 94 miles of road, 6,500 acres 
of right-of-way, siphons to bypass 4 rivers, large fish 
screens and 6 pumping units at the intake, and 14 release 
facilities. 36 It would take approximately ten years to com-
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plete if all SB 200 environmental requirements are met. 
Completion could be postponed if these requirements are 
not met. The cost for the canal alone has been estimated 
at $680 million in 1981 dollars. 37 
The Peripheral Canal as designed by the DWR and 
described in SB 200 could handle about twice as much 
water as the present arrangements deliver. Readers 
should note, however, that this additional water would be 
available only if the rest of the. upstream facilities in SB 
200 were built. Estimates of the cost of these facilities 
vary, but would certainly be several billions of dollars. 
Proponents of the canal claim that many years and 
millions of dollars have been spent on studies for the 
State Waier Plan, leading to the selection of the Peri-
pheral Canal alternative. They say that rejection of the 
canal alternative would waste the time and dollars already 
spent and cause additional costly delays to completion of 
the plan. They add that the canal alternative provides an 
achievable balance between environmental concerns in 
the Delta and long-run commitments to ship water south. 
Opponents claim that in spite of all the efforts and 
studies, the Peripheral Canal is not a good choice, given 
the present package of environmental safeguards. Some 
critics claim either that the canal might not be completed, 
or that all the available extra water would be used to 
meet the environmental requirements. Critics also main-
tain that the canal is too large and expensive as presently 
designed. They argue that if the supporting facilities of 
SB 200 are not built, there will be no reason for the canal 
to be so large. Other critics tnaintain that no matter what 
the entitlement arrangements are, southern California 
does not need all the water that the Peripheral Canal 
could deliver. 
If the Peripheral Canal were built, the quality of 
water transferred south would be high. It would no 
longer depend on the quality of water in the Delta, 
because the canal would draw high-quality water from the 
Sacramento River at Hood. During periods of low flow, 
the canal could be used to increase water-quality levels in 
the Delta by releasing water from any of its 14 valves. 
This should alleviate problems that fish have with low-
quality water and reverse flows, and could lead to an 
increase in their survival rate, despite some deaths from 
the diversion pumps drawing water from the Sacramento 
River. The released water could flush the south Delta, 
helping remove stagnant water and poor-quality San 
Joaquin River water. 
But recreationists, Delta farmers, and municipal and 
industrial water users who draw directly from the Delta 
waterways fear that the SB 200 guarantees to maintain 
minimum water-quality standards will not be observed. 
An isolated canal could reduce the state and federal 
government incentives to improve Delta levees, thus 
shifting initiative and responsibility for levee operation 
and maintenance to Delta landowners and local districts. 
In addition, the isolated canal might reduce federal aid 
granted in times of flood, because federal CVP water 
would not be affected. 
• 
Third Set of Options: 
Institutional Change 
Relating to Water Use 
The final set of policy options are institutional and 
regulatory changes affecting users of SWP water. Similar 
federal changes could be made for CVP water users. 
Water demand could be reduced, and/or supplies 
stretched, by such measures as conservation, water pric-
ing, water rights transferability, reclamation, conjunctive 
use, and drainage. Reducing the amount of water actu-
ally used would enhance the quality of Delta water, and 
of water transported south. 
(1) More positive encouragement of conservation 
measures is one way to reduce the demand for water. 
Conservation could be mandated in ways that leave water 
agencies and users free to choose their preferred conser-
vation techniques, e.g., lining ditches, improving irriga-
tion technology, or raising runoff water quality standards. 
(2) A revision in water pricing is another possible 
change. Water agencies have traditionally priced water so 
that it is feasible for users to buy it, instead of pricing it 
so as to meet costs. Present water pricing gives inade-
quate incentives for water conservation. Thus an 
individual who reduces water use does not reap the 
resulting benefits as economic savings, which instead 
accrue to the entire system. 
If users were charged the total added cost of deliver-
ing any "new" water, instead of an averaged cost for both 
"new" and "old" water, people would probably make deci-
sions on water use more favorable to conservation. Such 
a pricing system would require identifying uses of new 
and old water. It would also involve equity considera-
tions between new and old users of water. For example, 
would it be fair and feasible to charge new water users 
higher rates than old users? 
(3) Free market advocates suggest the sale of 
developed water on an open market basis, with prices cover-
ing total costs. Under foreseeable conditions of restricted 
water supplies and increasing demand, different users 
could bid up the price for water until they got what they 
wanted, or were priced out of the market To establish 
an open market, California would have to change existing 
water law and the system of water rights presently in 
effect. 
(4) Water-use efficiency could be increased by mak-
ing water rights transferable. That is, water users would 
be able to buy water rights from others, and transfer 
them to new locations. Under a transfer system, those 
directly involved would be better off economically, or 
else they would not trade. Nevertheless, these actions 
may not lead to the best long-run resource use. 
(5) Mandated reclamation is another option that could 
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increase the supply of usable water in California. Pro-
ponents claim that this option could yield hundreds of 
thousands of acre feet of water at prices competitive with 
the cost of developing new water supplies. Under 
present regulatioss, reclamation would not reduce any 
entitlement under the State Water Plan, but it could 
reduce the demand for the SWP-delivered water. 
(6) Cor!iunctive use, i.e., the combined management 
and use of ground and surface water, is another way to 
reduce surface water use. While this option is now used 
in many water basins, there are some which do not 
require it. Individual users currently have little personal 
incentive to recharge water basins also used by others, or 
to conserve water in a basin (except in responding to 
their qwn pumping costs). If there were different con-
trols on ground water use, the need to transport expen-
sive surface water to recharge basins could be reduced. 
As things now stand, most ground water users can pump 
out unlimited amounts of water, paying only the costs of 
pumping, and not paying any possible costs of recharging 
the basin. 
(7) Drainage has a major effect on Delta water qual-
ity. Accordingly, tjfiuent standards established for water 
that drains into the Delta is another possible institutional 
change. If more water is supplied to the San Joaquin 
Valley, drainage needs will be increased. This would, in 
turn, add to the water-quality problems of the Delta and 
the Bay Area. Freshwater releases are the only way now 
available to cope with such problems in the Delta. Other 
proposals that could help solve drainage problems include 
requiring settling or evaporation ponds, regulating treat-
ment of drain water, or even reversing the Valley Drain 
so that it flows southward into the Tulare Sink. 
SUMMARY 
Each person voting on Proposition 9 in June will 
presumably be strongly influenced by what he or she con-
siders to be the most likely water transport alternative if 
the proposition loses and the Peripheral Canal is 
defeated. This article has dealt with alternatives for 
moving water south, and for coping with Delta environ-
mental problems of water quality, fish and wildlife, as 
well as meeting existing contracts for state water. 
On the other hand, if Proposition 9 passes, the state 
will be given clear authority to complete the State Water 
Plan. In either case, the people of California will still 
have the responsibility of deciding among Delta levee 
protection alternatives, and on institutional changes 
which apply to water issues. 
The Delta is a key water-transfer facility for CVP and 
SWP withdrawals. Consequently the state's water users 
are increasingly concerned about the Delta's dependabil-
ity as a source of high-quality water, and as a major 
recreational and environmental resource. 
Three sets of policy options that would influence 
Delta water quality have been reviewed: (1) levee 
maintenance and repair, (2) water-transport, and (3) 
selected institutional and regulatory changes. (Some of 
these options can be combined.) 
The existing Delta levees are deteriorating. Effective 
protection for fish and the environment is also declining. 
Further Joss of islands to flooding will lower water qual-
ity. Offsetting these negative effects will require the 
release of more freshwater into the Delta. There is no 
easy way out: all the available options - even maintain-
ing the status quo - will be increasingly expensive. 
The present system and the proposed Through-Delta 
facility both rely more heavily on maintaining Delta 
water quality than does the Peripheral Canal. As a 
result, the political vulnerability of Delta water quality 
will increase if voters approve the Peripheral Canal and it 
is built. Proponents of both the Through-Delta and Peri-
pheral canals claim they will improve fish protection, and 
enable more water to be handled than is posstb1e-no1f. 
Official agency opinions conflict, however, on which 
alternative will be the more expensive way to provide 
essentially the same amounts of export water. 
Institutional changes could help solve the water-
quality problems by reducing the amount of water actu-
ally used, or "stretching" it to make it go farther. More-
over, any of these institutional changes could be imple-
mented along with options chosen from the other groups: 
levee maintenance and repair, and water transport. 
The June 1982 vote to either affirm or repeal SB 200 
cannot begin to resolve all the complex and politically 
sensitive water issues. No matter how the referendum is 
decided, a crucial question will remain unanswered: Can 
the Delta's water quality be maintained (or perhaps even 
enhanced) without prohibitive costs, while still assuring 
adequate supplies and an equitable distribution of 
California's water? 
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"Acid rain" is a popular term describing 
precipitation-rain, snow, fog, mist, dew, dust-whose 
acid content has been increased by human activity. It is 
generally attributed to the burning of fossil fuels such as 
coal, oil, and natural gas, in power plants, industrial facil-
ities, and automobiles, producing emissions of sulfur 
oxides and nitrogen oxides. These oxides then undergo 
acid-forming chemical transformations in the atmo-
sphere, and are transported-often substantial ci.isulnces 
from the emission sources-and deposited as "acid rain. • . 
Acid rain was first recognized as a serious problem in 
the Scandinavian countries. As early as 1955, increasing 
acidity was being noted in southern Norway and 
Sweden.l The problem was soon widely acknowledged as 
fish populations in many Scandinavian lakes and streams 
were reduced or eradicated. Concern over acid rain in 
the United States began mounting in the 1960s with the 
loss of trout populations from sensitive Adirondack lakes 
of northern New York state.2 The effect of acid rain on 
forests, grasslands, and croplands is now also a real con-
cern, with the possibility of significant economic loss due 
to lowered productivity. 3 
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Acid Precipitation in California 
California was long assumed to be relatively free of 
acid rain. Winds blowing across the state from the 
Pacific Ocean are free of the industrial pollutants that 
blow across the northeast; there are no large, coal-fired 
power plants in the state; and the Central Valley and 
desert areas contain alkaline soils, which are a source of 
dust particles that could neutralize acid rain. 
But two projects sponsored by the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) studied the chemical composi-
tion of the state's rain, using samples collected in 1978 
and 1979, demonstrating that precipitation was acidic in 
both northern and southern California. 4 A network of 
eight stations in northern California, from urban areas to 
the Tahoe Basin, was set up to record seasonal variations 
in the acidity of rain and snow. The pooled data showed 
an average pH of 4.9-measured on the pH scale that 
defines unpolluted rain as pH 5.6.5 (On the pH scale each 
decrease of 1.0 represents a ten-fold increase in acidity, 
with the neutral point at 7.0.) Rainfall in urban areas 
such as Los Angeles and the Bay Area was found to be 
particuiarly acidic, the pH of some storms being as low as 
2.89, about the same pH as vinegar. These results con-
cerned CARB officials, who, in January, 1981, convened 
a symposium on the effects or' acid precipitation. 6 It was 
agreed that California faces potential ecosystem damage 
from acid rain, including forest, fish, and agricultural 
crop loss. The principal sources of the acids were not 
positively identified, but likely candidates are the urban 
population centers with their automobiles, refineries, and 
oil-fired power plants. 
The High Sierra Watersheds 
Fortunately, California recognized the potential prob-
lem before its natural resources were damaged. So far, 
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scientists are unsure how acid rain may affect the state's 
ecosystems. From observations in other parts of the 
world, however, we know that the small headwater lakes 
of the Sierra Nevada-being relatively unable to neutral-
ize acids-are good systems to study in looking for early 
signs of deterioration. . 
Subalpine lakes on the western slope are especially 
susceptible because their small volumes, limit~d 
watershed areas, location in granitic basins, and thm 
watershed soils all contribute to a lack of buffering capa-
city, or ability to neutralize acid. 7 These sensitive lakes 
constitute an early warning system that may reflect the 
effects of increasing California air pollution. 
A large volume of California's precipitation falls as 
snow on the western slope of the Sierra, as east-moving 
weather systems pass over California's population centers 
and then drop much of their precipitation. Studies of 
acid snowfall in Canada and. Norway have noted that pol-
lutants were concentrated in the part of the snow that 
melts first in the spring. 8 If that also happens in Califor-
nia, then the acid and associated ions may flow out in a 
concentrated pulse, harming the lakes and streams that 
receive the meltwater. The biological activity of these 
especially vulnerable mountain lakes could be seriously 
damaged by such acid pulses. 
Measurement of pH alone is not likely to provide the 
most useful information for anticipating chemical and 
biological changes in the lakes. Before a significant pH 
drop is observed, there is a gradual loss of buffering 
capacity. Consequently periodic measurements of 
buffering capacity are particularly important. A drop in a 
lake's buffering capacity is an early warning of impending 
change in the pH and the lake's biological character. 
Buffering capacity can be partially renewed by natural 
geological and biological processes. 9 It is important to 
measure the rate of renewal of buffering capacity, as this 
provides a useful measure of the resistance of the lake 
and its surrounding watershed to acidification. 
Our research project collected data on the sensitivity 
of these subalpine lakes. A brief summary of our experi-
mental approach and results is given here. (For complete 
details concerning analytical techniques, sampling 
methods, and analysis of experimental error, the 
interested reader is referred to the final research 
report).IO 
The first step in studying selected aquatic systems of 
the Sierra Nevada was to record the existing chemical 
and biological conditions of lakes likely to be most 
vulnerable, thus providing a baseline estimate of the sys-
tems' health. In a controlled laboratory setting, we also 
studied possible changes caused by increasingly acidic 
precipitation. These laboratory experiments were con-
ducted with simulated lake systems (called microcosms), 
to which acid was added. The resulting chemical and bio-
logical changes were then compared with the conditions 
of other lake microcosms used as controls, which 
received no acid. Observations made elsewhere suggest 
that lakes affected by acid rain have elevated concentra-
tions of such elements as lead, zinc, cadmium, iron, 
aluminum, and manganese.ll Large concentrations of 
such metals could damage water quality and biological 
populations. Enhanced metal concentrations may also 
flow downstream and endanger the health of downstream 
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water users. Accordingly, we watched particularly for 
changes in levels of toxic metals in the microcosm sys-
tems receiving acid treatment. 
Water-Quality Studies in the Sierra Nevada 
Twenty-six lakes located at elevations of 5000 feet to 
9000 feet on the western slope of the Sierra Nevada were 
sampled during the spring, summer, and fall of 1980 and 
1981. Many are located in the subalpine zone (basins 
with few trees and thin soils), in national parks, national 
forests, and wilderness areas. As noted earlier, baseline 
data were obtained on pH, buffering capacity (measured 
by the amount of material available to neutralize .acid), 
and on concentrations of trace metals such as alummum, 
cadmium, copper, iron, lead, manganese, and zinc. 12 Cal-
cium and magnesium, components of some of the most 
common natural buffering materials in lakes and soils, 
were also measured. Phytoplankton species (microscopic 
plant life) were identified and individuals counted to pro-
vide an indication of the biological state of the system. 
The pH of all lakes sampled between June and 
October was in the neutral range, pH 6-8. Alkalinity of 
the Sierra lakes, or the amount of material available to 
neutralize acid, was very low, measured at 10 ~q/liter 
(micro-equivalents per liter) to 500 ~eq/liter. By com-
parison, a well-buffered aquatic system has an alkalinity 
of more than 1,000 ~eq/liter. These data are summar-
ized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 3, plotting pH 
versus alkalinity, shows low alkalinities in Sierra lakes 
over a range of pH values. (Note: For comparison, data 
were also collected on two lower-elevation reservoirs, 
Briones and Isabella. These showed both high pH and 
alkalinity, and are represented in Figure 3 by the square 
symbols.) 
Wide regional variations in lakewater metal conce~­
trations were found, with relatively high levels of alu~I­
num (40 to 250 micrograms per liter) being recorded m 
some Sierra lakes.I3 Aluminum is toxic at high concen-
trations, and is easily leached by acids into lakewater 
from watersheds and sediments. In areas plagued by 
chronic lake acidification, fish kills have been directly 
attributed to aluminum toxicity. 14 
The combination of near-neutral pH, low alkalinity, 
and availability of alumina minerals in soils and sedi-
ment, indicates that many Sierra lakes are susceptible. to 
acid-rain damage. These characteristics are shared With 
lakes found to be sensitive in other parts of the world. 
Our study provides a limited data base on the chemi-
cal and biological characteristics of a group of vulnerable 
Sierra lakes. In the future, field monitoring of selected 
lakes needs to be continued regularly, to watch for gra-
dual changes in lakewater chemistry that could warn of 
ecosystem acidification. Especially important is monitor-
ing of lakewater chemistry during snowmelt, when the 
lakes may be most vulnerable to acid stress. 
Experimental Studies of Lake Acidification 
When the field survey found the Sierra Nevada lakes 
susceptible to acid rain, we then sought to determine how 
acidification might affect these aquatic systems. 
• 
Although field experiments in which lakes and streams 
were artificially acidified have been performed elsewhere, 
we concluded that laboratory microcosm research, not 
-involving damage to natural lakes, was more appropriate 
for studying Sierra lakes' vulnerability to acid precipita-
tion.I5 
The microcosms used to simulate the lakes and test 
their probable response to acid rain were 18-liter plastic 
tanks, filled with water and sediment collected in the 
field, and maintained under controlled light and tempera-
ture conditions. By using these small replicas of the lake 
ecosystems, we were able to study the effect of altering 
acidity. Controllable variables such as temperature, light, 
and aeration were matched approximately to the levels 
observed in the actual lakes. Chemical and biological 
interactions in the lakewater determined the nutrient and 
metal concentrations, and changes in the plankton popu-
lations . 
The lakes simulated included a well-buffered Bay 
Area reservoir (Briones), and two high-altitude, subal-
pine Sierra lakes (Mosquito Lake, west of Ebbetts's Pass, 
and Tenaya Lake in Yosemite National Park). Nitric acid 
(HNO 3) was added to stress the systems because of the 
high relative concentration of the nitrate anion in precipi-
tation falling in California. It was assumed that it would 
be easier to interpret changes in a microcosm that had 
been subjected to increases in a single acid anion. 
In each experiment, microcosms were studied under 
various conditions. For greater statistical reliability three 
replicates of each condition were set up for the Sierra 
lake experiments and two were set up for each condition 
to be studied in the Briones Reservoir experiment. 
Because lake sediments are sources of both potentially 
toxic metals and of buffering agents, microcosms were 
set up with and without lake sediments. Some of the 
microcosms were stressed with enough acid to bring the 
system down to pH 4, an acidified state. Following this 
one-time acid addition, resembling the acid stress 
observed in Scandinavia and the Adirondacks during 
snowmelt, several variables were measured weekly over a 
seven-weeks experimental period: (1) pH, (2) alkalinity, 
(3) metal concentrations in the water, and (4) phyto-
plankton and zooplankton (animal life of the plankton) 
species and numbers. To demonstrate that inadvertent 
metal contamination did not occur in the laboratory, dis-
tilled water controls were set up in parallel with the lake 
microcosms, and metal concentrations were measured 
weekly in these controls. 
Chemical and Biological Changes 
Due to the comparative lack of buffering materials in 
the water and sediment, the Sierra lake microcosms 
recovered slowly or not at all after they were treated with 
acid (see Figure 4, Mosquito Lake, and Figure 5, Tenaya 
Lake). The Mosquito Lake systems recovered slightly--
the pH increased to about 5. This could be attributed to 
the buffering capacity of the fine-grained organic sedi-
ments. These sediments are characteristic of lower-
elevation lakes in forested basins and have a greate: 
buffering capacity than the coarse-grained gravel sedi-
ments of high-elevation lakes such as Tenaya. 
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Over a number of years vulnerable lakes may gradu-
ally lose the ability to buffer acid because the buffering 
capacity may be partially used up during the successive 
snowmelt acid pulses. These subtle changes in lake 
chemistry may not become obvious until a lake's alkalin-
ity is exhausted, producing a sudden pH drop. Figure 6 
charts the exhaustion of buffering capacity in an experi-
ment using water and sediments from Briones Reservoir. 
Here, acid was added at weeks 0, 2, and 4, depressing the 
pH to 4 each time. In each instance the pH begins a 
recovery towards the baseline, but the alkalinity remains 
depressed (between 0 and 150 ~J.eq/Iiter). Moreover, pH 
and alkalinity recovery is weaker following each succes-
sive acid addition. 
These pH and alkalinity changes after acidification are 
only some of the complex chemical reactions caused by 
such stress. Acid can also cause the release of metals, 
from sediment and suspended particles. For example, 
Figures 7-9 summarize the levels of dissolved aluminum, 
iron and manganese released during the Mosquito Lake 
microcosm experiment.l6 
Phytoplankton and zooplankton populations 
responded to acid in various ways. Generally the counts 
of ·individuals and numbers of species decreased in the 
acid-stressed systems, although the magnitude of the 
effect was more pronounced on zooplankton populations 
than on phytoplankton populations. In some cases acid 
did not cause a decrease in the populations, but instead 
suppressed the population blooms observed in the 
unacidified controls. (Because nitric acid supplies the 
nitrate ion, a nutrient for algae, some scientists have 
speculated that acidification might enhance algal growth. 
Indeed, for one species-a filamentous green alga-a 
bloom was encouraged in the acidified microcosms of 
Tenaya Lake.) 17 
Summary of Experimental Results 
In summary, these experiments have identified some 
of the variables that change significantly during 
acidification. Large decreases in pH cause significant 
increases of certain metals that are toxic at high concen-
trations. The acidified systems also exhibited significant 
biological effects, with some species being favored over 
others. By monitoring these variables in real lakes, 
changes in ecosystems due to acidic deposition can be 
identified. Admittedly in these experiments the lake 
microcosms were acidified suddenly, while in the field 
this process may take years or decades. Nevertheless, 
the diagnostic variables identified can help in recognizing 
early signs of lake damage due to acidification. 
Acid-induced biological and chemical changes can 
progressively alter freshwater lake systems. The greatest 
threats to Sierra lakes are (1) loss of the already small 
buffering capacity, leading to chronic lake acidification, 
(2) toxic effects of increased acidity on organisms, and 
(3) indirect and synergistic toxic effects on organisms, 
including man, due to metals leached from watershed 
soils or sediment because of increasingly acid rainfall and 
snowmelt. 
Recommendations: Monitoring, Research, and Regula-
tion 
The sensitive Sierra lakes will almost inevitably 
deteriorate if they are exposed to acid rain. Their chem-
istry and biology will change as their buffering capacity is 
depleted. 
Changes in these sensitive systems due to acid rain 
may also serve as a warning of more gradual, impercepti-
ble changes that may be taking place in other ecosystems 
further downstream. Accordingly, California should not 
defer policy decisions on acid rain until the Sierra lakes 
have in fact been damaged and changes have begun to be 
observed. More research is needed on pollution path-
ways, deposition, and effects, but there is already enough 
information to justify formulating environmental regula-
tions to protect all of California's natural resources from 
acid-rain damage. 
The most pressing priority is a network of precipita-
tion sampling stations to detect variations in the pH and 
chemical composition of rain, snow, fog, mist, and dry 
deposition. Anions, principally sulfate and nitrate, and 
other important atmospheric constituents such as 
ammonium, alkaline agents, and trace metals, should be 
monitored on a year-round, storm-by-storm (or event) 
basis to identify sources of air pollutants and seasonal 
trends. 
We can now only guess at possible sources and path-
ways of pollution affecting acidity of precipitation in Cali-
fornia. Without better understanding of the atmospheric 
pathways of pollutant dispersal, it will be difficult to make 
informed policy decisions about power plant siting. We 
know that the mountain lakes are sensitive to acid depo-
sition, but we do not yet know how to predict the 
amount of acid deposition that will reach the Sierra 
Nevada from fossil-fuel power plants located at alterna-
tive sites within the state. Monitoring the chemistry of 
precipitation provides insight into the atmospheric path-
ways for pollutant dispersal from existing sources, but 
provides little direct information about the consequences 
of locating new sources in areas where there are now no 
sources of pollution. Developing the ability to predict 
these consequences will require the combined research 
skills of atmospheric chemists and meteorologists. Such 
an interdisciplinary effort is currently in progress at the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. 
Another pressing priority for California is a Jake-
monitoring network in the Sierra Nevada. Water quality 
is important because these lakes are used for recreation, 
fishing, and as sources of agricultural and municipal 
water supplies. Without monitoring, important changes 
in lakewater chemistry could go undetected until the 
lakes are damaged. 
Large changes in pH, alkalinity and dissolved metals 
have been observed when snowmelt enters adversely 
affected Adirondack and Scandinavian lakes. Any moni-
toring scheme should emphasize the snowmelt period to 
see if similar changes in water chemistry occur in Califor-
nia. Studying snowpack chemistry may also alert us to 
changes in the precipitation chemistry in the Sierra 
Nevada where most of the precipitation falls as snow. 
Because acidification can cause increased toxic metal con-
centrations in the water, it is also important to monitor 
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background metal levels, and to identify the major 
sources of toxic metals in California's waters. 
Studies are needed of other biological effects of lake 
acidification that are likely to extend beyond damage to 
the plankton populations observed in the experiments 
described here. Microbe-mediated nutrient cycles, soil 
building processes, and forest and fish productivity in 
Sierra watersheds could also be altered and perhaps 
harmed by acidification. 
The California Air Resources Board appears to be 
taking the lead in studying and regulating precursors of 
acid rain, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide emit-
ted during fossil-fuel combustion. In the future, Califor-
nia agencies responsible for regulating energy production 
and for protecting aquatic resources should cooperate in 
studying and regulating potential causes of acid rain. In 
addition to the California Air Resources Boar~ other 
agencies that might participate include the California 
Energy Commission, the Department of Fish and Game, 
and the Water Quality Control Board. Federal concern 
with acid rain in California prompted the National 
Atmospheric Disposition Program (NADP) to install a 
number of monitoring stations in the state. Federal and 
state officials should be encouraged to cooperate in 
expanding networks to monitor both precipitation and 
lakewater quality. 
Despite uncertainties about acid rain and its effects in 
California, existing data cin be used for informed regula-
tion of fossil-fuel burning processes and for siting fossil-
fuel burning facilities. For example, available evidence 
points to mobile sources-principally automobiles-as a 
major contributor to acid deposition in California, espe-
cially in the urban areas. Although the evidence has not 
yet been thoroughly analyzed, southern California 
mobile-source pollution may even be a significant contri-
butor to acid rain in the Rocky Mountains. IS In light of 
these findings, and those on the Sierra lakes' susceptibil-
ity to acid inputs, we recommend against weakening 
present automotive nitrogen oxide emission standards. 
Moreover, stricter future standards may be warranted 
after we learn more about atmospheric pathways and lake 
vulnerability. 
An improved understanding of the Sierra lakes' vul-
nerability can help policy makers formulate siting criteria 
that will avoid, or at least limit, the adverse effects of 
fossil-fuel combustion on water supplies. The effects of 
acid rain will probably be most severe in high-altitude 
lakes with predominantly granitic bedrock and sparse 
vegetation, in central· and southern-Sierra regions. 
Accordingly, decisions about where to locate large, 
fossil-fuel burning facilities should be made in light of 
what is known about atmospheric transformation of pol-
lutants, and the deposition and effects of acidic com-
pounds in these sensitive regions. Meteorological infor-
mation on the movement of air masses and pollutants in 
California can suggest where acid might be deposited, 
and these areas can be monitored. This information can 
be used in making decisions about where to build power 
plants or large industrial facilities. In this way, vulner-
able areas could be protected from pollution. 
State environmental assessment procedures do not 
currently require that new facilities be evaluated in terms 
of their potential contribution to acid rain. There is a 
precedent, however, for requiring specific impacts to be 
evaluated (e.g., impacts of projectS on energy consump-
tion). Environmental impact · reporting for new 
refineries, and for petroleum or coal-fired electric gen-
erating plants, could thus be required to include full dis-
cussion, using the best available scientific information, of 
the facility's probable contribution to acid deposition, and 
of the possible impact the acid deposition will have on 
the state's sensitive ecosystems. The analyses might 
include information on emissions, meteorological trends, 
and existence of sensitive ecosystems downwind of pro-
posed new sources. We believe that such environmental 
impact reporting ought to be required in California. 
Conclusion 
The California Legislature recognized the importance 
of the acid-rain problem by creating the Assembly Select 
Committee on Acid Precipitation to evaluate existing evi-
dence on acid deposition and recommend legislation. In 
February 1982, Assembly Bill 2752 was introduced, pro-
posing the Kapiloff Acid Deposition Act, designed to 
finance and implement a coordinated monitoring and 
research effort administered by the California Air 
Resources Board. This legislation was passed by the Cali-
fornia Legislature, and signed by the Governor in Sep-
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tember 1982. This act is a reasonable first step toward 
controlling acid deposition and limiting its deleterious 
effects. It authorizes not only monitoring and research to 
define the extent and nature of the problem in Califor-
nia, but also calls for an analysis of possible control stra-
tegies, including emission-control technologies, 
alternative-energy policies, and air-quality management 
strategies. This kind of research and analysis can lay the 
groundwork for effective future regulation. 
Delay in regulation, after the extent of the problem is 
recognized, could mean loss of the valuable goods and 
services society derives from healthy ecosystems. 19 Many 
ecological effects are either irreversible or very costly to 
remedy. Now that we know something about the sensi-
tivity of the Sierra aquatic systems, these data should be 
used in regulatory decision making. The potential for 
significant damage should not be ignored until damage 
has occurred. Even if some of the initial regulations 
should later prove to be too strict, it would be easier to 
modify regulations than to restore damaged ecosystems. 
Through a reasoned consideration of (1) the best 
scientific information on the subject, and (2) the 
economic impact of possible regulations, public policy 
makers can attempt to formulate regulatory strategies to 
protect ecosystem quality. Resolution of the scientific 
and economic uncertainties should result in more 
effective policies for control of acid-rain damage. 
FIGURE 2 
Distn'bution of Sierra Lakes Alkalinities 






























pH and Alkalinity for Sierra Lakes 







0 :# a 
















0 = a high-elevation Sierra lake. 






Changes in pH of Microcosms (simulated lake 
systems), the Mosquito Lake Experiment 
I 
0.7 






11 -----o-----o-- /' R- ----6-----6-----6-----~-- ---....:. 
4 t Ac1d oddit1on 
3~-~------~---------~'---------~---~ 




--. Controls with sediment 
A---A Treatments 
o---o Treatments with sediment 




Otanges in pH of Microcosms (simulated lake 
systems), the Tenaya Lake Experiment 




- Controls with sediment 
A---4 Treatments 
o--o Treatments with sediment 
Note: The experiment covered seven weeks. 
FIGURE 6 
Loss of Buffering Capacity in Briones Reservoir 
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FIGURE 7 
Levels of Dissolved Aluminum Measured During 
the Mosquito Lake Experiment 
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1. See the report by E. Barret and G. Brodin, 'The Acidity of 
Scandinavian Precipitation," Tel/us, 1: 251-257 0955), for a dis-
cussion of some of the early data collected on acid rain 
occurrence in Scandinavia. 
FIGURE 9 
Levels of Dissolved Manganese Measured During 
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2. See, for example, U S Department of Interior, Office of 
Water Research Technology, C.L. Schofield. Acid Snowmelt 
E;ffects on Water Quality and Fish Survival in the Adirondack Moun-
tains of New York State, ReseNch Programs Technical 
Comprehensive Report No. A-072-NY. (1977). 
3. For a complete discussion of possible effects of acid rain 
on forests, crops, and soils, see the symposium volume E;ffects of 
Acid Precipitation on. Terrestrial Ecosystems, T.C. Hutchinson and 
M. Havas, eds. (New York: Plenum Press, 1980). 
4. See, for example, J. McColl, A Sllrllf!Y of Add Precipitation 
in Nonhern California, Firtal Report #A 7-149-30 to the California 
Air Resources Board (February 19, 1980); and J.J. Morgan and 
H.M. Liljestrand, Measurement and interpretation of Acid Rainfall 
in the Los Angeles Basin, Final Report to the California Air 
Resources Board (February 29, 1980). 
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5. The pH scale measures the acidity or alkalinity of solu-
tions, in a range from 0-14, with decreasing numbers indicating 
increasing acidity, and larger numbers signifying higher alkalin-
ity. Because the pH scale is logarithmic, each unit decrease 
corresponds to a ten-fold increase in acid content. Distilled 
water with a pH of 7 is considered neutral. Precipitation is often 
considered acid if its pH is below 5.6, the normal value for 
unpolluted precipitation in equilibrium with atmospheric carbon 
dioxide (C02 ). 
6. See the forthcoming report, "Proceedings of the California 
Symposium on Acid Precipitation" (Sacramento: California Air 
Resources Board, 1982). 
7. Buffering capacity is the ability of a lake to recover by 
neutralizing acid that enters the lake basin as rain, snowmelt or 
dry deposition. The normal pH of Sierra lakes is near neutrality, 
(pH7) but the lakes have a very low buffering capacity (alkalin-
ity) of only 10-500 ~eq/liter (micro-equivalents per liter). A 
lake's alkalinity is defined as the amount of material available to 
neutralize any added acid. A well-buffered system typically has 
an alkalinity greater than 1000 ~eq/liter. Studies of the alkalin· 
ity of Sierra lakes by Professor J. Melack of U.C. Santa Barbara 
also demonstrate the low alkalinity of these systems. (See the 
Proceeding of the American Water Resources Association, lnrerna-
tional Symposium on Hydrometeorology, Denver, Colorado (June 
13-17, 1982). 
8. See, for example, D.S. Jeffries, C.M. Cox, and PJ. Dil-
lon, "Depression of pH in Lakes and Streams in Central Ontario 
during Snowmelt." J. Fish.. Res. Board Can. 36:640-646 (1979), 
for a discussion of this concentration effect in Canada. Similar 
observations in Norway are described in, M. Johannessen and A. 
Henriksen, "Chemistry of Snow Meltwater: Changes in Concen-
tration During Melting," Water Resources Research 14(4):615-619 
(August 1978). 
9. Tnese processes include the weathering of rocks and bio-
logical production, which can yield acid-neutralizing products. 
10. See K. A. Tonnessen, "The Potential Effects of Acid 
Deposition on Aquatic Ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada, Califor-
nia," Ph.D. dissertation, Energy and Resources Group, U.C. 
Berkeley, 1983 (in preparation). 
11. For a review of data on increases in trace-metal concen-
trations in acidified lakes, see the report of the National 
Research Council of Canada, Acidification in Caood1an Aquatic 
EnVIronment: Scientific Critena for Assess1ng the E;ffects of Acidic 
Deposition on Aquatic Ecosystems, NRCC Report No. 18475, pp. 
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